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This thesis examines law from a mainly Whiteheadian, or ‘process’, perspective. Beginning 
with the judgement of Lord Justice Ward in the conjoined twins’ case, Re A, I identify a way 
of looking at law that centres on the relation between universals and particulars and show 
how the attempt to understand law in these terms encourages a dualism that results in a 
shortfall between lived experience and that which can be accounted for by legal 
representation. As a result, much of contemporary legal theory is, I suggest, effectively the 
expression of a continuing concern to ‘connect’ legal research with actual judicial decision 
making, to bridge the gap between rule-determination and rule-application. But, while legal 
theory and legal practice are indeed often thought of as if they were two separate but 
connectable areas, I argue that they are in fact more correctly understood as outlining a 
mutually constitutive process of becoming, interpenetrating and interrelating.  Focussing on 
the position of judge as institutional actor and decision maker, I describe how the different 
types of institutional knowledge that exist in law interact with each other and can be seen to 
be founded on different features of the legal institutional context. Thus, while the 
‘propositional’ structure of legal knowledge is fully realized within formal legal contexts in 
terms of ‘institutions’, these formal legal contexts are also ‘practices’, shared traditions in 
and out of which legal practitioners live and work, and in this latter sense legal knowledge 
has a ‘narrative’ structure. But these two features of legal institutional knowledge sit 
uncomfortably alongside each other. Drawing on several thinkers in the tradition of ‘process’ 
thought, such as Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze, and on the idea of ‘tacit’ knowledge 
developed by the social philosopher Michael Polanyi, I demonstrate how the judge’s role in 
managing these tensions can be seen to suggest an alternative understanding of the nature of 
law and legal reasoning that emphasises creative potential, novel adventure and continuous 
change. This in turn paves the way for a creative reconstruction of law according to process 
thought, integrating Neil MacCormick’s institutional theory of law within Alfred North 
Whitehead's scheme of metaphysical principles and relating his theory of legal reasoning to 
Whitehead’s analysis of the process of concrescence. In this way, I conclude with a 
presentation of the thesis in thoroughly Whiteheadian terms: law as process; legal decision 
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Illustrating the Problem 
 
Two things always bothered me when I was a boy. First of all, I puzzled interminably 
over my inability to ‘catch’ a single moment, to identify anything that I could really 
call ‘the present’. I had been taught in school that time could divided up into past, 
present and future and that these three related to each other in particular ways, but I 
had great difficulty understanding how this relation worked. I could see what the 
teacher meant when she said that the past was ‘what was over’: it was like the road 
already travelled, similar to the long stretch of grey tarmac that I could see out of the 
back window of my father’s car as he drove along. The future, too, I could 
understand: it was like the road ahead, perhaps less clear because as yet untravelled 
but able to be anticipated nonetheless. But what of the present? How was that to be 
understood? Was it the road beneath? My problem was that because the car was 
always moving I couldn’t fix on anything that I could identify as ‘the road beneath’. 
Of course, I tried to anticipate the road ahead as it appeared to move towards me 
(made a little easier by the way it was structured with a series of telegraph poles), but 
every time I tried to say ‘now’ it immediately became ‘then’, and I could see my 
‘now’ out of the rear window. So what was the ‘present’? Was it that part of the road 
that I could see immediately behind, that we’d just passed over? It couldn’t be: that 
was ‘past’. Every time I tried to think of this I became very confused. It seemed like 
everything was changing just a little too quickly for me. Nothing was standing still.    
 
The second illustration takes place the day I came home from school after 
being told for the first time about fractions and dividing. I remember sitting down in 
a chair, puzzled, repeatedly drawing my finger slowly to the arm of the chair and 
thinking all the time: ‘If I bring my finger down to the armrest I can touch it. I know 
this because if I continue to press then my finger gets sore and it makes a mark on 
the armrest’. Yet the teacher had only just finished telling us about fractions, and she 
had explained how, if you keep on halving something, you will always have 
something left to half that can itself be halved, and so on. ‘So’, I asked myself, ‘am I 
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not always, at some point, halving the distance between my finger and the armrest? 
How, then, can the two ever meet?’ At that early age I could find no way out of this: 
I concluded that either there must be something wrong with the halving rule, or my 
finger must never actually touch the surface of the chair. Yet when I tried it with a 
bowl of water, my finger definitely got wet! 
 
In thinking about law, I am continually drawn back to this childhood puzzle, 
for traditional approaches to the meaning and practice of law appear beset by this 
problem, forever stumbling on the same difficulty. In seeking to address the events 
and circumstances of human experience by means of legal representations of these 
events, law abstracts from and ‘freezes’ what is essentially a continuously moving 
and changing flow, progressing by way of a series of static representations of this 
experience, a collection of ‘snapshots’ of an otherwise ever-changing reality. But, of 
course, as we know, reality is not static; it only conveniently appears that way. Even 
the mountains that give the impression of standing firm forever do actually change 
over time (as, indeed, advances in photography and technology, which supposedly 
‘speed up’ time, demonstrate consistently).  
 
This connects with my second puzzle, for if law is, as it is commonly 
supposed to be, a way of understanding reality that involves abstraction for the 
purposes of representation, a reduction to role and rule achieved through the 
application of general rules to particular concrete facts, events and circumstances, 
then how does it not come up against exactly the same problem as my childhood 
experiment with the application of the halving rule to the continuous action of my 
finger towards the arm of the chair? If, in my earlier experiment, the difficulty with 
the application of the universal rule to the particular facts is that it always results in a 
‘gap’, then why should this be any different for law, since law also seeks to achieve 
its purposes through the application of universal rules to particular facts, events and 
circumstances? Moreover, if this is so, then how is this crossing of the gap achieved 
in law, and, if not by legal means, what does this tell us about the legal decision 




This question of the relationship between universals and particulars against 
the backdrop of an understanding of reality as constituted by continuous change is 
really what is at the heart of this doctoral research project. Here, I attempt to examine 
legal reasoning from a ‘process’ point of view, beginning with an understanding of 
reality that necessitates a reversal of the normal ontological prioritising of stability 
over change, asking what it might mean to represent law in these terms. Identifying a 
way of looking at law and legal reasoning that centres on the relation of particulars to 
universals, I focus on the problem of finding justifying reasons for legal decisions in 
hard cases. The difficulties involved in attempting to articulate the legal decision-
making experience in this way are well documented in the contemporary literature, 
being variously described as ‘the particularity void’, ‘the aporia’, ‘the phronetic gap’. 
In order to deal with this, some theories of practical judgement have been developed 
that are inherently particular while alternative theories that give more weight to the 
role of universals, rules and principles, are also advanced to validate the decision-
making process. Between these limits, of particularism and universalism, yet more 
theories attempt to find a sort of via media, reworking the understanding of the 
particular/universal relationship; still others claim that although justifying reasons are 
offered to characterise decisions as legal the reasons that would ground their 
justification cannot be found or given in law. 
  
What unites all of these approaches is a desire to take seriously the matter of 
justification in legal decision making and in doing so each may be seen to articulate 
one or another understanding of the particular/universal relationship. But there is a 
difficulty. Prevalent as these theoretical approaches are, every time an attempt is 
made to account for legal decisions, they somehow appear to effect an escape. Every 
attempt to offer justifying reasons for legal decisions appears at best to register only 
at the level of explanation. Why? I suggest that perhaps part of the problem may be 
that our inherited conceptual framework is tied to a ‘static’ way of thinking that is 
now outmoded. We try to understand by objectifying reality, analysing what we 
objectify. But reality is not static; it only conveniently appears that way. It is not, in 
fact, composed of simply locatable, separate ‘entities’ but is more akin to a 
continuous flux, where things merge into each other and the essential qualities seem 
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to be more correctly describable in terms of relatedness than separateness. So any 
articulation of the problem of finding justifying reasons for decisions conceived in 
static terms may be misconceived in law. In other words, a decision cannot be 
‘caught’ because once a decision is made, it is gone: it is momentous, and all that we 
observe of it is its trace.    
 
In this sense, law can never deliver the reasons to justify decision, since it is 
always ‘catching up’. In this sense, law is always the observation of the trace left 
behind, the multiplicity of points through which the movement has passed, rather 
than the experienced unity of the action. The application of universal rules might 
reduce indefinitely the distance that must be bridged to cross the 'particularity void' 
but, like the repeated application of a halving rule, without closing the gap. 
Understood thus, some gap always remains, the distance represented by the question 
concerning the appropriateness of that universal continuing into these particulars.  
 
So, one of the questions I am grappling with is: in what sense, if at all, can 
this ‘gap’ be closed? How, given the difficulties mentioned, does a judge acquire 
knowledge of any particular set of circumstances and link this to rule-like 
generalizations to formulate a decision? How do the universal and the particular 
meet? My contention is that judges do not simply use, instrumentally, already 
existing propositional knowledge, but they also draw upon the reservoir of their own 
factual knowledge and upon a collective knowledge of which they may or may not 
be wholly aware, and create new knowledge. In this way, to use the same 
terminology, the gap is closed, but not in the obvious way of bringing together the 
two extremes or bridging the distance between them: rather, through experience and 
through participation in a ‘community of practice’, judges develop a ‘sense’ of what 
is going on, of what is at stake, a legal skill that over time becomes instrumentalized.  
It allows them to reflect on things as they are going on, a skilful intuition that they 
develop and use as an extension of themselves to focus on the issue at hand. This is 
what accounts for the moment of decision, and the closing of the gap, and is one 
reason why it is so important that decisions must then be justified by providing 
reasons for the decision. But this intuitive, insightful aspect of legal decision making 
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reflects a knowledge that cannot be told, one that is difficult to put into words let 
alone be put in the form of propositional statements. In this latter sense, in terms of 
social practices, legal knowledge has a narrative structure, to complement its 
institutional propositional form. And what all of this points to, I suggest, is the fact 
that we need to revise our understanding of what is going on here. The supposedly 
unreflective practice of applying general rules to particular cases must somehow be 
transformed into a reflective one. The skill of legal decision making needs to be 
augmented by an understanding of what judges are doing when they practice that 
skill. Since what we know and how we know are recursively linked then we need to 
begin to think more seriously about how we think about things. Thus, I argue in 
favour of the importance of creative personal understanding - a method of decision 
making obtained or employed by judges using the exploration of possibilities rather 
than by following set rules; that is, heuristic knowledge. And what this implies is an 
activity that is as much about changing understandings as about changed procedure. 
It must involve the embracing and articulation of a vision and a definition of a new 
institutional reality and the ability and expertise to control information imaginatively.  
 
So while my contention is that reality is properly understood only when it is 
perceived as dynamic, and not static, my task has been to try to provide a 
thoroughgoing processual account of the nature of legal reasoning to meet this; that 
is, an account that sees everything in terms of process all the way down.   In 
attempting to articulate such a view, I suggest that repositioning law within a 
processual world-view allows a better understanding of the dynamic between 
institutions and practices and provides a more adequate description of the nature of 
law and legal reasoning; in particular, how a legal decision is created, maintained and 
employed within the decision making system.    
 
There is an overriding conviction identifiably present throughout the thesis. 
Since reality must always be infinitely more than our ideas about it then it is 
important always to be critical of abstractions, not interpreting the whole of reality 
by way of only some of its aspects but trying to remain faithful to the totality of our 
experience, helping to show the limitations of our way of thinking and identify what 
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is being ignored. In this way, not only will we understand how the different forms of 
abstractions that we make relate to each other, but our critical approach may also 
help to resolve conflicts of interpretations. This means a continuous effort to refine 
understanding and an implicit acceptance that there can be no final knowledge: there 
is only progress in the process of discovering the limitations of past understandings 
and moving beyond them. The thesis is presented in the following way. 
 
In Part I, I begin by looking at a recent case involving a pair of ischiopagus 
conjoined twins, the questions surrounding their legal separation and the issues 
arising from these to identify a way of looking at law and legal decision making that 
centres on the relation between universals and particulars. Demonstrating how 
attempts to understand law in these terms encourages a dualism that results in a 
shortfall between lived experience and that which can be accounted for by legal 
representation, I examine a number of different approaches to legal decision making 
and legal reasoning and consider how modern legal theorists have sought to address 
this vexed question of the incommensurability of modern legal decision making.  
    
In Part II, I begin to outline how an alternative approach derived from the 
tradition of process thought might be developed to better address the problems 
encountered here. Thus, while much of contemporary legal theory is, I suggest, 
effectively the expression of a continuing concern to bridge the gap that opens up in 
legal decision making between the domains of theory and practice, I argue that these 
should not be thought of as two separate but connectable areas; rather, they should be 
seen as outlining a mutually constitutive process of becoming, interpenetrating and 
interrelating. Informed by the works of Alfred North Whitehead, Henri Bergson, 
Gilles Deleuze and Michael Polanyi, and building upon recent developments in the 
field of organization studies, and translating these to within law, I demonstrate how 
such an alternative approach can be constructed. 
 
In Part III, I develop this perspective and focus on the position of judge as 
institutional actor and decision maker in order to describe how the different types of 
institutional knowledge that exist in law interact with each other and can be seen to 
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be founded on different features of the legal institutional context. Employing and 
building upon the constructionist approach developed and deployed within the 
context of organization studies to illustrate the links between individual knowledge, 
organizational knowledge and human action undertaken within organized contexts, I 
explore within the formal legal context the relation between institutions and 
practices, propositional knowledge and narrative knowledge, and the difficulties that 
arise from these. 
 
In Part IV, I draw much of the preceding argument towards its conclusion by 
demonstrating how the judge’s role in managing the tensions that arise in this context 
may actually be seen to suggest an alternative process-theoretical understanding of 
the nature of law and legal reasoning, one that emphasises creative potential, novel 
adventure and continuous change. This paves the way for the integration of law and 
process, or, rather, a creative reconstruction of law according to process thought, 
relating Neil MacCormick’s institutional theory of law and its associated theory of 
legal reasoning within Whitehead’s scheme of metaphysical principles and his 
analysis of the process of concrescence. In this way, following an established pattern 
of processual thought, I offer a description of the way in which a discrete instance of 
legal judgement is created and maintained within the decision-making process.     
 
I conclude with a brief statement of the thesis in thoroughly Whiteheadian 
















‘It is a dull and obtuse mind, 
that must divide in order to distinguish; 
but it is a still worse, 
that distinguishes in order to divide.’1 
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LOCATING THE PROBLEM IN LAW: THE  




The conjoined twins Jodie and Mary
3
 were born in August 2000 to Michelangelo and 
Rina Attard who lived on the Maltese island of Gozo but had arrived at St Mary’s 
Hospital, Manchester, seeking medical assistance unavailable in their home country. 
Joined at the pelvis, the twins had separate vital organs.
4
 Their circulatory system, 
however, was shared, being joined at the main artery through which Jodie’s heart 
supplied oxygenated blood to both babies. Critically, Mary’s heart and lungs did not 
work and her brain function was significantly impaired; indeed, had she been born a 
singleton she would not have survived birth and could not have been resuscitated. 
After examination by the doctors various options were established, with widely 
varying consequences: leaving the twins conjoined would result in the death of both;
5
 
performing surgery to separate them would preserve Jodie’s life but prematurely end 
Mary’s;
6
 separating only in an emergency would diminish significantly the 
likelihood of a successful outcome for Jodie.
7
 Crucially, although both parents were 
keen to take advantage of the best medical assistance available they opposed 
surgery,
8
 arguing that they could not ‘accept or contemplate that one of our children 




                                                 
2
 Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2000] 4 All E.R. 961 (hereinafter, Re A).   
3
 Real names respectively Gracie and Rosie Attard.  
4
 With the main exception of the liver and bladder. 
5
 For the time being Jodie’s heart sustained Mary, but it could not be expected to do so indefinitely. It 
was estimated that as the twins grew it would undoubtedly fail and bring about other complications 
leading to the death of both twins within six months to a few years. 
6
 Following surgery, Jodie’s prospects for survival would increase significantly and, following 
reconstructive surgery, she could be expected to lead a relatively ‘normal’ life; however, separation 
would involve clamping and severing the shared circulatory system and would therefore result in the 
death of Mary. While it was possible that Mary could, post operation, be placed on life support, none 
of the doctors and none of the judges considered this a realistic possibility. 
7
 The third option was discounted by all parties. 
8
 The Attards were devout Roman Catholics. 
9
 Re A, at 985. 
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In many jurisdictions that would have been the end of the matter, and an 
operation to separate the twins would never have taken place since the parents’ 
wishes would have prevailed. But the Manchester medical experts felt they could not 
simply stand by while both babies died; especially, since in their opinion they could 
certainly save one of them. So, unable to secure the necessary parental consent for 
the operation, the hospital applied to the High Court for a declaration that surgery to 
separate the twins would be lawful.  
 
In the High Court, with no legal precedent to guide and with very little time 
available to form a carefully reasoned and researched judgement, Justice Johnson 
decided to allow the separation.
10
 Unhappy with this decision, the parents appealed.
11
 
However, in the Appellate Court, all their appeals were dismissed: each of the 
judges,
12
 though for vastly differing reasons, finding in favour of lawful separation.
13
  
In November 2000, surgery to separate the conjoined twins, Jodie and Mary, was 
performed at St Mary’s Hospital, Manchester, England. As expected, Jodie survives, 
but Mary died.  
 
No doubt, many people would agree that the ‘least worst’ option was to 
perform the surgery to separate the twins, to save one at the cost of the other; 
                                                 
10
 Johson argued that surgery would not only be in Jodie’s but also in Mary’s ‘best interests’ since it 
would be ‘very seriously to her disadvantage’ to prolong her very short and hurtful life. Relying on a 
1993 House of Lords’ decision (Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, [1993] 1 All ER 821) that it was not 
unlawful for mechanical support to be withdrawn from a profoundly injured person, even though the 
inevitable result of doing so would be death, Johnson suggested that an analogy be drawn between life 
support offered by mechanical means and the natural life support offered to Mary through connection 
to the organs of her stronger sibling Jodie. Understood in this way, a decision to allow withdrawal of 
the blood supply to Mary from Jodie would be an ‘omission’ rather than an act, analogous to those 
cases where the courts had authorised the withholding of food and hydration. Thus, it was both 
permissible and lawful; that is, it would not be murder. 
11
 They argued that Johnson J had erred in holding that the operation was (a) in Mary’s best interests, 
(b) in Jodie’s best interests, and (c) lawful. 
12
 Lords Justice Ward, Brooke and Walker. 
13
 However, none concurred with Johnson J’s explanation of the law: the judges argued that there was 
a crucial difference between allowing a separate life, unsustainable without the aid of technology, to 
fade away after that technology was withdrawn and positive surgical action to terminate life. 
Separating Jodie from Mary involved clamping the main shared artery, severing the twins at the pelvis 
and donating to Jodie the whole of the shared single bladder, sex organs and anus. This positive act 
could not be considered equivalent to the switching off of a ventilator. All three judges agreed that 
nothing in Article 2 ECHR prevented the court from ordering that the operation be carried out: Mary 
was not being killed intentionally since her death was not the object of the operation; it was irrelevant 
that the doctors foresaw her death as a virtually certain consequence of the operation. 
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somewhat less would have sought to impose that view on parents who resolutely 
chose the alternate view, refusing to kill one to save the other; few indeed would 
argue to enforce that solution in a situation where parental responsibility was deemed 
paramount and where the particular parental choice in question had already been 
declared legitimate. Yet this was effectively the solution which prevailed in Re A.
14
 
How, then, did the presiding judges in this case reason towards their decision that the 




Having first established that under the Children Act 1989 the court had authority to 
override a decision by the parents that was not in the best interests of their child, 
Lord Justice Ward went on to question where, in relation to the proposed surgery, 
each of the twins’ best interests lay. In respect of Jodie, this was obvious: separation 
would ‘offer infinitely greater benefit’ to her than ‘letting her die’;
15
 but what about 
Mary? Could surgery be in her best interest? He suggested that ‘the operation will 
only be in her best interests if, but only if, it is carried out in order either to save her 
life or to ensure improvement or prevent deterioration in her physical or mental 
health’.
16
 However, since the only perceivable gain for Mary was the dignity of an 
independent existence which would be short-lived at best, and result in her demise, 




However, constructing the problem in this way immediately gave rise to a 
further problem; namely, since ‘the interests of Jodie were in conflict with the 
                                                 
14
 Somewhat curiously, it was affirmed that had the doctors concurred with the parents’ decision, or 
the Manchester Hospital Trust, in spite of the doctors’ views, yielded to the parents’ request, then no 
action would have followed and no fault would have been attached to either party. But, because the 
medical team were keen to proceed with the surgery, and the hospital agreed, then the hospital 
acquired the right to challenge the parental decision. But if the parental choice is to all intents and 
purposes a legitimate one, why proceed? The court’s answer was unequivocal: once a case is brought 
before the court, it must determine independently what is in the best interests of the child. That, the 
court said, “is what courts are for”’. And so, ‘the parental right to determine the outcome must yield to 
the judge’s independent assessment of the welfare of each child’. Ibid., at 596. 
15
 Re A, 996-997. 
16
 F v West Berkshire Health Authority (Mental Health Act Commission intervening), [1989] 2 All ER 
545 per Lord Brandon at 551. 
17
 Re A, at 1002. 
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interests of Mary, how were those interests to be balanced?’
18
 And, since established 
law dealt only with the interests of a single child, not comparatively with the interests 
of two, whose interests were paramount? Ward LJ responded by arguing that 
although Mary had always been ‘designated for death’
19
 the consequences for Jodie 
of not acting were extremely grave, since Mary ‘sucks the lifeblood out of Jodie’.
20
 
In these particular circumstances,
21
 the best course of action was to sanction the 
operation that would provide the only viable twin, Jodie, with the best chance of life; 
it was not the court’s business to engage in a comparative exercise over the worth of 
each life. Even so, the separation of Jodie from Mary would still involve clamping 
the main shared artery, severing the twins at the pelvis and donating to Jodie the 
whole of the shared single bladder, sex organs and anus;
22
 in other words, killing 
Mary. As a result, a deeper legal conflict, between these medical and family law 
issues and others from a criminal law perspective, began to emerge. 
 
In a nutshell, this was a typical catch-22 situation. On the one hand, in 
carrying out the operation to separate the twins the doctors would have the intention 
to kill Mary, which even if it did not imply any desire for Mary’s death would, 
nonetheless, be murder; on the other hand, failing to carry out the operation might 
just as easily attract an allegation of the murder of Jodie
23
 since both the doctors and 
Jodie’s parents could be seen to be under a duty to save her life. Each of the judges 
responded in a different way. Ward LJ considered two criminal law defences: a 
version of self-defence and necessity. Engaging the full drama of the courtroom 
representation of the twins’ dilemma, he suggested that Mary was effectively killing 
Jodie: ‘If Jodie could speak’, he proclaimed, ‘she would surely protest “stop it, Mary, 
you’re killing me”’.
24
 Besides, he felt that there were significant factors present here 
                                                 
18
 Re A, at 1004. 
19
  In other words, every proposed course of action would result in her death (Re A, at 1010). 
20
 Re A, at 1010. 
21
 That is, taking into account the condition and quality of life, both actual and prospective, 
counterbalancing the hastening of Mary’s certain death with the enhanced prospects for Jodie of a full 
life.  
22
 It is surprising, given the complexity of the evidence before them, that none of the judges found any 
difficulty in distinguishing separate body parts, dividing them between the twins, and referring to 
them as organs belonging to either Jodie or Mary. 
23
 Re A, at 1013. 
24
 There was therefore no need to consider further either the question regarding the value of Mary’s 
life or the value of her treatment.   
 18 
 
that could bring into operation the defence of necessity.
25
 Therefore, the doctors and 
the court must, in this case, choose the lesser of two evils,
26
 allowing Jodie to live by 
killing Mary.
27
 But could one of the twins be sacrificed to save the other? Lord 
Justice Brooke certainly thought so.
28
 For him, it was not a question of choosing 
Mary to die but of asking whether Jodie must also die with her.
29
 Lord Justice 
Walker, on the other hand, argued that what was at stake here was not the question of 
‘valu[ing] one life above another’;
30





Giving judgement, Ward LJ outlined the court’s responsibilities:  
 
‘This court is a court of law, not of morals, and our task has been to find, and 
our duty is then to apply the relevant principles of law to the situation before 




In conclusion, he felt it  
 
‘important to restate th[os]e unique circumstances for which this case is 
authority. They are that it must be impossible to preserve the life of X without 
bringing about the death of Y, that Y by his or her very continued existence 
will inevitably bring about the death of X within a short period of time, and 
                                                 
25
 Namely, that the duty to Mary not to operate else she would die conflicted with the duty to Jodie to 
operate else she would die. However, for policy reasons,
25
 neither duress nor necessity had generally 
been accepted as defences to murder in English Law (see R v Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 
273). 
26
 No relevance could be ascribed to the notion that one course of action involved an action while the 
other involved an omission. 
27
 The doctors would not be guilty of murder even though the operation would kill Mary because 
Mary, however legally innocent, was already causing Jodie’s death, ‘as surely as a slow drip of 
poison’ (Re A, at 1015). 
28
 He argued that although the operation appeared to involve murder it satisfied all the requirements 
for the application of the doctrine of necessity: (a) the act is required to avoid inevitable and 
irreparable evil; (b) no more should be done than is necessary for the purpose; and (c) the evil inflicted 
must not be disproportionate to the evil avoided. 
29
 In conclusion, he argued that ‘the doctrine of the sanctity of life respects the integrity of the body’ 
and, contrary to Ward LJ, that the proposed surgery would return to each twin’s body ‘the integrity 
which nature denied them’. 
30
 At best the future held nothing for Mary but the possibility of further pain (Re A, at 1065). 
31
 Re A, at 1065. Under English common law every individual enjoys a right to life and a corollary 
right to bodily integrity. 
32
 Re A, at 968. 
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that X is capable of living an independent life but Y is incapable under any 
circumstances (including all forms of medical intervention) of viable 




Reactions to the Decision in Re A 
 
With regard to medical and family law issues, ‘[t]here are good reasons for removing 
parental consent’, writes Raanan Gillon. For example, ‘where the parents are being 
negligent or where they have really weird views that would result in the deaths of 
their children’. However, ‘these parents … have very standard views’, he exclaims, 
‘the most important of which is you don’t kill one person in order to save another’.
34
 
Gillon finds no justification for this removing from the parents of their normal right 
and duty to make health care decisions in respect of their children.  
 
Suzanne Uniacke challenges the decision from a different perspective, 
questioning the criminal law approach adopted by each of the judges and drawing 
attention to the difficulties involved in any straightforward application of 
‘appropriate or applicable law’ to relevant or material facts. In particular, she 
identifies two issues: first, it is not clear that the ‘facts’ can be unproblematically 
assigned to type; second, the legal categories are not always as clearly bounded as 




Jenny McEwan, is also critical of ‘the mood of the Court’, and finds it all too 
‘reminiscent of … Bland’, where ‘the criminal law appeared to present an 
inconvenient obstacle to the result desired by all the courts involved’. She cites Ward 
LJ’s observation that ‘[t]he search for settled legal principle has been especially 
arduous and conducted under real pressure of time’ but contends that on one reading 
of the case, at least, ‘the settled principle was clear; the proposed operation would 
legally be murder. The only arduous aspect … was that it was difficult to escape this 
                                                 
33
 Re A, at 1018. 
34
 Raanan Gillon, quoted at BBC News Online: Health, Friday 22 September 2000, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/937057.stm 
35
 Uniacke (2001). 
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apparently unwelcome conclusion … so that all concerned (except the parents) could 
feel a comfortable sense of having saved a life’.
36
 However, McEwan maintains that 
there is something more serious at stake here than ‘the blatant distortion’ of criminal 
law doctrine; in particular, the attempt to disguise the fact that at every point … they 
are engaged in a comparison of the respective rights to life of two human beings’, 
thereby ‘adopt[ing] an interpretation … which relegates Mary’s interests to the 
periphery … .’
37
 All of this, she concludes, ‘enables the Court of Appeal to achieve a 
utilitarian goal (saving one life rather than losing two lives) while talking in terms of 
the right to life and the sanctity of life. It also allows the judges to impose their views 
upon the parents from outside the jurisdiction, although those views are highly 






 highlights what she describes as the ‘problematic’ nature of 
employing rights as ‘a mechanism for providing boundaries between one[ person]’s 
interests and those of another’, particularly ‘where the subjects involved defy 
conventional separation’.
40
 This, she complains, ‘foster[s] a strongly separatist 
agenda’ that results in a legal environment ‘dominated by demands for individual 
entitlement’. In such a setting, law is characterized by ‘an adjudicative function 
concerned primarily with evaluating competing claims rather than with meaningfully 
resolving complex dilemmas’.
41
 As a result of this ‘assumption of conflict’, we 
visualize the twins as ‘competing legal persons locked within a relationship of 
conflict’
42
 and admit a further ‘presumption of conflict’ between them and their 
parents, all of which helps to ‘undermine the strong connection between the parties 
involved.
43
 The failure to achieve resolution ‘via a separatist agenda’ exposes the 
inability of ‘an ideology which conceives of the legal person as radically 
autonomous, disinterested and self-referential’ to engage fully and effectively with 
                                                 
36
 McEwan (2001), p. 246. 
37
 Ibid., pp. 247-8. 
38
 Ibid., p. 258. 
39
 Munro (2001). 
40
 Ibid., p. 460. 
41
 Ibid., p. 462. 
42
 Ibid., p. 466. 
43
 Ibid., p. 467. By ‘removing the power of decision from the twin’s parents … the Court undermined 
the parental rights it had initially ascribed to them’ and ‘the twins became perceived as in need of 
protection from the misguided wishes of their parents …’ 
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the complexity of the twins’ entanglement: ‘It simply does not have the requisite 





But it is always the same with things understood as being ‘on the margins’, 
says Alice Dreger: ‘the study of conjoined twins allows us to see more clearly the 
size and shape of the culture contained within those margins’.
45
 She claims that 
‘attempts to separate twins are driven largely … by a deep-seated concern for 
cultural norms of individuality’, calculated ‘to bring the bodies into conformation 
with cultural norms’.
46
 In this way cultural norms which are ‘often assumed to be 
pre-existing and fairly fixed’, are in reality ‘problematized, negotiated, and then 
reified by scientists and medical doctors at the loci of the supposedly abnormal 
person’.
47
 Thus, ‘[t]he separation of conjoined twins is invariably at least in part an 
issue of the predominant culture’s ill ease with continuity’. To address this will 





Mike Bratton and Steve Chetwynd also see in the Court of Appeal’s decision 
a ‘startling example’ of the stress in Western ethical and legal thought on ‘physical 
separateness as … constitutive … of individual identity’. Like Dreger, they find it 
provides ‘an unusually clear expression of the drive within the law … to “customise” 
human anatomy in accordance with norms that associate individuality with the 
“standard” … physically separate, body’.
49
. But, while the court seemed to assume 
‘that out of their entanglement of body parts, two singleton individuals could be 
"liberated"’,
50
 they would rather ‘highlight — where separation is called for — what 
is lost in separation’.
51
 They maintain that ‘there is a "given-ness" about [the twins’] 
conjoined state that makes it difficult to claim they were "meant to be physically 
                                                 
44
 Ibid., pp. 469.  
45




 Ibid, p. 5. 
48
 Ibid, pp. 25-26. 
49
 Bratton and Chetwynd (2004), p. 279.  
50
 Ibid., p. 280. 
51
 Ibid., pp. 279-280. In fact, they maintain that ‘separation is detrimental to both twins, since they 





 While ‘most "contractual" relationships … are premised on 
arrangements made between physically independent people’, Jodie and Mary’s 
relationship is characterised by ‘an unbroken history of physical interdependence’, 
which means that ‘it does not make sense to pretend that their conjoined relationship 
was something entered into through negotiation, or to treat it as something that can 
be broken on the assumption that their physical entanglement was not negotiated, as 
it were, "at arm’s length"’.
53
 Instead, Jodie and Mary ought to be seen as ‘facing a 
common problem’, where separation will mean ‘disadvantages for both, even for a 
survivor who might otherwise have died’.
54
 In particular, they are concerned to find a 
model that would ‘attempt to resolve their situation without necessarily pitting them 
against one another …’, which does not ‘assume that the twins are the same 
individuals before and after this calculation’. In other words, ‘two individuals in one 





However, for Sharon Levy, the essential problem is of a different order 
altogether: ‘We can talk all day about what the parents should do, and [about] what 
we would do if we were in their shoes, but the truth of it is we don’t have a clue. 
Only if it happens to your own blood can you know’.
56
 Thus, we are drawn back 
once more to the Attards’ response to the proposal to separate their daughters by 
surgery: ‘[W]e cannot begin to accept or contemplate that one of our children should 
die to enable the other one to survive’. How then, in view of this, did the Court of 
Appeal reason towards its decision to allow their separation against the firmly held 
and legitimate objections and convictions of their parents? First, Let us look a little 
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 Ibid., p. 281. 
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 Ibid., p. 283. 
54
 Ibid., p. 284. 
55
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56
 See Levy (2002). 
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Scrutinising the Decision 
 
Arguably none of the vastly differing responses of the judges provides a satisfactory 
solution to the problems encountered in this difficult case.
57
 But, as we have already 
noted, there are much more serious matters than the effectiveness of the Lord 
Justices’ arguments at issue here. On one reading at least, what we are concerned 
with here is not a question about the legitimacy of surgery to separate conjoined 
twins when the procedure results in the death of one of the twins but the legitimacy 
of performing such an operation over the legitimate wishes of the parents. Looked at 
in this way it is clear from the beginning that two very different versions of events, 
and accounts of the situation, run in parallel here: there is an impossible tension 
between, on the one hand, the parents’ real life experience of and concern over the 
plight of their daughters, and, on the other, its medical and legal institutional 
representation; moreover, it is equally clear that this tension exists because these two 
versions really belong to two quite different worlds. The objective events and 
circumstances to which they refer and from which they derive their meaning are 
really quite different ‘entities’ in each, and, to put it succinctly, ne’er the twain shall 
meet. So how do the judges deal with this tension? 
 
In the first place, even though the court had established that it could, 
legitimately, override a parental decision to consent, or refuse consent, to medical 
                                                 
57
 First, while self-defence may be extended in exceptional circumstances to include actions taken to 
protect others (usually close relatives in an emergency), it normally relates to protection of the self; it 
does not normally stretch to include as self-defence actions taken by medical professionals against an 
infant assailant in the course of a finely planned surgical procedure. It is also interesting to note the 
somewhat paradoxical manner in which Ward LJ makes his point.. Having rejected as a ‘wholly 
inappropriate’ way to describe the ‘sad and helpless position’ of Mary any use of ‘the American 
terminology which would paint her … an “unjust aggressor”’, he then goes on to describe her as a 
‘bloodsucking, parasitic murderer’. Of course this, or some similar, description is fundamental to his 
assertion that the intervention by the doctors is a lawful act of self-defence; that is, the lawfulness of 
the action of coming to the defence of an ‘innocent victim’ is based on its justification as defence 
against an ‘unjust aggressor’. Second, accepting necessity as a defence to a charge of homicide flies in 
the face of a century of common law reasoning
57
 and might be considered by many to be the ‘thin end 
of the wedge’ against the sanctity of human life, cf. Palmer v The Queen [1971] AC 814; R v Howe 
[1987] 1 AC 417 at 429. Third, as the House of Lords made clear in 1999, ‘where a man realises that 
it is for all practical purposes inevitable that his actions will result in death or serious harm, the 
inference may be irresistible that he intended that result, however little he may have desired or wished 
it to happen’ (see R v Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82 at 90-93). So, while it may be argued that the surgeons 
did not have the desire to kill Mary, if Mary’s death was the natural and inevitable consequence of the 
surgeons’ actions then English common law would normally attribute that intent to them.    
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treatment for their child, there was no conclusive authority supporting the court’s 
balancing the interests of the two children.
58
 This meant that the court was 
attempting to reason in an area where no law directly applied. It was uncharted 
territory, a paradigm example of what Herbert Hart has famously described as an 
area of ‘open texture’. Lord Justice Ward, describing the dilemma facing the court 
as, on the one hand, a choice between the ‘lesser of two evils’ and, on the other hand, 
a legal and moral obligation not to kill, concluded that ‘[p]arents … placed on the 
horns of such a terrible dilemma simply ha[ve] to choose the lesser of their inevitable 
loss’. Yet surely this is simply to beg the question in favour of the judges’ preferred 
option. Furthermore, concluding because it was in the best interests of Jodie that the 
operation should proceed but not in the best interests of Mary to be killed by the 
operation that then, in view of this conflict of interests, ‘there was no other way of 
dealing with it than by choosing the lesser of two evils and so finding the least 
detrimental alternative’, merely ‘affirms one limb of the moral dilemma, ignores the 
other, and begs the moral question as to which is “the lesser of the two evils”’.
59
 Is 
there no other way of dealing with this dilemma? What about the parents’ argument 
that not killing an innocent baby is “the lesser of the two evils”, despite the fact that 
the baby would die in a few months and even if the killing would save the other 
baby’s life? - Except that argument has already been ruled out under the guise of 
fairness in decision making. Ward LJ has secured this with his declaration that 
because the court is a legal authority the case must be decided on the basis of ‘settled 




Ultimately, then, faced with an impossible dilemma, and unable or unwilling 
to avoid a decision on the merits, the court abandoned its stated position of moral 
neutrality, bridging the gap that it perceived to exist between the facts and the law 
with its own moral values and ‘cloak[ing] its moral choices as assumptions about the 
decision-making process’.
61
 Since law alone could not cross the gap the court felt 
compelled to resort to a utilitarian calculus that betrayed its avowedly deontological 
                                                 
58
 Re A, at 1003: ‘There is no clear authority on the point.’ Per Ward LJ. 
59
 See Gillon (2001), p. 3. 
60
 Re A, at 1016. 
61
 Editorial comment on ‘Recent Cases’ [2001] Harvard Law Review 114, 1800 at 1804. 
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approach. However, this case demanded far more than a simple assessment of the 
best interests of each twin, choosing to decide in this way also meant that a decision 
had to be made about whose best interests should prevail. In addressing this question, 
the court felt that it was best placed to provide a suitable answer. But why is the 
assumption so readily embraced that a ‘dispassionate, disinterested observer is 
necessarily the most capable person to decide what is in a child’s best interests’? 
What overriding reasons are there to suggest that ‘three people who loved neither 
child were automatically better-qualified to make such a choice than were two people 
who loved them both’?
62
 In other words, was the decision in Re A a responsible 
application of legal principle that captured the ethical dilemma, or a failure of the 
ethical and legal imagination?
63
   
 
 
Understanding What is at Stake - The Silencing of Voices 
 
According to Emilios Christodoulidis, writing in a different context,
64
 cases such as 
this, involving limit situations, are not exceptions that can be ignored for their 
infrequency of arising; rather, they expose the characteristics of the observed 
institution that ordinary cases leave intact and overlooked. He questions the 
legitimacy of the courtroom as a forum that provides the procedural means to 
accommodate and resolve disputes and wrongdoing. On this analysis, what we find 
in Re A is nothing less than the expression of an impossible dialogue, a non-
engagement with the protestations of the parents that really amounts to a banning of 
the statement of their objections. In this sense, the further (prior) question that 
emerges is not whether the parents’ decision was the only correct one, or even if it 
was well founded, but why it was not and could not be put in law.  
 
This problem is one which arises as a result of the way that we think about 
law. In electing to confront the twins’ dilemma by resort to the legal institutional 
                                                 
62
 Ibid, at 1805. 
63
 See Bratton and Chetwynd (2004), p. 280. 
64
 See Christodoulidis (2004). Although his criticisms arise in relation to a wholly different set of 
courtroom situations and interactions they are nonetheless instructive here. 
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realm, the Court is effectively shifting the debate into an arena where the choice of 
language used always-already selects and prescribes the context within which events 
are to be recognized. In this sense, the official language of the court establishes itself 
as a privileged vocabulary, determining the context and the form in which claims are 
to be made. The consequence of this imposition of the institutional upon the 
experiential is the collapse of the parents’ objection through its removal from its 
living context and its realignment under the terms, conditions and relations of the 
legal context. On one view at least, what is being engaged with here in the courtroom 
setting is not the living reality of conjoinment as experienced by Jodie and Mary and 
their parents, Michaelangelo and Rina Attard, but the highly abstract legal 
representation of that situation and its construction as a legal issue conceived and 
presented in pairs of oppositional terms– a conflict of doctrines, principles and 
values: a conflict of rights between two individual right-bearers, between Mary the 
aggressor and Jodie the innocent victim; a choice between two distinct alternatives, 
the lesser of two evils. On that view, the substitution of context is witnessed from the 
parents’ perspective by the double suggestion of a conflict that never actually is: 
first, between the parents (whose ‘legitimate’ view is somehow construed as not 
being in the ‘best interests’ of the twins and from whose care the twins are thus 
portrayed as being in need of protection) and the twins and, second, between one 
twin (whose actions, however passive are killing, ‘draining the life-blood’, from her 
sister) and the other.  
 
Understood in these terms, there appears to be no way at all for the parents’ 
objection to be heard in its own terms. Within the legal institutional setting, the 
judges effectively control the criteria of what counts as legal and the court‘s setting 
and arrangements work together to construct a context that will cater for the judicial 
as legal but not the living experience of the parents, who are thereby deprived of any 
means to articulate their claim other than as extra-legal. In thus removing any 
possibility of dispute over the constitution of meaning as a stake of the debate the 
judges establish the innocence of the legal mode of expression, and, in positing this 
mode as universal, draw irresistibly both the parents and the twins within the 




Through such devices and steps any suggestion of incompatibility between 
the two discourses and languages apparently disappears and the task becomes 
straightforward, uncomplicated and clear: choose the lesser of two evils. In this way, 
too, any threat to the legitimacy of the court’s decision is removed and the judge can 
affirm the autonomy of the parents as addressor and addressee of their own 
prescriptions, since any ‘[p]arents … placed on the horns of such a terrible dilemma 
simply ha[ve] to choose the lesser of their inevitable loss’…’ If the parents might 
still wish to argue ‘we cannot’ then they will simply be met with the reply, ‘yes, you 
can; for the ‘we’ and the ‘you’ have been universalised, are now the same, and this is 
fair’.  
 
In this way, the unique living experience of parents and twins is confronted 
by the court and universalized in law, but not without a cost: the silencing of every 
one of their objections before they can be raised, achieved through the imposition 
that if they must be raised then they can only be raised in terms that register in the 
court’s legal context. The crucial point here is that in this sense the parents’ 
objections (and the interests of the twins) cannot be said to really register at all, or, if 
they do, it is under some other category and in that sense they cannot be said to 
register in their own terms; therefore, they find no representation in law.  
 
According to Christodoulidis, the only response that might be able to provide 
any normative justification for the passing of a sentence on a citizen is that which 
includes the citizen in the creation of that norm from which the sentencing originates, 
giving her a voice during the processes of deliberation as to whether the norm applies 
to her. He cites Klaus Gunther’s ‘sense of appropriateness’, Jurgen Habermas’s 
‘discourse theory’ and Robert Alexy’s ‘theory of legal argumentation’ to suggest 
how such a response might be constructed.
65
 But, for Christodoulidis, even such an 
                                                 
65
 See Christodoulidis (2004). A related response might be developed on the basis of Michael 
Detmold’s notion of legal reasoning as practical reasoning. For example, he argues that when 
‘Socrates before his execution was invited to escape … he said no. He had no law but Athenian law … 
Thus the law that authorised his death was his law. It was reasonable, Socrates judged, to accept his 
lawful execution … [H]e authorised the law and the crossing of the particularity void to his own 
death’ (see Detmold (1989), p. 436). 
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apparently credible normative underpinning of legal procedures must ultimately fail 
under the weight of its own aspirations, because any objection can only be 
understood as logically cutting across the coincidence of addressor and addressee, 
‘we’ and ‘us’.
66
 Indeed, presented thus, there appears to be nothing within law that 
can account for or redeem the subsequent displacement that continues to invoke 
those who are spoken about, in their absence, usurping the right to speak ‘in their 
name’ after any possibility of their speaking for themselves has been tactically 
withdrawn.  
 
If we accept this conclusion, then we must also include within it the Attards’ 
objection on behalf of their daughters. To be sure, we can see exactly how this 
happens in Re A: first, the right of the parents’ to make health care decisions on 
behalf of their children is removed; then the court, assuming the mantle of guardian 
of ‘best interests’, speaks ‘for them’. Ultimately, the parents’ objection must be 
understood as an objection to the invocation of the ‘we’, but the legal institutional 
context in which they must legitimate their claim operates to deny them both the 
opportunity and the means with which to make it; that is, their dissensus immediately 
puts them on the side of those not seeking the twins’ best interests. Trapped under 
the terms of this inclusion that simultaneously excludes, they are unable either to step 
back or to object. In this way, the path opens up for Ward LJ to speak and he does so 
in dramatic terms. But his appeal to Mary and to Jodie, as it were speaking for them, 
becomes simply another desperate attempt to legitimate the Court’s law as ‘their’ 
law: 
 
‘[Mary] sucks the life blood out of Jodie … [Her] parasitic living will be the 
cause of Jodie’s ceasing to live. If Jodie could speak, she would surely 




Of course, it is quite incorrect to describe Mary’s physical relationship to Jodie in 
these terms.
68
 But for Christodoulidis this is nothing more than ideology operating at 
                                                 
66
 As Habermas also puts it: ‘citizens should always be able to understand themselves also as authors 
of the law to which they are subject as addressees’ (quoted in Christodoulidis (2004), p. 10) 
67
 Re A at 1010. 
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a deep level, where the possibility of raising an objection is always-already undercut 
and the objector is always invisible except as an outsider. Here, with the objection 
that cannot be heard, we have come to the limits of legal possibility:  
 
‘“The objection that cannot be raised” is not merely … side-lined in official 





In this way, the silencing of the parents’ (and, by extension, the twins’) voice is 
achieved with what appears to be little more than pretence: in the name of reflexivity 
and representation we find curtailment and exclusion. In effect, it is really an act of 
‘violence’ on the free flow and expression of opinions and arguments - all that could 
be contested is not actually contested – and the result is a critical shortfall that looks 
difficult to calculate and impossible to remedy. It appears like an impossible passage, 
an unbridgeable gap. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
68
 As Uniacke points out, ‘Mary was not engaged in any threatening activity [towards Jodie]. Contra 
Ward LJ, Mary was not killing Jodie’. Indeed, despite Ward LJ’s insistence that Jodie, if she were able 
to speak, would say ‘“Mary, stop it, you’re killing me,” and that “Mary would have no answer to 
that,” … we can reply on Mary’s behalf, “What is it that you are asking me to stop? Contra Ward L. 
J., I do not suck the life-blood out of you. Rather, it is your heart that is doing the pumping. I am not 
interfering with or impinging on you, either voluntarily or involuntarily or actively or passively. The 
fact is that we share an artery in virtue of which I am an entirely passive recipient of oxygenated 
blood.’ (See Uniacke (2001), pp. 211-212). 
69





JUSTIFYING LEGAL DECISIONS IN HARD CASES:  
DIFFERENT APPROACHES  
 
1. Neil MacCormick’s Universalisability Thesis 
 
It is ‘an important aspect of the rule of law’, says Neil MacCormick, ‘that courts and 
judges take seriously the established rules of the institutional normative order’. 
Precisely because of this the whole business of the justification of legal decisions 
will ‘focus on a syllogistic element, showing what rule is being applied, and how’.
70
 
According to MacCormick, Ward LJ’s final ruling in Re A demonstrates clearly that 
this case must be 
 
‘viewed in law as a type-case, as a universally stated situation … [I]t is not 
some ineffable particular feature of this Jodie interacting with this Mary that 
justifies the decision but certain statable aspects of the relationship between 




Thus, while it may indeed be true that ‘particular reasons must always exist for 
particular decisions’, the real issue is ‘the significance of the justifying relationship 
between reason and decision, and whether or not this involves the universalizability 
of grounds of decision’.
72
 Ultimately, ‘[t]here is … no justification without 
universalization … For particular facts – or particular motives – to be justifying 





This account of legal decision making emerges as consistent with the account 
of law as institutional fact that MacCormick has developed under the idea of an 
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Institutional Theory of Law (ITL).
74
 With this updated account, MacCormick both 
confirms and expands upon the model of legal reasoning that he first presented in 
detailed form in 1978.
75
 There, building upon H. L. A. Hart's linguistic criteria of 
'open texture' and his analysis of reasoning in hard cases, he suggested a process of 
legal decision making made up of several stages: Universalisability; Consequences; 
Coherence; Consistency. Unlike Hart, MacCormick did not suggest that a judge 
enjoys an almost unfettered discretion in decision making in hard cases; rather, he 
outlined a theory about the constraints that govern the exercise of judicial discretion 
when hard cases occur. Nonetheless, like Hart, MacCormick regarded open texture 
as an attractive feature, allowing the law an opportunity for advancement. His theory 
can be stated briefly. First, the principle of ‘universalisability’ entails that the way a 
decision is made in a hard case must also hold for decisions in every such case in the 
future (one must 'treat like as like'; both backward-looking and forward-looking) and 
involves generalisation as a first step towards identifying the relevant general 
category.
76
 Second, an assessment of the ‘consequences’ of generalising allows one 
to balance universalisability, fixing the genus through a subjective judgement of 
value and permitting a choice between two or more possible rulings to disclose a 
likely rule. Next, the requirement of ‘coherence’ operates to ensure that the chosen 
rule can be subsumed under some principle of generality already present in settled 
law, that it is not simply an exercise in creative interpretation but is grounded in 
some general principle of law the existence of which may be described as being like 
part of the ‘glue’ that holds law together; in other words, that what is presented is 
really only a making explicit of some principle already implicit in law such that the 
relevant ‘rule’ may be seen as correctly subsumed under it (for example, Lord 
Atkin's identification of the 'neighbour principle' in Donoghue and Stevenson).
77
 
Finally, ‘consistency’ tests the non-contradictoriness of this rule in relation to other 
explicitly formulated legal norms within the legal system. 
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An Institutional Theory of Law 
 
MacCormick’s Institutional Theory of Law
78
 claims to offer an ontological basis for 
the analysis of all social action, including law. Here he adopts the theory of 
institutional facts as set out by G.E.M Anscombe
79
 and John Searle,
80
 drawing on 
their observations that there are some entities that seem to exist in the world 
independent of our frameworks of thought, will and judgement, which they call 
‘brute facts’, and others which appear not to exist in this way; for example, a goal in 
a football match. We cannot point to any physical thing or event and say that it, bare 
and simple, is a goal, and yet we do, nonetheless, talk intelligibly about a goal. Searle 
calls these facts ‘institutional facts’, since they ‘are indeed facts; but their existence, 





Institutional facts, then, are explicable given these overarching institutions 
and exist within their systemic framework. They might be tied to specific physical 
acts or events but they are not identical with these physical events. Much depends on 
Searle’s distinction between regulative rules and constitutive rules.   Whereas a 
constitutive rule might define what constitutes a goal, a regulative rule would specify 
what one does next after a goal has been scored. The objects that together make up 
the physical setting for the football match assume a new form of existence in their 
being interpreted in terms of these constitutive and regulative rules.  
 
MacCormick develops Searle’s distinction to suggest that legal ‘institutional 
facts’ (such as the temporal existence of a contract between two persons) exist within 
the frame of reference of certain organized activities that we may term ‘institutions’ 
(for example, the institution of Contract that precedes any particular instantiation of 
it). In this regard, three features structure our use of these concepts: ‘Institutive 
rules’, which lay down ‘the conditions which are essential to the existence of an 
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instance of each such institution’; ‘Consequential rules’, which detail the 
consequences that arise as a result of the establishing of an instance of an institution, 
and ‘Terminative rules’, which outline the provisions regarding termination of 
instances of institutions. Thus, the term ‘institutions of law’ denotes ‘[t]hose legal 
concepts which are regulated by sets of institutive, consequential, and terminative 
rules, with the effect that instances of them are properly said to exist over a period of 
time, from the occurrence of an institutive act or event until the occurrence of a 
terminative act or event’.
82
 But there is a difference between the institution per se 
and instances of it: ‘The existence of an institution as such is relative to a given legal 
system, and depends upon whether or not that system contains an appropriate set of 
institutive, consequential and terminative rules. If it does, then the occurrence of 
given events or the performance of given acts has by virtue of the rules the effect of 




So we can envisage such institutions ‘as being structured by legal rules’,
84
 
and ‘[t]his way of conceptualising the matter …makes clear the diachronic quality … 
of our legal arrangements, by virtue of the way it separates or “individuates” 
institutive and terminative rules … “Instances of institutions” exist in the eye of the 
law … from the moment of an institutive event until the occurrence of a terminative 
event’.
85
 This, in turn, ‘makes clear the way in which … “momentary legal 
information” connects logically with “diachronic legal information”. Diachronic 
information concerns standing arrangements  … [from which] one can derive by 
deduction the momentary consequential duties, liberties and powers one has in 
respect of the given arrangement’.
86
 Momentary legal information ‘is normative in 
form. It tells us what ought to or must, be or be done … what can or cannot validly 
be achieved … Thus it is choice guiding’, on the basis of some ‘underpinning value’, 
without which ‘the information would lose its practical or normative quality’.
87
  But 
‘[s]etting up legal arrangements will help us achieve valued states of affairs only to 
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the extent that we have a reason to suppose that their normative consequences will be 
mirrored in actual behavioural outcomes’, and ‘it is not worth much if arrangements 
we make can largely be ignored’.
88
 Consequently, ‘[r]elative immunity from 
arbitrary change is in effect a necessary condition for legal arrangements and legal 
institutions to have the diachronic quality which … is one of their characteristic 
features’.
89
 ‘In so far as legal reasoning can be deductive, the model towards which 
this … looks would be that of predicate logic. Indeed, institutional facts could almost 





Exploring Particulars and Universals 
 
To explain how he now sees all of this relating within the practical decision-making 
setting, MacCormick recalls two familiar stories, the judgement of Solomon
91
 and 
the death of Cleopatra. He begins his analysis by juxtaposing the Solomonic 
judgement and the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re A: ‘the phenomenon of 
conjoined twins … can [easily] pose issues quite as awful as the king’s sword’,
92
 he 
argues. For instance, imagine that before some contemporary tribunal we have 
established the rule that ‘children should be under the custody of their natural 
mothers’ and, together with this, we have also developed some ‘reliable evidentiary 
(DNA) test’. In this event, we will immediately have translated Solomon’s ‘brilliant 
feat into a routine practice’, albeit ‘the real world will always be capable of throwing 
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up surprises’. However, the point is that ‘[o]nce the application of law becomes 
problematized, the problems … raised … must be solved’. Then, he suggests, the 
most immediate issue becomes that of ‘how to do so’.
93
    
 
So, suppose we were to regard King Solomon’s method as the ‘model’ for 
our judgement. In that event, we might consider it right to posit some form of 
‘instinct or intuition’ that would enable us to latch on to the particulars of the case, to 
indicate ‘the answer that the rules fail to yield’. On that basis, our answer in the 
present case might well be thought of as providing us with a precedent for future 
cases. However, precedents can only ever be ‘analogies for new decisions’, since no 
two sets of events are ever exactly the same;
94
 therefore, our intuition might also tell 
us that it would be right to have a rule and to treat the instant case as a ‘rule-case’. 
But even so, ‘anomalous cases’ will still appear on occasion, forcing us to ask 
whether the rule permits a different interpretation or if all the facts are ‘appropriately 
classified’. In which case, we will begin to ‘problematize the rule’s applicability to 
the case in hand’, ‘treating it as a case of first impression’ and directing our intuitive 
judgement once more towards its unique particularity. Within such a scenario, 
exclaims MacCormick, ‘[e]very judge … will have to be possessed of some small 




Effectively, every judge ‘has two choices’, says MacCormick: either she must 
regard the instant case as ‘a rule-case’ or she must concede that it is ‘a new 
problem’.
96
 The point is that no matter how routine the case the judge’s decision will 
always be a particular decision. It is not simply a question of universals but of 
particulars and universals, of ‘particular persons … that … instantiate certain 
universals’. So in this sense the reasons that a judge gives to justify her decision will 
always be ‘rooted in the particular case’, 
97
 but what an intuitionist approach would 
do is help a judge to discover her intuitive capacity to determine the features of a 
                                                 
93




 Ibid., p. 6 (emphasis added). 
96
 Ibid., p. 7. 
97
 Ibid., p. 9. 
 36 
 
decision that make it right. In which case, a good decision-making procedure would 
be one that  
 
‘maximized opportunities [for] careful attention to all points of a problem 
situation, and that gave decision-making tasks to appropriate persons … 
endowed both with adequate attentiveness to detail and with a fair-minded 









In relation to the judicial act of justifying a judgement, MacCormick suggests 
that Adam Smith’s model of an ‘ideal, fully informed, impartial spectator’ provides 
the best example of how to go beyond our immediate reaction to a situation to ‘a 
view that can be common to all concerned persons’; in other words, to a ‘rationalized 
response to the whole of a situation in all its particularity’.
100
 But he also notes that 
any ‘fully developed moral agent … capable of giving allegiance to moral rules … 
derived from generalizing responses to recurring types of cases … would be a 
member of a community whose members owe allegiance to such rules’. In which 
case, any ‘fully refined moral capacity would be something supervenient on a more 
unrefined attachment to rules of a heteronomous character’. Thus, we can see how 
‘judging according to rules’ is not inconsistent with ‘judging in a deeper way that 
confronts the whole complexity of real-life situations’.
 
Indeed, it would seem ‘a 
mistake’ to overemphasize the ‘particularistic quality of judgement, especially 




This procedure is clearly evident in the Solomonic judgement: First, Solomon 
‘infers that she is the mother … Then his judgement is … “Give her the child 
…[because] she is the mother …”’ We have to understand that in the procedure 
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followed here this ‘“because” nexus is all-important’.
102
 So not only does the sword-
drama expose ‘the true mother’, it also reveals how being the true mother becomes 
the ‘reason’ for awarding the child. Furthermore, since this ‘motherhood 
relationship’ is identified as a ‘because-reason’ (‘justifying reason’) in this case, it 
therefore also becomes a ‘because-reason’ for any future cases. What this amounts 
to, MacCormick suggests, is just another way of saying that reasons must be 
‘universalizable’.
103
 That is why Ward LJ, in his closing remarks, determines that Re 
A, ‘however … unlikely to be repeated, has to be viewed in law as a type-case … 
The “because” of justification is a universal nexus…’.
104
 Indeed, it is precisely this 
‘fundamental property of normative justification, … its universalisability’, that, 
together with the requirements of ‘consistency over time’ and ‘an overall coherence 





Causality: Cleopatra and the Poisonous Snake  
 
Causes are always ‘particular events, processes or states’, says MacCormick, and, 
inasmuch ‘as we can discover sets of like cause-and-effect series, we may be able to 
establish inductive generalisations from them’.   However, 
 
‘[t]hat one particular has been shown to cause another particular would be no 
proof that anything else has ever caused, is now causing or will ever again 
cause any other thing.   Just this is what David Hume classically showed to be 
the difficulty about causalism … At the level of … observation of particulars, 
we never observe anything.   We may see the snake biting, we may see the 
queen dying.   But we do not see this bite causing this death.   And if we did 
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Therefore, the relationship between particulars and generalizations is one of 
‘potential falsification’; that is to say, ‘ascriptions of effect to cause require recourse 
to unrefuted generalizations, and … any explanatory hypothesis … has also to be 
capable of forming a consistent part of a coherent general theory’. Thus,  
 
‘[i]t is of course the snake bite, not the theory that snake bites can be fatal 
because of the properties of snake venom, that causes Cleopatra’s death.   But 
what enables us to conceptualise the death of Cleopatra is that the particular 
fact of the snake biting belongs as minor premise in an argument of which the 
major premise is a hypothesis culled from the snake-venom theory and the 




Merely to affirm that ‘reasons for particular actions are both particular and factual … 
does not show … that the link … is not a relevant universal’;
108
 on the contrary, to 
justify an act is ‘to show that … upon any objective view of the matter, the act ought 
to have been done … given the character of the act and the circumstances of the 
case’. Accordingly, for any reason to be a justifying reason it must indicate ‘the 
generic nature of the act and the generic circumstances of action … [T]he moment 
these are stated, an implicit principle – universal in terms – is revealed’. In this way, 
we can see how, for MacCormick, justifying reasons are ‘conceptually distinct’ from 
both explanatory and motivating reasons.
: 
 
‘There is no justification without universalisation; motivation needs no 
universalisation; but explanation requires generalisation.   For particular facts 
– or particular motives – to be justifying reasons they have to be subsumable 
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MacCormick argues that '[t]here is no justification without universalisation ….   For 
particular facts to be justifying reasons they have to be subsumable under a relevant 
principle of action universally stated'.
110
 Of course, 'at one level this is irrefutable', 
says Christodoulidis, '[b]ut it is a level that concerns the delivery of explanation 
rather than the making of decisions’. Moreover, ‘there is an important distinction to 
be made between the two levels’ which, when focussed upon, ‘throws the issue of 
"particularity" wide open’. Echoing Bengoextea,
111
 he argues that ‘universalization is 
only justification a posteriori’; that is, it arrives ‘too late’ to inform or to guide the 
judge. Certainly, the decision will ‘turn on particulars, address questions of 
appropriateness, justify the application of universal categories’, but such 
‘justification of the application cannot draw its reasons from "universalisability" but 
from the appropriateness of extending the universal … into this set of particulars … 
[and] this is a judgement that cannot be carried in the universal category but requires 




In this sense, law can never deliver the reasons to justify a decision. It always 
comes too late to inform the moment of its occurrence. In this sense, in the terms 
stated previously, law is always the observation of a trace left behind, a multiplicity 
of points through which a movement has passed, rather than the experienced unity of 
an action itself. Universalisation may reduce indefinitely the distance that must be 
bridged but, like the repeated application of a halving rule, without closing the gap: 
some gap always remains, the distance represented by the question concerning the 
appropriateness of that universal continuing into these particulars. In fairness to 
MacCormick, however, universalism is really only seen as doing part of the work 
here, even if the greater part, and particularism, as in the form of the appeal to 
consequences, actually concludes the task. At this point, there is always the 
possibility that the judge will deem the circumstances of the case to present a ‘new 
problem’. But, asks Christodoulidis, in the context of decision making in a hard case, 
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when the rules appear to have run out and the judge is faced with what appears as a 
new problem, how, given the prior commitment to universalisation, will she 
recognise the problem as a new one? What provides the cue for her recognising the 
inappropriateness of applying the universal rule here? To put in another way, how, he 
asks, can some particular (or set of particulars) that do not register in law as instances 
of a general rule register as exceptions to that rule? Given a prior commitment to 
universalisation and an adherence to the doctrine of formal justice to 'treat like cases 
alike', how is it possible that any case might be recognized as not always-already 
instantiating some general rule? Are we not simply brought back once more to a 
question over the limits of legal possibility? 
 
We will continue to address this question in the next and subsequent sections 
but, for the moment, let us simply flag up this difficulty and, with it, one possible 
avenue for developing a response. If the pull to universalisation is grounded in the 
prior selection from among a variety of possibilities those features that identify a 
case as always-already instantiating a rule then, by definition, choosing some means 
not choosing others. The issue then is whether those characteristics that are not 
chosen thereby become invisible in such a way that their exclusion also prevents 




2. Michael Detmold’s ‘Particularity Void’: The Moment of Indecision  
 
According to Michael Detmold there are particular situations, practical questions, 
which universal reasoning cannot answer. For him, part of the meaning of 
universality, that the rule is always applied when the conditions of its application are 
met, presents us with a problem. It is not that we cannot use a rule when deciding a 
case but that rules are not self-applying. There is a gap between a rule and its 
application, which he calls the ‘particularity void’. What he means is that there is a 
difference between asking whether a rule is reasonable and whether it is reasonable 
to apply it. In other words, it is in particulars and not in universals that actions must 
be grounded, so that an assessment has to be made each time a decision is made 
whether the conditions of application are met. In this way, a judge cannot evade 
responsibility for her decisions by hiding behind the rules. She cannot meaningfully 
say that she sentences someone to death and at the same that she does not support the 
death penalty, since she must decide each time whether it is the right thing to do and 
also think that it is the right thing to do. In this sense, the particularity void, as he 
calls it, becomes the place where I must take responsibility for my decisions. 
 
To reiterate, for Detmold legal reasoning is practical insofar as it is 
‘reasoning towards a decision for or against action’
113
 and his primary concern is 
with a ‘judge’s practical reasoning towards the action of giving judgment’,
114
 what 
he calls ‘[t]he particularity of adjudication’.
115
 He gives the example of someone 




‘I am given a problem to solve consisting of facts A B and C. I work it out 
and conclude, the defendant must pay damages. My conclusion is universal: a 
defendant in circumstances A B and C must pay damages. But am I right? I 
check my reasoning and conclude I am right. I finish the exam, content. But 
being rather introspective, I go to my books after the exam to make sure. Yes 
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… I am sure. I am now sure that I have the answer to the (universal) question: 
where A B C must the defendant pay damages? 
  
Nonetheless, this is still not ‘a practical answer’, argues Detmold. It ‘will become 
practical [only] when it becomes particular’.
 117
 But is this merely a matter of waiting 
for a suitable particular to come along that accords this universal judgement? In due 
course I am appointed and my first case replicates the case of my exam. As I sit 
alone in my chambers contemplating judgment, why does my will not unleash itself? 
It is not that I doubt my conclusion: ‘I remember my reasoning very clearly’. But ‘I 
now have a radically different problem’, he explains, one ‘which universal 
(hypothetical) reasoning does not solve’; indeed, ‘the whole problem is that no 
reasoning can solve it. It is particular’. It is something of which ‘nothing can be said 




The Moment of Indecision 
 
How should we account for this? We can take this further, Detmold suggests, by 
looking at the confrontation between Pierre and Davoût in Tolstoy’s War and Peace. 
A ‘moment of indecision’ saves Pierre from being shot as a spy on Davout’s orders. 
Davout, holding his rifle, looks towards Pierre; he hesitates and does not fire. At this 
moment, according to Tolstoy, many things pass through Davout’s mind: 
 
‘Davout lifted his eyes and gazed searchingly at him. For some seconds they 
looked at one another, and that look saved Pierre. It went beyond the 
circumstances of war and the court-room, and established human relations 
between the two men. Both of them in that one instant were dimly aware  of 
an infinite number of things, and they realised that they were both children of 
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At first, this appears very like universalist reasoning and indeed Tolstoy seems to 
suggest as much. But for Detmold both the hesitation and the action are deeply 
significant: 
 
‘Davout, at the moment of practicality entered the unanswering void of 
particularity, the realm of love, about which only mystical, poetic things can 





In this sense, he claims, those theorists
121
 who seek to find through ‘the 
progressive refinement of the categories of law according to experience’ a means by 
which to settle these issues, are mistaken; in fact, no matter how ‘highly defined A B 
and C are … [the] problem [is] exactly the same … A judgment in respect of A B 
and C … cannot cross the void … [I]t can justify a judgment … a 
theoretical/hypothetical … right up to the void. But the final rationality of practical 
judgement seems in doubt …’
122
 He notes how Neil MacCormick has attempted ‘to 
reassert that rationality against … particularity’ through a reconsideration of the idea 
of justification. But for Detmold ‘th[is] act of justification is incapable of solving the 
problem for it immediately raises the question, why justify?; and the answer, like that 
to the original question, will be ultimately particular, not universal; so it will have its 
own particularity void’.  
 
Even MacCormick’s attempt to derive the desired universality along the lines 
of Adam Smith’s postulate of the ideal spectator does not successfully evade 
criticism, since ‘anyone’s question is anyone’s void’. Ultimately, what MacCormick 
and Smith fail to show,’ he argues, is ‘how the impartial spectator’s judgment is not 
also incorrigibly particular’. In this sense, ‘[t]here are two questions of 
universalisation’ involved in practical reasoning: ‘The first question is whether I am 
to be universalised to all moral agents judging p … But the other … is whether p is 
universal or incorrigibly particular’. Moreover, ‘it is p which opens the particularity 
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void and casts doubt on the truth of all practical judgments, subjective or 
objective’.
123
 ‘I want to pursue the idea’, Detmold says, ‘that the negotiation of the 
particularity void depends upon the particular in respect of which my action is 
contemplated speaking for himself’. Although it was reason that ‘led Davoût to the 
acceptance of the norm: execute all Russian spies’, nonetheless, ‘the void of reason 
… stood between this norm and the particular Pierre’. Davoût might just as well 
‘have said to himself, “it is reasonable to execute the enemies of France, but why 
should I do it?’ So we find ‘a second particularity void: … one for subject as well as 
object.’ Therefore, in the end, ‘particularity holds out’. And what this suggests is ‘a 




In a more recent piece, Detmold has elaborated a little further on the 
problems of particularity in adjudication. Here, he sees two problems in this respect: 
the ‘in-tray’, the matter of what it is that informs a decision and how it will be 
justified and the extent to which that informing thing is particular or universal; and 
the ‘out-tray’, actually making the decision and deciding to whom or to what it 
applies, the particular or the universal. According to Detmold, all practical 
judgements are of the out-tray and are radically particular. Even though there are 
clearly difficulties involved in the notion of deciding something about another 
person’s life, still the common law seeks to address itself to history, an always 
radically particular history, and judges that history; in other words, it is always a 





 Here we see again Detmold’s way of understanding the gap that we 
recognised earlier in Re A. On this view, it has at least two aspects: first, in terms of 
the potential asymmetry between addressor and addressee; second, in terms of the 
void between determination and application. In general, judges only tend to make 
law conservatively, says Detmold. However, if judges were to understand law as 
being found ‘in the people’, and the people were to change, then, of course, ‘the law 
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 Thus, ‘the fullness of law as practical reason is achieved when the law 
that judges apply is law that has crossed the citizen subject void; when law is in a 
true sense the citizen’s law, when law is common law’. 
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3. Zenon Bakowski’s ‘Inside Outside’ Distinction: Occupying ‘The Middle’ 
 
This distinction between determination and application, and between application and 
justification, central to Detmold’s argument, is also, as Zenon Bakowski notes, one 
which Klaus Gnther makes. According to Bankowski, Gnther, following 
Habermas, has 
 
' posit[ed] two different discourses.   One is the justification discourse where 
norms are justified and where criteria of universalizability are [used] …   The 
second is the application discourse which decides whether or not a particular 
justified norm is to be applied.   The criteria used here are different …   We 
… note that prima facie a distinction has been made between the criteria used 
to justify the norm and those used to apply it … opening up a gap in the 




For Bakowski this separation is not entirely helpful and he attempts instead to 
'conceptualise a dynamic form of legal reasoning and process’. He notes first the 'two 
opposed and irreconcilable positions’ in this way of thinking:    
 
‘On the one hand the law is static, locked into its universalising criteria and 
becoming a form of … legalism.   On the other hand, it becomes so open to 
other criteria that there appears to be no law left; just the contingent decisions 
of judges.   My attempt is to show that law should be seen as the articulation 
of two systems, the doctrinal and universalising system which has its own 
internal world and the more arbitrary and contingent application system 
which is sensitive to the outside.   We should not, however, see this as two 
systems loosely connected but rather one system instantiated in the 
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On this basis, Bakowski begins to articulate an 'Outside Inside' distinction, 
something that can be see to ‘emerge from the fluctuating negotiations at the border 
posts of identities', where ‘the outside’, what is not law, is introduced to ‘leaven and 
change the law'.
129
   In contrast to Detmold, for whom the moment of particularity 
‘cannot be covered by any criteria and is forever … mystical', Bakowski seeks to 
'adduce some criteria and capacities' and to 'get a little more concrete’ about judicial 
reasoning.   He suggests that we begin by 'paying attention to the particularity of the 
situation’, considering in the first instance ‘whether or not the inside needs to be 
readjusted with the outside’
130
 But he warns that we must be careful not to 
understand this as some kind of independent ‘sociological thesis as to what sort of 
extra legal factors influence the law’; rather, what we have is ‘a theoretical thesis 
about how the law is open to the "outside" … [as] part of the nature of the process of 
law and thus "inside" …’
131
 So what we have, in effect, is a new way of 
conceptualising the legal task: 
 
‘the attempt to overcome a dichotomous mode of thinking based on the 
polarisation of seemingly opposite principles … It goes on to explore a new 
construction of the space within and between … in which two terms co-exist 






 Bakowski sees this ‘middle’ as a ‘tension-laden 
space’, so difficult to maintain that we attempt to ‘theorise it away’. But this only 
results in the to and fro of a ‘false and distorting polarisation’, where we find 
ourselves drawn ‘on the one hand to the soulless force of instrumental rationality 
and, on the other, to the always frustrated search for immediacy’.
134
 Precisely 
because of this struggle between extremes, we understand this middle as a space to 
be ‘protected’, where concepts are held apart without collapsing into ‘an unreflective 
                                                 
129
 Ibid., p. 10. 
130
 Ibid., p. 10. 
131
 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
132
 Ibid., pp. 34-35. 
133
 See Rose (1992). 
134





 In this sense, the middle is always ‘an ambiguous place’, where law not 
only defines the power we possess already but also, at the same time, becomes the 
precursor of anxiety.
136
 We can see this in Martha Nussbaum’s reading of 
Antigone.
137
 Nussbaum explains how both Creon and Antigone make ‘the same 
moral mistake’, attempting to ‘run away from the tension and anxiety of the middle 
… deny[ing] … any conflict’. This, Bakowski asserts, is the ‘condition of 
modernity’, the endless attempt ‘to seek a “comfort zone” – either by the soulless 
application of universalism … or by recognising the “violence” behind the law and 
going over to the nihilism of love’. That is why the middle is ‘risky and unsettled’, 
because here we must ‘stake ourselves’. But how do we do this? How do we refrain 




According to Bakowski, we do this by ‘suspending the ethical’, refraining 
from seeing everything as always-already ‘an incarnation of the universal’
139
 and 
‘us[ing] that anxiety creatively’.
140
 The starting point for this is ‘the distinction that 
Günther makes between justification and application’. According to Günther, when 
we justify a norm we use universalistic criteria but when we apply that norm we 
attend to the particularities of the case; that is, first we decide what the law means 
and then we decide whether and how that law applies in a particular case. In the 
former part, ‘the criteria will be universalistic’, says Bakowski, and in the latter 
‘more particular’.
141
 But this still leaves unanswered the question of how exactly we 
decide on the particularities of the case and, here, even Günther ‘appears somewhat 
to nullify’ the distinction between justification and application, for ‘the idea … that 
the judgement must fit and be coherent with all similar instances …at least on one of 
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However, if we think of the middle in terms of ‘what Michael Detmold calls 
the “particularity void”’ then we can take the argument a little further, says 
Bakowski. For Detmold, there is ‘a difference between deciding whether something 
is reasonable to do and whether some rule is reasonable to apply’;
143
 thus, ‘Davoût 
does not shoot Pierre as a Russian spy, even though those are his orders …’
144
 What 
this suggests is that the problem must be recast as one of ‘recognition and 
discernment’. Recognition is ‘what emerges from a held tension between particular 




What all of this means, says Bakowski, is that the law may be seen both as 
something that in a certain way ‘forms individuals’ and also as something which the 
individual, once formed, is able to ‘deploy in new and original ways in the diverse 
situations’; that is, the individual, in turn ‘becomes a lawmaker’. This subsequent 
‘encounter between the law and the particular situation’ is what marks out the 
conditions for the emergence of ‘the singular’. Here, ‘the particular is neither simply 
subsumed beneath the law … nor is the law abandoned’; rather, the emergence of 
singularity depends upon the ‘ability to recognise the particular instance as both 
consistent with and different from previous instances’.  In this way, we recognise our 
understanding as ‘contingent and limited, continually subject to the revision and 
rearticulation afforded by fresh encounter’; that is, there is ‘no final judgement; I can 
always be wrong’.
146
 However, notwithstanding this, ‘[I] have to engage and take 
responsibility’.
147
 This is what gives to law its indeterminate character, ‘the fact that 
in the encounter we enter the place where we have to decide whether to apply it or 
not’ and that there we must ‘take responsibility’.
148
 Contra Detmold, for Bakowski 
‘the “particularity void” is not mystical’ at all, it is simply ‘a statement of the fact 
that we have to start from the particular situation’ and we should not let the rules 
make us forget this: ‘Davoût does not start from the rule “Spies are to be shot”’; 
rather, ‘paying attention to his encounter with Pierre, he sees his affliction and does 
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not shoot him, in a sense recreating the law as “All men are brothers and not to be 
shot”’.
149
 What is important is our ‘paying attention to the story… But this attention 
will always be something done within the context of the law. The encounter is a 





Bakowski notes how Bernard Jackson also appears to affirm that ‘it is 
attention to the stories of the cases which leads to an understanding of the result, 
rather than the rules [bestowing on them] a pre-ordained meaning’.
151
 According to 
Jackson, one ‘can understand … different decision[s] only in terms of paying 
attention to the story’.
152
 For example, it makes a difference to whether and how we 
apply the law if we are talking about the sale of jewels to ‘a jeweller, who would be 
presumed to expect at least some fraud’ or if we are talking about ‘a private 
transaction with two old ladies’.
153
 What this tells us, claims Bakowski, is that 
‘getting immersed in the practical details and cross-currents of the story’, reading it 
from the inside out, is critically important. This is what ‘drives the judgement on’.
154
 
Looking at things from the perspective of the middle will help us to realise that 
although ‘the principle is necessary …it will be the encounter with the case itself that 
will determine whether the principle will be applied. It will be in that act that the law 





Perhaps we can understand better this idea of ‘suspending the ethical’, 
Bankowski suggests, if we think of legal reasoning as a form of  
 
‘operating in a sphere which is barred by a thick almost opaque curtain. You 
sometimes see dimly other things that might be important through it. You lift 
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the curtain to look but the curtain is extremely heavy … You have to drop it 




But how do we know when to look beyond? And when we do, how do we balance 
the reasons while holding the curtain? What informs whether our decision to remain 
on one side or move to the other? Bakowski’s answer is that we must go back again 
to the story:  
 
‘The key is to pay attention, to let the story speak for itself and not be too 
quick to apply closure by imposing a principle or pattern on it. This is the 
sense behind these mystical post-modern utterances like “deferring the 
undeferrable”; of “saying what cannot be said”; “listening to what cannot be 
heard”… [It] is the ability to listen; to know when to stop because you know 
what is before you is a case of x; to know when to continue listening because 
you see difference. A common mistake is to jump to a conclusion before the 
story has a chance to reveal itself … The trick is to explore the story until you 
know that it is appropriate to stop and make a decision … when to move 
beyond; when not to apply a pattern … [I]n this way one can understand what 
I mean by living as though there was no outside. We cannot go actively 
seeking the outside because that would … negate the point of the routinised 
activity. It is the anomaly and the interruption that sensitises us to the need 




But how could we recognise any anomaly? How, for example, would the fact 
that an injustice was likely to be done by the application of a certain rule pierce the 
exclusionary curtain privileging that rule in order to make its presence known? It 
cannot be that this would happen automatically, for the whole point of law is to 
reduce such complexity and facilitate predictability of results in decision making by 
the application of rules. This is an important question, since the exclusionary nature 
of legal reasons would seem to exclude such substantive considerations.  
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The idea of an exclusionary reason was first introduced by Joseph Raz
158
 in 1975. 
Adapting a distinction from Herbert Hart,
159
 Raz distinguished between first- and 
second-order reasons. Essentially, a first-order reason is a reason to perform an act, a 
reason balanced against other first-order reasons according to relative weight. A 
second-order reason is a reason to act for a reason, which may be positive (a reason 
to act on the basis of the weightiest first-order reason) or negative (a reason not to act 
for a reason). It is this negative second-order reason that Raz terms exclusionary, 
since it provides a reason for not acting on the basis of a reason that is conclusive 
(there is no need or possibility of inquiring behind it). Conflict between a first-order 
reason and a second-order reason that excludes it is unlike the conflict between two 
first-order reasons: where two first-order reasons compete the actor weighs up the 
balance of reasons and acts accordingly; where a first-order reason conflicts with a 
valid exclusionary reason the actor may well be acting against the balance of first-
order reasons but the action of the exclusionary reason is better described not in 
terms of the balance of first-order reasons but as taking that reason out of the balance 
of first-order reasons altogether, without affecting its weight as a reason. This is the 
crucial difference between exclusionary and first-order reasons: a weightier first-
order reason will override a weaker first-order reason but a valid exclusionary reason 
will exclude from consideration all those first-order reasons to which it has reference 
whatever their strength. Clearly, to function properly, exclusionary reasons must be 
exempt from the need for re-examination with a view to revision on those occasions 
to which they apply. But this raises the question of whether this exemption operates 
on every occasion or if exclusionary reasons may sometimes yield to waive the 
exclusion of disregarded reasons. What, then, is the possibility, having entrenched a 




 uses the example of marriage to show how formal reasoning 
operates much on the model of Raz’s theory of exclusionary reasons. If a reason is 
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there then it provides us with a reason not to question but simply to act: we don’t 
think about it, we just do it! In marriage, for example, the reasons underlying patterns 
of interaction between lovers become entrenched into rules informing the marital 
relationship. As a result, substantive reasons for action become temporarily “frozen” 
into formal (exclusionary) rules. This facilitates decision making; that is, since the 
rules are there we don’t ask, but just apply them. However, if, or rather when, the 
rules fail to reflect their underlying substantive reasons we can, says Atiyah, revise 
them, by going behind the rules and starting to look at the substantive reasons once 




 agrees with Raz that rules should be understood as 
“entrenched generalisations”. Rules ensure that the presence of certain operative 
facts always triggers certain prescribed consequences. So we follow a rule because it 
is the rule and we do so regardless of any underlying justification. However, Schauer 
makes a distinction between the idea of exclusion and the force of exclusion to allow 
that, on occasion, one may look at the first-order reason to determine if it is to 
control in that particular case:  
 
‘Insofar as it is possible for an exclusionary reason to tell an agent to look just 
quickly, if possible, at the excluded first-order reason to see if this is one of 




Inasmuch as one is, in this way, always looking at first order reasons, and ‘looking 
just quickly’ rather than taking careful consideration, this might not necessarily be 
regarded as negating the idea of exclusionary reasons. 
 
But the question still remains: how is it possible that a ‘signal that revision is 
needed [could] be received at the exclusionary level given that first-order reasons no 
longer resound at that level, by the very nature of a reason as exclusionary’? 
‘Revisability’, argues Christodoulidis, ‘has been cut off from the concerns that 
informed the entrenchment of a reason as exclusionary in the first place’. It has been 
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‘removed from the concerns that might have occasioned it’.
163
 On this basis, 
suspensions are not only improbable, they are impossible. 
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4. Emilios Christodoulidis and the Reductive Reflexive Disjunctive  
 
'[L]aw stands impotent before the particular… It has to address the 
complexity that confronts it by reducing that complexity and of course it can 
neither address nor redress its own complexity deficit that results from this. It 
is that deficit and the blindspot that accompanies it that forces law to miss the 
particular. At the same time, there can be no legal judgement over the 
appropriateness of the application of law. There can be no decision within a 
context as to the appropriateness of the context'.
164
   
 
Emilios Christodoulidis argues that if we want to find a way to incorporate respect 
for the particular into our thinking then we must look not to law but to ethics. Ethical 
reason is ‘reflexive’, he argues, and so it can ‘accommodate complexity’.
165
 It 
‘allows for the comprehension of the “other” not as classification in terms of abstract 
categorisation, but as inseparable from “his” invocation’.
166
 In other words, it has 
more flexibility and freedom in the encounter because ‘while it fixes the terms of that 
encounter … it keeps open the question of their revisability as appropriate to the 
encounter rather than as appropriate to a certain function …’
167
 Christodoulidis 
points to what he calls 'a disjunctive between the reductive and the reflexive', arguing 
that while ‘the reductive works to immunise … the reflexive remains [open] to … 
contingency, the admission that a determination could be otherwise’.
168
    
 
We see an example of how he employs this distinction in his ‘Reply’ to 
Roberto Unger’s law-as-politics thesis, where he underscores his contention that 
although law may be ‘shaken from within’ this surprise cannot carry through to upset 
the ‘constitutive assumptions’ underlying law’s institutional identity. He sees what 
Unger calls law’s ‘institutional imagination’ as, on the one hand, both limited and 
limiting, as a result of the forcing and entrenching of reductions on ‘the “plastic” 
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world of political possibilities’.
169
 To challenge those reductions would be 
tantamount to dispensing with law altogether.
170
 However, on the other hand, he 
affirms Niklas Luhmann’s observation that such reductions, while ‘limiting’ are also 
‘empowering’: 
 
‘Legal institutionalisation is the entrenchment of certain reductions on the 
possibilities of communication … to the exclusion of other possibilities … 
Institutional imagination is indeed a reduction achievement … to be assessed 
in the light of the possibilities it offers people to communicate successfully 
… in a world that is making it all the more urgent but at the same time all the 
more unlikely that such communication and the action that depends on it … 




Luhmann, as Christodoulidis notes,
172
 both draws upon and then creatively 
diverges from what Talcott Parsons
173
 describes as a situation of ‘double 
contingency’.
174
 For Luhmann, the possibility for the interrelating of human 
behaviour rests on the question of whether and how the complexity of this double 
indeterminacy can be reduced. One way is through the ‘fixing of a context’, through 
its ‘structuring into frameworks that have the form of “expectations of 
expectations”’.
175
 Communication becomes possible ‘through reductions … 
premised on system selectivity …’
176
 Law achieves constancy through a narrowing 
of ‘the expectability of expectations’, he says, and ‘by abstracting from the 
“concrete” parties involved …: it allows people to encounter each other as role 
players, … as legal actors’.
177
 Thus, ‘[l]aw provides a context to settle contingencies 
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… at the expense of other contexts’. In other words, contra Unger, there can be no 
negotiation of these roles.
178
 But this means that systems, as ‘institutionalised 
versions of society’ are ‘relatively stable and delineated’.
179
 They ‘reproduce 
themselves by projecting expectations’, permitting the system to ‘react, modify [its] 
expectations and evolve’.  
 
Still, legal expectations are always reductions from ‘possible expectations’ 
and this always includes a certain ‘immunisation from challenge’.
180
 That is to say, 
law, as an achievement, is always achieved at ‘a cost’: some contingencies are 
admitted and others precluded, the latter being unable, thereafter, to register as 
expectations. In this way, with conflicts perceived as order and conflicting elements 
silenced, the ‘system is neither static nor insensitive to change’ but must continually 
‘vary the expectations it projects’. It ‘“learns” and evolves ’
181
 by means of conflict, 
without which it would atrophy and die. ‘In a nutshell’, says Christodoulidis, ‘the 





Of course, all of this has ‘major consequences’, he warns. In this way, 
‘already existing structural assumptions [are brought] into play as preconditions to all 
attempts to push for change’ Since the only way that a ‘claim for change may register 
is if it manages to surprise projections of expectations’, and ‘we can only see what 
we know how to look for’, then, ‘[f]or a challenge to register … the system’s 
memory has to be tapped’. Thus, law ‘controls the context against which informative 
surprises may be articulated’.
183
 In other words, any challenge that is ‘to register in 
law will only make a difference in the evolution of the system on the basis of its 
alignment to already existing reductions … against a background of settled 
meaning’.
184
 Now, this radically circumscribes the possibilities for change, he 
argues, since ‘[c]hallenges to the structure can only be accommodated by the 
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structure as demands to draw new internal distinctions and boundaries … This 
assimilation of the extraordinary to the ordinary … places a wooden hand on the 
possibility to politicise and contest’.
185
 The point is, he argues, that ‘Unger’s 
formulation … is misleading because it refers to what is not selected … what 
remains an environment to the system … And that is the crux of institutionalisation, 
of the drawing of the legal system’s boundary’.
186
 Consequently, ‘structural 
reductions cannot be employed and defied at once … [A]t the first-order level … 
where complexity is reduced and the world becomes legally observable, the 
reduction cannot but remain a blindspot … There can be no structure-defying 




To bring this all back to the question of what possibilities for radical change 
in understanding are present in the encounter between Pierre and Davout, an 
‘instance of “merciful” legal judgement cannot account for the emergence of a 
context that names it as “an application of x norm”, as “an instance of x 
commonality”, a posteriori’,
188
 says Christodoulidis. ‘Norms that inform legal 
judgement … must … pre-exist their application’.
189
 So, in the encounter between 
Davout and Pierre, any emergence of 'known commonality' as the criterion for 
judgement can occur only at the expense of law: 
 
'To law the particularity of the affective encounter is invisible, the 
particularity could not have pierced the legal terms of its exclusion'.
190
      
 
Precisely because, in law, particularity is abstracted, more-or-less fixed and reduced 
to role and rule, this involves a reduction to an exclusionary language that both 
prevents visibility of the particular and is unyielding to considerations of 
appropriateness; otherwise, law's exclusionary reasons would have to give way to 
substantive ones, which is impossible due to the limits of revisability of exclusionary 
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reasons. Thus, for Christodoulidis, while the particular can be meaningfully invoked 
it cannot be addressed in legal judgement; that is, law cannot cross the particularity 
void.  
 
Of course, Christodoulidis is certainly correct to insist that ‘universalisation 
is only justification a posteriori’. Can it ever be anything else? Experience is always 
experience of the past as it is presented to us in perception and, even at the most, will 
be experience of the immediate past. So the statement, that it ‘comes too late to guide 
the decision of the judge’, while correct, may not necessarily be understood to negate 
the understanding of justification as, for example, MacCormick uses it. Indeed, in the 
sense in which we normally understand the reasons given in a judge’s judgement as 
justifying her decision, surely this simply operates to affirm a necessary relationship 
between her decision and its subsequent justification; that is, as Charles Hartshorne 
puts it ‘memory of E is not memory of something like E … but of E itself’.
191
    
 
Likewise, Bakowski’s objection that MacCormick’s emphasis on the 
knowing subject and her reasoning seems inevitably to downplay particularity is 
also, in a sense, correct. Indeed, as Detmold notes,
192
 the point is made well by Nigel 
Simmonds. Simmonds claims that all talk of the particular is misguided since the 
particular is itself a very abstract description, the ‘most abstract of all abstractions’. 
So, for him, there is really no such thing as the particular, merely different sets of 
descriptions: all talk of particulars as captured by categories means that particulars 
are always subject to further description. The real particular, if there is one, always 
‘slips beneath every description, and escapes every act of judgement’.
193
 
Correspondingly, for Bankowski, the more universal that one gets in description then 
the more abstract the reasoning becomes and thus also the more removed from the 
actual event, person or thing to which one is referring: ‘But what does this … do to 
the particularities of the situation?’ he asks. ‘Firstly, the particular being judged 
disappears and is lost by being brought into the universalizing net of rules … Take 
one of MacCormick’s examples. In the case of Ealing London Borough Council v 
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Race Relations Board, the question was whether discrimination “on the grounds of 
colour, race, or ethnic or national origin” includes legal nationality. MacCormick 
says that the question asked is not a particular question’; that is, it ‘“is not a question 
about a particular act of discrimination: it is a logically universal question”. But 
notice what happens: the person discriminated against is now out of the picture. The 
judges talk of classes of people who might or might not represent him’. In other 
words, we are no longer dealing with ‘Zesko, the Polish national and ex-RAF pilot’ 




However, the point is that no description of Mr Zesko will ever yield a real, 
irreducible particular. All attempts to capture or describe Mr Zesko will, to some 
extent, be abstractions from reality, from process. What we are really talking about, it 
seems, is not so much real particularity or the objective reality of the universal but, as 
Hartshorne puts it, ‘the objective reality of the distinction between universal and 
particular’. For in the attempt to simply locate it, the real particular disappears, and, 
given that it is sensible to suppose coincidence among the contrasts universal-
particular and possible-actual, ‘no possibility is literally particular, no universal is 




With ‘[c]ommon sense’, writes Hartshorne, one ‘tends to think of a particular 
animal or physical thing as the extreme contrary of the abstract or general’. However,  
 
‘a particular person or thing, enduring and changing through time, is really a 
kind of low-level universal, compared to the momentary states or events in 
which alone the individual is fully concrete or actual …   The supposition that 
the indivisible units of concrete reality are single substances rather than single 
states or events has produced endless confusion'.
196
    
 
But ‘[i]f the extreme of concreteness tends to be missed by ordinary speech, so does 
the extreme of abstractness’. Therefore, the real task of the legal philosopher is more 
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correctly described in terms of an engagement with endless refinement of the 
abstractions that she uses, criticising them, attempting to put into words ‘what can be 
said universally about the most concrete levels of reality’.
197
 Scott Veitch comes 
closer to this when he writes that  
 
‘[p]articulars and universals are relative, not just to each other, but to a 
complex and varied range of institutional settings … to the demands of a 
variety of contingently present constituencies, their goals and their relative 
social priority … Are there any particulars? Are there any universals? It may 
well be that while there are undoubtedly universal forms, universal and 
particular in practical reasoning (including legal reasoning), are no more than 
relative forms of abstraction or of generalisation - more or less useful tools, 
stakes in a debate … always deployable, not categorical. This is arguably 
what Adam Smith’s model of moral reasoning … which constantly refers 
back to a sympathetic mainspring in particular circumstances and spectatorial 
reactions and works up to general rules, grasped so well. What it saw less 
clearly … was that the basic elements that he claimed make up this low level 





We can see then how theories of legal reasoning usually proceed on the basis of an 
assumption that rule definition is different from rule application, whether this is 
thought of as problematic, as in Detmold, or not, as with MacCormick. Here, legal 
knowledge is believed to engage with an explicit, precise and coherent representation 
of social reality and the real challenge for decision makers is to facilitate the 
transition or transmission of rules from creation to application without diminution or 
corruption; in other words, the aim is to maintain the correspondence of law to fact, 
theory to practice, allowing the dominant rule-definition/rule-application relationship 
to be founded or confirmed. Such an understanding of the method of applying law is 
widely held to be the natural and transparent mode of operation of the legal system.  
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In this way, we can also see how traditional thinking about the nature of legal 
knowledge and the practice of law is generally assumed to proceed on the basis of a 
simple correspondence between the production of norms, or rules, and their 
implementation. In this sense, it is in terms of its functional value as a commodity,
199
 
its meaning and relevance for the legal institutional system, that information is held 
to be significant.
200
 Indeed, it is the assumption about the correctness of this way of 
thinking that underlies, for example, Detmold’s notion of the ‘particularity void’ as a 
troublesome gap between rule-determination and rule-application. Nonetheless, it 
should be obvious that any ‘gap’ as such can only emerge if we focus first on the 
abstracted ‘ends’ of the processes of creating, communicating and applying legal 
knowledge ahead of any analysis of the nature of such knowledge; any ‘bridging’ of 
this gap can proceed only on the basis of an assumption about the possibility of 
transferring knowledge between those abstracted ends.  
 
Such a view itself presupposes an understanding of reality as composed of 
essentially static, immobile and discrete ‘things’. Understood thus, legal knowledge 
is considered as the substantial flow of information from point A through point B to 
point C, and so on, which means that any conception of knowledge as a continuous 
process that ‘goes beyond the simple determination and application of the criterion of 
truth’
 201
 seems to have disappeared altogether. Nonetheless, as I will argue, legal 
knowledge should not be understood merely in terms of an ‘informational 
commodity’ whose progressive development can be charted as from points A to B to 
C; rather, it is properly to be understood more in terms of what happens in-between, 
the undefined, indeterminate and limitless processes from which these points are but 
momentary abstractions, frozen from time.  
 
Employing a process metaphysics, informed by the work of Alfred North 
Whitehead, Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze, I will argue that such an ontology of 
‘being’ involves a ‘counterfeit’ movement, that terms like ‘rule’ and ‘fact’, 
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‘universal’ and ‘particular’, ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ are really only momentary 
‘snapshots’ of reality, images extracted from an otherwise heterogeneous continuity 
and movement, merely convenient labels that we utilise to describe and illustrate 
interpenetration by means of side-by-side representation. Thus, I will argue that we 
cannot say that rules as universals are applied to facts as particulars, neither can we 
say that legal practitioners somehow reflect upon theory to justify the application of 
their decisions as if these activities were essentially separate entities. Indeed, such a 
view only prevents us from seeing the extent to which ‘rule’ and ‘fact’, ‘universal’ 
and ‘particular’, already actually interpenetrate one another. In fact, on a Bergsonian 
view, judges reflecting on their decisions for the purpose of giving justifying reasons 
for their decisions are really only institutional actors giving linguistic expression to a 
past experience within the terms of an already ordered institutional code. That is why 
although their justifying reasons may deliver a symbolic representation of 








DEVELOPING AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH:  




'Words and phrases must be stretched towards a 
generality foreign to their ordinary usage; and 
however such elements of language be stabilized as 
technicalities, they remain metaphors mutely 
appealing for an imaginative leap'.
202
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Much of contemporary legal theory is effectively the expression of a continuing 
concern to ‘bridge’ this ‘gap’ that opens up in legal decision making between living 
reality and legal representation, two supposedly separate and distinct but connectable 
domains, most obvious in respect of ‘hard cases’ such as Re A where the interface 
between the so-called ‘theoretical’ and the ‘practical’ is revealed as problematic but 
nonetheless true of other cases where the anomalies are not so obvious or so easily 
recognised. Such an understanding of the legal task plainly has its roots in a 
Parmenidean-inspired universe, in particular in the teachings of Democritus of the 
Eleatic school; that is, with the understanding of an entitative conception of reality in 
which the ultimate building blocks of reality are atomic entities, basic and 
undividable, whose relative motions and relationship to each other are regulated and 
apprehended through the use of general predictable laws.
203
 Clearly, only on the 
basis of such an understanding as composed of fixed, or fixable, and relatively 
constant entities can we make any further assumption about the accuracy of their 
linguistic and conceptual representation within a ‘correspondence theory of truth’. 
The counter view to this Parmenidean theory of essentially unchanging reality has its 
roots in the tales of Heraclitus. Unlike Parmenides, Heraclitus contended that 
‘everything is in flux, and nothing is at rest’,
204
 so that rather than it being this 
outward appearance of stability which most truly represents reality, reality is more 
accurately thought of as a world of continuous but imperceptible change.  
 
The proposal offered here is that although the minutiae of legal decision 
making and the relations between them are often thought of in terms as separate but 
connectable and essentially stable elements in the ongoing process of law they 
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should not be thought of as ‘simply locatable’, or isolatable, elements whose forms 
and functions can be abstracted to imply separate fixed points with connections and 
correspondences between them. Rather, they should be thought of as outlining a 
mutually constitutive process of becoming, not reducible to each other or to anything 
else; that is, interpenetrating and interrelated. But how might we begin, and where 
should we look to, to develop further such a view of law?  According to Alfred North 
Whitehead, 
 
‘creative activity … is the process of eliciting into actual being factors in the 
universe which antecedent to that process exist only in the mode of unrealised 
potentialities.   The process of self creation is the transformation of the 
potential into the actual, and the fact of such transformation includes the 
immediacy of self enjoyment.   Thus in conceiving … an occasion of 
experience, we must discriminate the actualised data presented by the 
antecedent world, the non-actualised potentialities which lie ready to promote 
their fusion into a new unity of experience, and the immediacy of self 
enjoyment which belongs to the creative fusion of those data with those 
potentialities.   This is the doctrine of the creative advance whereby it belongs 




Whitehead's early philosophical interest 
 
In his early writings,
206
 Whitehead’s concern was mainly with the problems of 
modern science and, in particular, with the breakdown of Newtonian cosmology.
207
 
‘Newtonian physics’, he observed, ‘is based upon the independent individuality of 
each bit of matter …. fully describable apart from any reference to any other portion 
of matter …. [and] adequately described without any reference to past or future[,] …. 
conceived fully and adequately as wholly constituted within the present moment’.
208
 
But this concept of the ultimate facts as ‘simply located particles’ is inconsistent with 
                                                 
205
 Whitehead (1938), pp. 206-207. 
206
 Whitehead (1919), (1920), (1922) and (1929b), herinafter PNK, CN, PRel and AE respectively. A 
major shift takes place when his attention turns to metaphysics 
207
 Whitehead (1933), p. 200, herinafter AI. 
208
 Ibid., pp 200-1. 
 67 
 
the notions of ‘velocity, acceleration, momentum, and kinetic energy, which 
certainly are essential physical qualities’,
209
 proving that ‘there is a fatal 
contradiction inherent in the Newtonian cosmology’.
210
 In providing a different 
conception, ‘we must therefore in the ultimate fact, beyond which science ceases to 
analyse, include the notion of a state of change’.
211
     
 
So, in place of the concept of simply located particles of matter, Whitehead 
attempted to formulate a conception of the ultimate facts consistent with experience 
and free from the contradictions of the older theory. His proposal was that ‘the 
ultimate facts of nature in terms of which all physical and biological explanation 
must be expressed, are events connected by their spatio-temporal relations’.
212
 On 
this basis, taking ‘event’ as the ultimate fact, he included ‘a state of change’ as an 
intrinsic feature of the ultimate facts and, in recognising that events extend over each 
other, was able to account for their essential relatedness. However, ‘sense-awareness 
also yields to us other factors … which are not events … with a definite implication 
in events…’.
213
 Clarifying his concepts and working out the relations between 
events, and between events and objects, Whitehead now entertains problems and 
issues essentially different from the strictly scientific ones that characterised his early 
work. Philosophical considerations take centre stage and issue in a comprehensive 
metaphysical enquiry; in particular, ‘the idea that the relation of extension has a 
unique pre-eminence’ gives way to ‘the true doctrine, that “process” is the 
fundamental idea …. Extension is a derivative from process, and is required by it’.
214
 
Believing that a more complete account of the ‘complex essences’ of events as 
derivative from their interconnections is discovered through emphasising the 
‘prehensive’,
215
 rather than the ‘separative’, character of space-time, Whitehead 
ascribes to events the essential feature of ‘unity’. ‘The event is the unit of things 
real’.
216
 Yet, ‘this abstract word cannot be sufficient to characterise what the fact of 
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the reality of an event is in itself’.
217
 Thus, what began as a fairly abstract theory of 
‘events’ put forward to replace the older theory of simply located matter now 
becomes a much more complex, and concrete, investigation into the ultimate nature 
of reality: ‘The final problem is to conceive a complete fact []’;
218
 not 
“being” as such, but “being” in the sense of a fully existing entity, a particular 
concrete thing.    
 
The Formative Elements of a Philosophy of Process 
 
In contrast to traditional philosophy, then, Whitehead conceives of individual entities 
as series of moments of experience rather than masses of static substance. Within 
each moment, an entity is influenced by others, creates its own identity and propels 
itself into further experiences. Reality, then, is this process of creative advance in 
which many past events are integrated in the events of the present and, in turn, are 
taken up by future events. Events particularise ultimate creative power; the world is 
the realisation of a selection of creative potentials. Process thought is an attempt to 
elucidate the developmental nature of reality, of ‘becoming’ rather than sheer 
existence or ‘being’: it seeks unity-in-diversity, the ‘many-becoming-one’, in a 
sequence of integrations at every level and moment of existence. 
 
 For Whitehead, reality is composed of complex combinations of actual 
energy events. These units of becoming, or ‘occasions of experience’, may be 
described as dipolar: that is, Whitehead describes each as having a physical pole, 
which is the repeat of past occasions of experience in the present unit of becoming, 
and a mental pole, which represents the element of subjectivity that enables each 
occasion of experience, in the process of becoming, to entertain novel possibilities 
and exercise some determination over the shape it will take. The basic idea is the 
Heraclitean one, that all things are in flux, and that there is no 'unchanging subject of 
change', for the primary feature of existence is not ‘substance’ or ‘being’, but 
‘process’ or ‘becoming’. Being is the final outcome of each process of becoming, the 
result of its instantly ‘perishing’ as the next stage of becoming commences. 
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However, with the perishing of each moment comes the possibility of the present and 
the advance into the future; everything is in this process of becoming, moving from 
the past through the present into the future.  
 
 This process of becoming of each 'actual occasion' of experience Whitehead 
terms ‘concrescence’. It consists as follows: first, at the physical pole, there is the 
passive reception of data (or ‘physical prehension’ of prior occasions of experience); 
next, at the mental pole, an entertaining of novel possibilities (or 'conceptual 
prehensions'); finally, a reconciliation of the initial desire to conform to the past and 
the subsequent desire to achieve new possibility. So, each actual occasion of 
experience takes on a new form and immediately perishes, to be replaced by a 
succeeding occasion in its first phase: passively receiving data and attempting to 
maintain the same aim of immediately preceding occasions; entertaining novel 
possibilities; achieving reconciliation and ‘choosing’ the form it will take (ie. 
determining its 'subjective aim' or 'guiding principle'). Finally, to account for where 
and how these novel possibilities arise, that are ‘felt’ or ‘grasped’ through conceptual 
prehensions, Whitehead develops the concept of ‘eternal objects’, the pure potentials 
of the universe that forever remain constant (in the same way that “blue-ness” 
remains unchanged even though the different things that we refer to as “blue” 
changes). Thus, logically, each actual occasion prehends all occasions of experience 
antecedent to itself: ‘the many become one and are increased by one’.
219
    
 
 It is to be noted that prehension, in Whitehead’s terms, does not equate to 
rational or conscious activity. It is more properly understood as a sort of selective 
filter, providing emphasis or de-emphasis. Equally, not all past occasions and present 
possibilities may be absorbed in the integration of physical and conceptual 
prehensions in the process of concrescence: as well as ‘positive’ prehensions, there 
are ‘negative’ ones, excluding certain past occasions of experience and certain 
possibilities from the process of concrescence; moreover, organic, unlike inorganic, 
forms of life exhibit modes of behaviour that suggest creative impulses that go 
beyond a mere physical prehension of the past. 
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 So, in each present occasion of experience, past occasions are synthesised 
with conceptual prehensions into a subjective aim before being returned to the realm 
of data to be prehended by future occasions. In this passing from ‘subject’ to 
‘object’, each occasion achieves an ‘objective immortality’, an existence that all 
future occasions prehend and with which they must grapple. But, while all prior 
occasions of experience internally determine the present occasion in this way, 
nonetheless, each present occasion is free to come to its own ‘satisfaction’; that is, as 
well as feeling a desire to conform to the past each also contains its own lure to novel 
adventure.  
 
How then can we make sense of our commonly expressed experience that 
‘things’ change over time? Accepting, on the one hand, the implication that this 
scheme seems to suggest (that the ultimate metaphysical truth is atomism), 
Whitehead, on the other hand, appears to evade the same charge by developing a 
notion of ‘societies’ or groupings of occasions of experience that together exhibit 
some sort of enduring order or pattern that is reproduced in each occasion in society. 
As long as this commonality remains, a society, or a ‘society of societies’, unlike an 
occasion of experience, may change over time. Subject to evolution in this way, they 
too can never really be defined until their existence is totally in the past. 
 
‘Between Order and Chaos’: On The Development of Human Civilisation 
 
We can appreciate the thrust of Whitehead’s scheme by looking at what he says on 
the development of human civilisation. This tension between the physical and mental 
poles in an occasion of experience is the tension between order and chaos, a tension 
between conformity to the past and creativity in the future. Here, chaos is inevitable, 
for progress demands the forsaking of present perfections for greater possible 
perfections and without the advance into novelty there is no possibility of achieving 
higher perfections. Whitehead describes two types of advance into novelty, ‘the 
discovery of novel pattern’ and ‘the gathering of detail within assigned pattern’.
220
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The first of these he describes as ‘the condition for excellence’; the second, as 
‘stifling the freshness of living’.
221
 These are illustrated by reference to the Hellenic 
mentality of ancient Greece and the Hellenistic mentality of the later Alexandrian 
and medieval scholastic tradition, respectively. Hellenism was an advance of the first 
type, beyond known modes of perfection; Hellenistic scholarship was an advance of 
the second type; that is, within a given state of perfection, exploring new ways to 
achieve this perfection. 
 
 Significantly, this latter form generates only a minor form of chaos, while 
harmony among the occasions is overwhelming. Eventually, though, the various 
possibilities for advance within a mode of perfection play themselves out and, at that 
point, repetition begins to produce a gradual lowering of vivid appreciation - 
convention dominates, suppressing adventure. Precisely at this point, adventure of 
the former type, the search for new perfections, becomes essential; there must be a 
‘leap of imagination … beyond the safe limits of the epoch, and beyond the safe 
limits of learned rules of taste’.
222
 A sense of discord occurs, until the contrasts can 
be resolved into new and larger patterns of harmony. Nothing can prevent this 
advance into novelty: there is no moment when the process halts or when being can 
be understood independently of becoming. And there is no end state, ‘no perfection 




 Of course, bad choices can be made as well as good ones, so a civilisation 
must possess other qualities such as Truth, Beauty and Peace, the highest goal being 
Beauty: ‘[t]he teleology of the universe is directed to the production of Beauty’.
224
 
Beauty is the internal conformation of the various items of experience with each 
other, that is, the perfection of harmony. Thus, an advancing civilisation must 
integrate in each present occasion three conditions: the infusion of pattern; the 
stability of pattern; the modification of pattern. What is required is ‘order entering 
upon novelty; so that the massiveness of order does not degenerate into mere 
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repetition; and so that the novelty is always reflected upon a background of system 
… But the two elements must not really be disjoined … In either alternative of 
excess, whether the past be lost, or be dominant, the present is enfeebled.   This is 




 But how does this scheme coordinate other features, such as morality?   
Whitehead sees morality as an aspect of beauty, it ‘consists in the aim at the ideal, 
and at its slowest it concerns the prevention of relapse to lower levels …’. In other 
words, ‘stagnation is the deadly foe of morality’.
226
 But there can be no universal 
moral ideals; moral codes are relative to social circumstance, useless when unduly 
rigid, most useful when they retain a provisional quality that remains sensitive to 
novel conduct that aims at higher perfections. Here, what is of greatest importance in 
any social system is the promotion of value experience among individual human 




Whitehead's Analysis of the Phases of Concrescence 
  
‘The creative advance of the world is the becoming, 
the perishing, and the objective immortalities of those 




Whitehead maintains that although each actual entity is in fact undivided, rational 
analysis can understand it as a process: ‘[t]he analysis of an actual entity is only 
intellectual … only objective. Each actual entity is a cell with atomic unity. But in 
analysis it can only be understood as a process; it can only be felt as a process, that is 
to say, as in passage. The actual entity is divisible; but is in fact undivided. The 
divisibility can thus only refer to its objectifications in which it transcends itself. But 
such transcendence is self-revelation’.
229
 We can summarise the basic elements of 
Whitehead’s theory for the simplest case in the following way. Every actual entity, 
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being dipolar, has both a physical pole (where it experiences other actual entities) 
and a mental pole (where it experiences possibilities and values). In the simplest 
case, an occasion’s concrescence (or process of becoming) consists of three phases: 
 
(a) The first phase constitutes the physical pole, the phase of physical 
prehensions, involving:  
 
(i) something to be received (the objective datum for the 
concrescence);  
(ii) the act of receiving or inheriting the objective datum (referred to 
as physical feeling);  
(iii) the way that the objective datum is received (the subjective form 
of physical feeling);  
(iv) the conformation of feeling (at least in the simplest case), since 
the subjective form of the physical feeling is the same as the form in 
the datum. 
 
(b) The second phase constitutes the mental pole, the phase of conceptual 
prehensions, involving: 
 
(i) the receiving or grasping of forms of definiteness (which are 
abstract potentials, or mere possibilities), also known as eternal 
objects; 
  (ii) the act of grasping eternal objects (conceptual feeling); 
 (iii) the way that eternal objects are received (the subjective form of 
conceptual feeling); that is, a valuation of the worth of the various 
possibilities open to it; 
 (iv) the determination of the relative worth of possibilities (the 
subjective aim of the concrescence). It is the desire to form the 
subjective aim (the concrescing subject’s appetition to make 
something of and for itself in the present) that drives the process of 
 74 
 
becoming. The initial subjective aim guides the process of valuations 
towards the production of the final subjective aim. 
 
(c) The third phase is the phase of simple comparative feelings: the 
integration of second phase conceptual feelings (and their valuations) with 
first phase physical feelings. Here, the actual occasion in the process of 
concrescence makes a ‘decision’ about which eternal object it will present in 
itself, integrating it with its physical prehension and thus terminating the 
process of becoming.   The actual entity becomes what it is - its subjectivity 
of becoming passing or ‘perishing’ immediately into the objectivity of being - 
and propels itself into the future as an objective datum to be taken account of 
by new concrescing subjects. In the simplest case, where only minimal or 
negligible novelty is introduced, this third phase forms what Whitehead terms 
a ‘physical purpose’, which accounts for the persistence of physical order in 
the universe.         
 
It will be clear that, even in the simplest case, subjects ‘are not simply what the past 




 Having summarised the basic elements of Whitehead's theory of 
concrescence for the simplest case, we are in a position to understand what he says 
about those more complex, ‘higher grade’, occasions and his description of the 
supplemental phases to the process of concrescence. In higher grade occasions, the 
concrescence does not terminate with the integration of conceptual and physical 
prehensions; instead, it produces a further datum, called a ‘metaphysical 
proposition’. A metaphysical proposition can be understood as formed by the 
application of a predicate (a possible form of definiteness), derived from an 
occasion's conceptual prehensions, to a subject, the actual entity (or entities) grasped 
in its physical prehensions. Whitehead calls this integrated prehension or feeling a 
‘propositional feeling’. Such a proposition lures the concrescing occasion towards 
feeling it. The proposition merely presents a possibility that may be acted upon; its 
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purpose is to influence the concrescence, not to express truth or falsehood. In higher 
grade occasions, as the concrescing occasion ‘feels’ the metaphysical proposition, 
and reacts to it, the third phase of concrescence grows more complex, becoming 
‘prolonged’ into sub-phases. Consciousness, or capability for language, is only a 
sufficient and not a necessary condition for the prehending or feeling of metaphysical 
propositions. 
 
 Plainly, in everyday life, we often act without conscious forethought, 
allowing propositions to influence or lure us into action that we might otherwise not 
have chosen, or which we later regret. Even when we consciously reflect upon 
possibilities, we often act without exercising rational judgment. Here, propositions 
attract us through value. We can see this in our aesthetic appreciation of, for 
example, Hamlet's famous soliloquy. As Whitehead puts it, we react to the 
proposition ‘To be or not to be …’ not on the basis of ‘a judgment concerning truth 
or falsehood but simply as a lure for feeling'.
231
 Such a proposition is purely 
theoretical but it draws us into Hamlet’s imaginary life, and from there to a deeper 
appreciation of the tragedy of all human life and, perhaps, to action. All this is 
accomplished through feeling of value; rational judgment and criticism arise only 
later, if at all. Thus, our conscious grasping of propositions and feelings of value, the 
'intuitive knowing' that allows us to acquire knowledge without the exercise of the 
formal process of reasoning, is a more basic form of knowledge than what we call 
‘rational knowing’. To affirm the existence of ‘intuitive knowing’ is not to 
contradict, negate or deny 'rational knowing' but merely to confirm that rational 
knowing enables us to criticise intuitive knowing and action, thereby deepening and 
improving our knowledge (and to say this is, perhaps, to do no more than give 
‘common sense’ its rightful place). So, Whitehead differentiates two distinct types of 
experience (conscious and unconscious) with regard to our feeling of and acting 
upon propositions, without the exercise of rational judgment.    
 
 But the integration of eternal objects with physical prehensions need not 
always result in propositional feelings. In the simplest case, as we have seen, the 
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integration terminates the concrescence: a ‘comparative feeling’ is formed but not 
‘felt’ as a proposition, since the concrescing occasion perishes immediately. In 
higher grade occasions, the concrescence does not terminate immediately and the 
integration of conceptual and physical prehensions is felt as a new datum for the 
concrescence, which is ‘prolonged’. Without consciousness, however, this amounts 
to no more than ‘flashes of novelty’
232
 at the mental pole of occasions.    
 
 Therefore, Whitehead says, ‘a proposition is a new kind of entity. It is a 
hybrid between pure potentialities and actualities’.
233
 Eternal objects, as we have 
noticed, do not in themselves possess any definite reference to any particular actual 
entities: ‘… an eternal object refers only to the purely general any among actual 
entities. In itself an eternal object evades any selection among actualities or epochs 
… This doctrine is the ultimate ground of empiricism; namely, that eternal objects 
tell no tales as to their ingressions’.
234
 Actual entities, on the other hand, ‘tell no 
tales’ about what is possible; only what has been. However, propositions, being 
hybrid entities, bring a new possibility, a new form of datum for feeling: a possibility 
linked to a concrete circumstance in the real world. A proposition, says Whitehead 
introduces ‘the possibility of that predicate applying in that assigned way to those 
logical subjects’.
235
 It is an entity, but not an actual entity. However, provided the 
logical subjects of the proposition are found within the ‘actual world’ of the 
occasion, then that proposition will be present in that occasion to act as a ‘lure’ for 
its feeling. 
 
 Now, a proposition, unlike an eternal object, ‘may be conformal or non-
conformal to the actual world’, says Whitehead. That is, whereas an eternal object 
simply is, a proposition, since it refers to determinate actual entities, may be either 
‘true or false’.
236
 However, considered merely as a proposition (that is, without 
reference to its logical subjects, the ‘reasons’ determining its truth or falsehood), a 
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proposition, like an eternal object, is indeterminate; it ‘tells no tales about itself’,
237
 
proclaiming only its possibility. Metaphysically, what this means is that false 
propositions represent potential for creative advance: from a ‘purely logical aspect, 
non-conformal propositions are merely wrong, and therefore worse than useless.   
But in their primary role, they pave the way along which the world advances into 
novelty.   Error is the price we pay for such progress’.
238
   
 
 In other words, whereas a true proposition may be regarded as a proposition 
that conforms to the ‘actual world’ of an occasion prehending it, a false proposition 
is one that does not: 
 
‘When a conformal proposition is admitted into feeling, the reaction to the 
datum has simply resulted in the conformation of feeling to fact …   The 
prehension of the proposition has abruptly emphasised one form of 






‘[w]hen a non-conformal proposition is admitted into feeling, the reaction to 
the datum has resulted in the synthesis of fact with the alternative potentiality 
of the complex predicate.   A novelty has emerged into creation.   The novelty 
may promote or destroy order; it may be good or bad.   But it is new, a new 
type of individual, and not merely a new intensity of individual feeling.   That 
member of the locus has introduced a new form into the actual world; or, at 




which is why: 
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‘in the real world it is more important that a proposition be interesting than it 




 The subjective form of a propositional prehension, like that of a conceptual 
prehension, can be described as an 'emotional' reaction to the inherent value of the 
proposition for the occasion's becoming. The concrescing occasion is either attracted 
or repelled by the possibility of actualising it for itself. In any case, either way, a 
‘decision’ is made. Propositional feelings, presenting the contrast between what is 
(physical prehension) and what might be (propositional datum) encourage greater 
subjective intensity of feeling. This contrast, felt in the concrescence, may ‘lure’ the 
occasion to ‘decide’ in favour of actualising the non-conformal proposition and, if 
this happens, then it does not merely repeat its inheritance from the past but 
introduces novelty into the world. 
 
 We can now begin to compare Whitehead's analysis of intellectual feelings 
and consciousness with this stage of propositional feelings. To summarise: (a) a 
propositional feeling ‘feels’ the contrast between a possibility and a fact; (b) the 
concrescing subject's reaction of the propositional feeling is an unconscious 
evaluation of its worth to the concrescing subject; the concrescence may terminate 
with the formation of its ‘unconscious purpose’, that is, the integration of the 
propositional feeling with the occasion's original physical prehension.    
 
 However, the concrescence need not necessarily terminate here. This 
integration may itself become the datum for a further feeling, evoking consciousness 
as the dominant subjective form of feeling. This is an intellectual feeling. That is, an 
intellectual feeling not only ‘feels’ the contrast ((a) above), but can distinguish 
possibility from fact. In other words, the intellectual feeling not only apprehends the 
propositional feeling as possibility (‘theory’) and the physical prehension as fact but 
is also aware of the contrast. This awareness is consciousness, the subjective form of 
the intellectual feeling. Thus, while a propositional feeling merely ‘feels’ the contrast 
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between fact and possibility, an intellectual feeling may be said to know the contrast 
between fact and theory. That is: 
 
‘[i]n awareness actuality, as a process in fact, is integrated with the 
potentialities which illustrate either what is and might not be, or what is not 
and might be. In other words, there is no consciousness without reference to 
definiteness, affirmation, and negation. Also affirmation involves its contrast 
with negation, and negation involves its contrast with affirmation. Further, 
affirmation and negation are alike meaningless apart from reference to the 





Thus, in the case where a conformal proposition is consciously apprehended and 
evaluated, there is at the same time an awareness of the possibility that the character 
of the propositional feeling might be otherwise; that is, even while and although the 
conscious intellectual feeling compares the propositional feeling with the data of its 
physical prehensions and judges that it is not, in fact, otherwise. Similarly, in the 
case of the conscious apprehension and evaluation of a non-conformal proposition, 
where the intellectual feeling informs the concrescing subject that something is not 
but might yet be. 
 
 Moreover, without physical prehensions there cannot be consciousness: 
 
‘Wherever there is consciousness there is some element of recollection.   It 
recalls earlier phases from the dim recesses of the unconscious …   
[C]onsciousness enlightens experience which precedes it, and could be 




The conscious intellectual feeling recalls the propositional feeling and the initial 
physical prehension (both of which are unconscious) to ‘enlighten’ the ‘earlier’ 
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experience.   Just so, ‘this character of our experience suggests that consciousness is 




 How do intellectual feelings function and why are they important?   
According to Whitehead’s scheme, ‘the primary function of conscious intellectual 
feelings is to shed light on the grounds for “decision” and so assist in the formation 
of an occasion's subjective aim. The importance of intellectual feelings rests in the 
fact that consciousness introduces critical ability into the concrescence of the 
occasion.   It enables the occasion to form a judgment before it commits itself to the 




 In unconsciousness, ‘decisions’ involve valuation (the attraction to the 
possibility embodied in an eternal object or a proposition), but not criticism. ‘The 
primitive form of physical experience’, says Whitehead, ‘is emotional – blind 
emotion’. That is, the occasion commits itself to actualising a possibility that it does 
not visualise. It is consciousness that allows the occasion to evaluate critically a 
proposition before it ‘decides’ to actualise it, and also to criticise its own 
unconscious valuations. Consciousness prepares the way for a formation of 
judgment: ‘an intellectual feeling is aware of the difference between the mere 
possibility represented in the proposition and the actual facts represented in the 
physical prehensions. The intellectual feeling integrates these two, the merely 
possible and the actual fact. The subjective form of this integral feeling must include 
judgment of what is, what is not, and what might be in its datum’.
246
    
 
 ‘[C]onscious perception is’, Whitehead maintains, ‘the most primitive form 
of judgment’.
247
 Consequently, the most primitive form of knowledge is conscious 
intellectual feelings, the form of knowledge that is shared by most animals.  
Judgment (not, that is, the rational judgment of higher animals but this primitive 
form of judgment,) allows a concrescing occasion the opportunity to alter its decision 
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regarding how it will form itself. Intellectual feelings allow the concrescing subject 
to criticise its propositional lures: ‘[a] judgment weakens or strengthens the decision 
whereby the judged proposition, as a constituent in the lure, is admitted as an 
efficient element in the concrescence, with the reinforcement of knowledge. A 
judgment is the critique of a lure for feeling’.
248
 Further, ‘consciousness is like a 
spotlight’, says Thomas Hosinski, focussing attention on something that matters to 
the concrescing subject at that moment … There is a vague awareness of [everything 




 In this sense, then, we can see that the judgment we are concerned with in 
conscious intellectual feelings
250
 relates entirely to the immediacy of the becoming of 
the judging subject: ‘[i]n the philosophy of organism, an actual occasion … is the 
whole universe in process of attainment of a particular satisfaction … The final 
actuality is the particular process with its particular attainment of satisfaction. The 
actuality of the universe is merely derivative from its solidarity in each actual entity 
… [J]udgment concerns the universe as objectified from the standpoint of the 
judging subject. It concerns the universe through that subject’.
251
 Thus, it is not so 
much the truth or falsity of the proposition that is important in this respect but the 
question of the possibilities offered through the proposition given the physical data 
of the immediate situation. In other words, in relation to its ‘particular attainment of 
satisfaction’ the concrescing subject is concerned solely with the question of this 
possibility and these facts: the judgment made will determine its self-constitution in 
this moment.   
 
 How then, does Whitehead’s theory of concrescence contribute to our 
understanding of the present problem? While Whitehead's theory, as we have seen, is 
extremely complex, our everyday understanding of the world (and of legal reality) is 
characterised by the attempt to reduce complexity, to make things simpler and more 
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manageable. Is it not a retrograde step, to recognise the achievement that is (for 
example) law and to then begin to reintroduce complexity? Is this not simply to make 
our understanding unmanageable again, rather than to aid or improve understanding? 
We need to recognise that reduction is only a limited achievement that helps us to 
communicate within boundaries and that, in fact, the greater achievement is to 
forever push at and expand those boundaries for, as the old saying goes, a horizon is 
nothing but the limit of our sight. The problem is that our ideas, our conscious 
awareness of things, are too simple, not that they are too complex. We train 
ourselves to ignore the complexity of the world and our participation in it. ‘In this 
way’, writes Hosinski, ‘we are like swimmers on the surface of the ocean, aware of a 





 How does this increase of complexity that Whitehead’s theory represents 
contribute to our understanding? As we have seen, Whitehead’s analysis confirms 
that it is in the later, responsive phases of concrescence in the higher organisms that 
sense perception occurs (ie. in the integrative and reintegrative phases of physical, 
conceptual and propositional feelings). Furthermore, its occurrence here is dependent 
on the earlier, simpler, unconscious phases. Sense perception is understood, in 
Whitehead’s terms, within the whole act of perception, which he calls ‘symbolic 
reference’. Symbolic reference
253
 (which corresponds to an intellectual feeling) is the 
integration of ‘perception in the mode of presentational immediacy’ (which 
corresponds to the conscious apprehending of a propositional feeling) and 
‘perception in the mode of causal efficacy’ (which corresponds to the initial physical 
prehensions). It functions by the referral of data given in one mode to that given in 
the other mode.   That is, symbolic reference integrates the data in the propositional 
feeling with the data in the initial physical prehension. It is therefore utterly 
dependent upon these. Physical prehensions are, then, the more primitive form of  
ingredients of our experience; sense perception is utterly dependent on ‘perception in 
the mode of causal efficacy’. 
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 Whitehead maintains that his theory, in showing how a moment of experience 
includes within itself several types of relations between a concrescing subject and the 
actual world, not only reveals but corrects a defect in modern epistemology. Ever 
since Hume and Kant, the difficulty of showing a relationship between a knowing 
subject and an object that is known has plagued epistemology. Both Hume and Kant 
assumed that the most primitive ingredients in experience are sense perceptions, 
abstract universals not referenced to any particular. This meant that it became 
impossible to identify and demonstrate any sort of fundamental, necessary 
relationship between knower and the known. While Hume concluded that it is 
doubtful whether we can ever really know anything at all, Kant affirmed that all 
knowledge is knowledge of things filtered through the structure of our minds 
(phenomena) and not of things in themselves (noumena). Nonetheless, knowledge as 
such multiplies! Whitehead's answer to this is his identification of the ontological 
ground for the possibility of knowledge; the revelation of those of a concrescing 
subject. It is these relations that make knowledge possible: ‘all relatedness has its 




‘“Actuality” is the decision amid “potentiality”. It represents stubborn fact 
which cannot be evaded. The real internal constitution of an actual entity 
progressively constitutes a decision conditioning the creativity which 
transcends that actuality. The Castle rock at Edinburgh exists from moment to 
moment, and from century to century, by reason of the decision effected by 
its own historic route of antecedent occasions. And if, in some vast upheaval 
of nature, it were shattered into fragments, that convulsion would still be 
conditioned by the fact that it was the destruction of that rock. The point to be 
emphasised is the insistent particularity of things experienced and of the act 
of experiencing. Bradley's doctrine – Wolf-eating-Lamb as a universal 
qualifying the absolute – is a travesty of the evidence. That wolf eat that lamb 
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Whitehead's complex ontological theorising only confirms that which, by common 
sense, we already know to be the case: ‘[t]he very possibility of knowledge should 
not be an accident …; it should depend on the interwoven natures of things’.
256
   
What ‘[t]he problem of concrescence solves is, how the many components of the 
objective content are to be unified in one felt content with its complex subjective 
form …   [I]n its phase of satisfaction, the entity has attained its individual separation 
from other things; it has absorbed the datum, and it has not yet lost itself in the swing 
back to the “decision” whereby its appetition becomes an element in the data of other 




 There is one further consequence of Whitehead’s thinking that we need to 
deal with before we can turn to consider properly its significance for law. That is the 
relation between rational knowing and ontological knowing. On the one hand, we 
have already pointed to the distinction between these two forms of knowing. We 
have seen that, for Whitehead, ontological knowing rests on a judgment concerning 
the immediate becoming of a concrescing subject. What is at stake is not 
propositional truth or falsehood but self-constitution; that is, how the concrescing 
subject will form itself in this moment given those propositional and physical 
feelings. Rational knowing, however, is the product of many moments’ inferences, 
reflections, balancings of weight of evidence, rational judgment. What is at stake 
here is precisely propositional truth. Here, ‘there is abstraction from the judging 
subject. The subjectivist principle has been transcended, and the judgment has shifted 
its emphasis … to the truth-value of the proposition in question’.
258
 On the other 
hand, as Hosinski points out, we can see how ‘this distinction also reveals the 
connection between ontological knowing and rational knowing’.
259
 Rational 
knowledge requires insight (the ability to distinguish between different possible 
understanding of a problem) and reflective judgment (a decision in respect of the 
correspondence of possible understandings with facts of experience), both of which 
are momentary events and a type of intellectual feeling that Whitehead terms 
                                                 
256
 Ibid., p. 190. 
257
 Ibid., p. 154. 
258
 Ibid., pp. 191-192. 
259
 Hosinski (1993), p. 122. 
 85 
 
‘intuitive judgments’. Thus, rational knowing ‘is based in all of its key points in the 
more basic ontological knowing’ and, further, ‘the structure of rational knowing, 
though it involves many individual moments of experience, is parallel to the structure 
of a single moment of experience’. Indeed, ‘[i]t seems clear that the three phases of 
rational knowing [particular observation; imaginative generalization; renewed 
observation] correspond to the three phases of concrescence [physical prehensions; 
conceptual prehensions; integration of prehensions in decision]’.
260
 Moreover, the 
‘correspondence becomes even closer when we consider the concrescence of an 
actual occasion of higher grade’ and, ‘[i]n an occasion that is conscious, the same 
correspondence holds, except that in this case the subject is aware of what is mere 
theory and what is fact … This … introduces judgment prior to “decision” and thus 
is the most primitive form of knowing. Here, the structural correspondence to 




 We have seen that, for Whitehead, rational knowing finds its basis in 
ontological knowing. What is the purpose of rational knowing? We need to 
remember that the possibility of knowledge is found in the relations between a 
knowing subject and the actual world. But every moment of experience is a reduction 
from complexity, an abstraction from fullness and a selection (which begins in the 
first phase of concrescence and continues throughout). Further, each decision in an 
occasion of experience is a decision determined by a concern in respect of its own 
becoming. This introduces the possibility of error. Rational knowing, stimulated by a 
concern for self-transcendent truth, for a harmony of truth beyond a simple concern 
with the self, can be a means of refining, enhancing and correcting an individual's 
connection with the world of the past and the future (at least to the extent that this 
might inform acting). Reflective inquiry allows us to examine critically the 
commitments, decisions, judgments and purposes that condition our aspirations. 
Nonetheless, without exception, our use of reason always tends towards greater 
abstraction, a further reduction of, and a increase in, complexity. We look, select and 
act, grasping truth only incompletely and pursuing our purposes with blissful 
ignorance; unable to apprehend what does not fall within our field of vision and 
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unable to comprehend that we have not seen it. It is just at this point, then, that 
critical reason may help to illuminate our understanding of the greater concrete 
reality from which we habitually abstract: 
 
‘Apart from detail, and apart from system, a philosophic outlook is the very 
foundation of thought and of life. The sort of ideas we attend to, and the sort 
of ideas which we push into the negligible background, govern our hopes, our 
fears, our control of behaviour’.
262
 
                                                 
262





LESSONS FROM ORGANIZATION THEORY 
 
The Attack on a Metaphysics of Substance 
 
In the field of organisation studies, several theorists have begun to utilise a process 
metaphysics to argue against what they describe as a tendency towards reification.
263
 
By means of a deconstructive analysis of organisation they are beginning to 
challenge approaches to Organisation theory and management which view 
organisations effectively as outcomes of forgetting (as constituted by conventional 
wisdom but pre-existing our experiential knowledge of them) and argue for a 
refocusing on the practices of organising rather than the features and effects by 
which we define organisations (boundaries, environments, goals, strategies). Here, 
we find evidence of an increasing processual awareness of organisations as ‘loose 
and active assemblages of organisings’
264
, as ever-moving groupings of dynamic acts 
rather than static structures. Such an understanding, it is claimed, can help to foster a 
more constructive consideration of organisations than has been possible on the basis 
of ideas derived from the mechanistic and rationalist assumptions of Newtonian 
thought. 
 
On this view, the problem as inherited is three-fold:
265
 in the first place, 
Newtonian assumptions have now become ‘so firmly entrenched that they [have] led 
to the creation of a disciplinary self-image, whereby the field [has drawn] the 
boundaries around itself so narrowly as to exclude th[os]e ideas and practices … 
which [are] not modern’;
266
 second, theoretical development is now underpinned by 
‘progression’: there is an ‘assumption that we are part of a continuous progress in 
supplying ever more adequate unifying conceptions’;
267
 third, ‘conventional 
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analytical approaches adopted by mathematics and the physical sciences [have 
proved] impotent in helping us fully understand … [our] experience of change’.
268
 
This is because ‘commonly held notions of time and sequencing of events … 
[together with a] reliance on scientific systems for objective analysis fail to recognise 
[that] our experience of temporality and change is one of indivisible movement.’
269
 
Of course it is true that, at one level, ‘formal organisations [do] accomplish through 
an architecture of constraints, … highly stable and discriminate types of 
behaviour’
270
 but, in organisation studies at least, it is also quite clear that Newtonian 
terminology is gradually being replaced by a new, and ‘significantly less mechanistic 
than before’,
271
 Aristotelian or Heraclitian style of thinking more in tune with a 
processual understanding of the world. This newer way of thinking both encourages 
a consideration of how a subject may intervene upon the experience of the object and 
discourages a view of chaos as antithetical to organisation; instead, there is a 
growing awareness of the importance of unpredictability, multiplicity, novelty and 
surprise.
272
 In sum, such a view ‘fosters … awareness of dynamic processes; it 
encourages a positive attitude toward unpredictability and novelty; and it invites us 




Thus, we can discern a significant shift in organisation studies from thinking 
of organisations as entities to a ‘more ontologically and epistemologically aware 
understanding’
274
 of the process of organising as 
 
‘a complex and dynamic web of interlocking visual acts of arresting, 
punctuating, isolating and classifying of the essentially undivided flow of 
human experiences for the purpose of rendering more controllable and 
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and the act of organising, as ‘an interminable ontological quest of carving out a 
version of reality from what would otherwise be an amorphous and indistinguishable 
mass’.
276
   
 
Robert Chia maintains that those ‘common organizational attributes’ that 
positivists and realists allegedly discover are in reality only ‘mirror images of their 
own deeply-entrenched thought structures'. Alternatively, commitment to a ‘process-
based becoming ontology’ would open up possibilities for ‘rethinking’ organization 
in terms that better reflect its essential characteristics as a process of 'world-
making'.
277
 This alternative approach ‘draws its inspiration from a vastly different set 
of ontological and epistemological priorities and … is more epistemologically 
robust’.
278
    
 
He identifies six enduring ‘instincts’, characteristic of positivistic thought: 
 
‘First, there is an emphasis placed on the idea of empirical verification or 
some variant such as "falsification" as a key principle … [which] requires 
that all theoretical principles be empirically tested to determine whether or 
not such propositions are at all true. Second, positivists are strongly 
observational … [T]hey believe that what we can see, feel, touch or sense 
directly provides the best foundation for all forms of knowledge. Third, there 
is much support for the Humean notion … for explaining cause and effect … 
Cause … is understood to be the likelihood of one event following another. 
No attempt is made to seek out any underlying causes or generative 
mechanisms … When one event follows another in a regular predictable 
manner, a causal relationship is said to exist. Fourth, positivists see the task 
of science as enabling the prediction of events.   Explanations of the past are 
attempted only in so far as they help determine the predictability of the 
future. The idea of understanding past events for their own sake is 
underemphasized. Fifth, positivists reject the existence of theoretical entities, 
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insisting that primary importance is placed on observable reality … [rather 
than] non-observable mechanisms … Finally, empirically untestable 
propositions, unobservable entities, deep causes … belong to the realm of idle 
speculation …’    
 
These six instincts, Chia says, provide the ‘epistemological justification for a 
positivist view of scientific inquiry’.
279
   However, this positivistic epistemology 
clearly derives from a set of ‘ontological commitments’ with their roots in a 
Parmenidean cosmology:  
 
‘First, reality is made up of discrete, self,-identical “things” which are 
conceptually isolatable and which exist, independently of our perceptual 
apprehension. Second, these things or entities are primary to process. This 
means that change and transformation are epiphenomena of entities, not 
primary processes constitutive of them. Being precedes and is primary to 
becoming … Third, the state of rest, stability and equilibrium is a natural 
state.   Movement only occurs when things are “disturbed” or “pertubated”. 
Fourth, an external force is required to initiate change, movement or 
adaptation … This imputation of the requirement of an external force is what 
precipitates the widely-assumed notion of “causation” and its attendant 
effects. Finally, the commitment to a being ontology precipitates a subject-
predicate mode of thought in which linguistic terms and categories are 
deemed to be more adequate to the description of reality. Literal, precise and 
parsimonious language is encouraged because these are deemed to be more 
able to accurately "capture" and represent reality as it is in itself ’.
280
    
 
Chia maintains that contemporary organizational theorizing ‘tacitly 
presupposes’ this notion of the necessary pre-existence of enduring presentational 
forms in that it more or less assumes such an ‘entitative conception of reality' in 
which ‘clear-cut, definite things … occupy clear-cut, definite places’, a style of 
thinking ‘in which the “thingness” of things, social entities, and their properties and 
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‘this very act of “foregrounding” organizations as clearly circumscribed, 
legitimate objects of analysis, whilst at the same time denying the status of 
the network of organizing from which this theoretical object has been 
abstracted, is itself an ontological act of organization. Organization … now 
refers to these inclusive and exclusive divisional acts of “reality-constituting” 
or “world-making” … which necessarily precede any form of … theorizing 
… [E]ven "individuals" have to be constructed and legitimized before they 
can enter … discourse as legitimate objects of knowledge … Knowledge 
about organizations and organization of knowledge … implicate and 
explicate each other and are thereby irretrievably intertwined. Only by a 
dogmatic and intellectually convenient process of “forgetting” its “other” can 




We can see how this ‘forgetting’ happens from an explanation that Steve 
Woolgar provides.
283
 Woolgar identifies a five stage ‘splitting and inversion model 
of discovery’ in the scientific research process: (i) first, there is the production of 
(often speculative) documents; (ii) this is followed by the projection of the existence 
of that object that will become the legitimate focus of investigation; (iii) at the same 
time, perception of this ‘object’ grows until it attains an existence of its own, 
independent of all notions of it; (iv) next, the relationship becomes inverted, and the 
idea forms that it is in fact the object itself that stimulates attention towards it; (v) 
and, finally, this inversion becomes so embedded in the research process that stages 
(i)-(iii) are either ‘forgotten’ or denied. Woolgar believes that this model is 
sufficiently robust as an explanatory device to be generally applicable and useful for 
understanding the practice of all forms of representational thinking. Chia maintains 
that any ‘findings’ obtained in this way will simply mirror the ‘unquestioned 
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predisposition to think in static, structured and discrete terms’, thereby reinforcing a 
belief in the validity of those findings.    
 
This is precisely the point that Michael Baxendall makes in relation to 
Kenneth Clark's account of Piero della Francesca’s Baptism of Christ: 
 
‘[W]e are at once conscious of a geometric framework; and a few seconds’ 
analysis shows us that it is divided into thirds horizontally, and into quarters 
vertically. The horizontal divisions come, of course, on the line of the Dove’s 
wings and the line of the Angel's hands, Christ’s loin-cloth and the Baptist's 
left hand; the vertical divisions are the pink angel’s columnary drapery, the 
central line of the Christ and the back of St John. These divisions form a 
central square, which is again divided into thirds and quarters, and a triangle 
drawn within this square, having its apex at the Dove and its base at the lower 




Baxandall’s point is that Clark’s use of language represents not so much a 
description of the picture itself as Clark’s own thoughts about the picture and his 
attempt to provide an explanation of it: ‘what one offers in a description is a 
representation of thinking about a picture more than a representation of a picture’.
285
 
So, for Chia, if we really want to understand the complexity of the world, we need to 
acquire a more dynamic understanding of complexity that will improve our 
awareness of the indivisibility of movement and change, the interpenetration of past, 
present and future. He suggests embracing a qualitative awareness of duration as an 
indivisible flux and becoming, a fusion of heterogenous instants; a corresponding 
relinquishing of the dominant spatialized conception of time that conceives of 
movement as a set of rests along the line of a trajectory. To think complexly is, he 
claims, ‘to avoid the seductive appeal of the metaphysics of presence, to resist the 
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overwhelming tendency to think in terms of simple location, and to recognize the 
immanent, enfolded and implicate character of phenomena’.
286
    
 
Nonetheless, social life becomes possible only when it is seen as ‘simple 
location’, when entities are in fact posited as discrete isolated systems existing in 
space-time.   Understood in this way, organization becomes a simplifying ontological 
activity in which  
 
‘subjective phenomenal experiences are simply located, fixed, externalized, 
and objectified into isolatable elements ready for reconstitution by the 
intellect’.
287
    
 
That is, we perceive the world as the outcome of an organizing process: ‘All our 
belief in objects, all our operations on the systems that science isolates, rest in fact on 
the idea that time does not bite into them’.
288
 However, the point is that we need to 
balance this realization with a deeper one, thinking in a complex way that will 
overcome this self-imposed simplification. 
 
In several recent contributions to organisation studies, Stephen Linstead, 
Anthony O'Shea, Roland Calori and Martin Wood have adopted Henri Bergson’s 
thinking to present a fresh challenge to the notion that punctuated equilibria can ever 
form an adequate basis for understanding radical novelty or creative advance. As 
their arguments suggest, whereas Bergson’s thought on the importance of intuition as 
a form of knowing allows normative concerns for the production and use of 
knowledge to be reconceived in terms of essentially dynamic movements of enfolded 
meanings relating all things at all places and times, organisation theory has failed to 
take this into account. Wood, for example, following Bergson and Deleuze, suggests  
 
‘an alternative becoming ontology, in which theory becomes part of practice 
at the same time as practice becomes part of theory.   There is a practice-
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becoming of theory and a theory-becoming of practice, a double capture since 
“what” each becomes changes no less than “that which” becomes …   The 
production-use relationship is therefore not one of integration between 
extrinsically distinct entities, but one of internal difference with a focus on 
differentiation and division’.
289
    
 
This substitution of a Parmenidean-based theory of unchanging reality with a 
rediscovered ‘Heraclitean-inspired’ world-view, where ‘everything is in flux, and 
nothing is at rest' is simply the realization that ‘we are living in a world of change 
whose processes are imperceptible: there is change but there are no things that 
change’.  Reality cannot be analysed purely in terms of ‘spatialized and localized 
end-states … [I]nformation and communication do not merely convey 
representational contents that bridge the various stages of an evolutionary process but 
also contribute to the fabrication of new assemblages of movement, flows, 
stimulation and connections that cannot be simply located’.
 290
    
 
Wood adopts the idea of ‘creative involution’
291
 to express this ‘relaxation of 
natural, obvious and reified forms, and the creation … of heterogeneous 
combinations and novel alliances … cut[ting] across and beneath … assignable 
relations', and to emphasise ‘modes of “transversal communication” … that scramble 
simple, genealogical lineages and allow heterogeneous assemblages to develop and 
break out across closed thresholds and species’.   In this way, he is able to represent 
these in Deleuzian terms as ‘rhizomic web[s] of continual transversal communication 
… involv[ing] “unnatural” combinations, mergers, incorporations and associations 
…’ Thus,  ‘strictly speaking, the points are not real positions [but] a non-localizable 
line of becoming, a middle, an in-between that recognizes the continual participation 
of points within each other, even though in reality one does not become the other, or 
achieve any necessary correspondence with it.’ As Deleuze and Guattari put it, 
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‘A line of becoming is not defined by points that it connects, or by points that 
compose it; on the contrary, it passes between points …  [It] has neither 
beginning nor end, departure nor arrival, origin nor destination …   A line of 
becoming is only a middle.   The middle is not an average; it is fast motion, it 
is the absolute speed of movement.   A becoming is always in the middle; one 
can only get at it from the middle; it is the in-between, the border … no man's 
land, a nonlocalisable relation sweeping up the two distant or contiguous 
points, carrying one into the proximity of the other’.
292
    
 
But ‘[w]hy’, Wood asks, 'is involution creative?’ Essentially, because it ‘has 
to do with communications that cut across distinct lineages, … that have a tendency 
to break out of fixed or stable determinations … [I]ts inventions do not exist in 
advance but involve rhizomic modes of becoming … bound up with [what Bergson 
calls] the creation of forms … [and] the continual elaboration of the absolutely 
new’.
293
    The contrary idea that knowledge can be produced and subsequently used 
involves ‘abstractions from an idealized space foreign to real movement’,
294
 a notion 
which, as Chia points out, is a ‘confusion [that] results from a total misunderstanding 
of movement and trajectory, conflating one with the other’;
295
 in other words, a 
confusion of ‘lived time’ with ‘clock time’. For Bergson, intellectual analysis 
customarily proceeds on the basis of a reduction of the object of interest to an a 
priori, already established, set of conceptual elements; that is, a translation into pre-
defined symbols of representation and organizing codes. But this type of analysis can 
only ever express an object as a function of something other than itself, alienating it 
from itself. It ‘multiplies without end the number of its points of view in order to 
complete its always incomplete representation, … ceaselessly var[ying] its symbols 
that it may perfect the always imperfect translation’.
296
 Intuition, on the other hand, 
attempts to help make contact with the reality of change and movement. It is a 
method of thinking in duration; a temporal synthesis of passing images into one 
coherent whole. He illustrates this point with the example of an artist visiting Paris.   
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The artist makes numerous sketches of the city, writing underneath each the word 
‘Paris’.   Because he has actually been there, he will be able to place this multiplicity 
of created images within his original intuition and synthesize them within his original 
intuitive experience of Paris as a unique whole. But only because he has been there: 
it would be impossible to achieve this synthesis otherwise. So, for Bergson, intuition 
is not mysterious; rather, it is a discipline, something we can all develop to a greater 
or lesser degree.
297
 Nonetheless, in our favouring of the intellect as the more useful 
faculty, we have thereby neglected the status of intuition:  
 
‘It is a lamp almost extinguished which only glimmers now and then for a 
few moments … whenever a vital interest is at stake … [I]t throws a light, 
feeble and vacillating, but which none the less, pierces the darkness of the 
night in which the Intellect leaves us’.
298
    
 
Chia suggests that we should see here, in this comparison of these two modes 
of thinking, the beginnings of ‘a more complex and dynamic’ mode of inquiry. 
‘What are subliminal about Bergsonian intuition are its fleeting characteristics’ says 
Chia, and this is something that ‘finds sympathetic resonance with what the art 
theorist Norman Bryson calls the logic of the glance’.
299
 For Bryson, ‘the dominant 
factor in shaping our current forms of knowing is that of ocular vision and in 
particular the “method” of the Gaze’. However, comparing Western and Chinese 
painting methods, Bryson comments that whilst the former is predicated on the 
'disavowal of deictic reference' the latter is predicated on the ‘acknowledgement and 
indeed the cultivation of deictic markers’.  What ‘deictic’ refers to is that 
characteristic where ‘[t]he work of production is constantly displayed in the wake of 
its traces’, where ‘the body of labour is on constant display’.
300
   But this 
characteristic, Bryson insists, is almost impossible to retrieve in Western paintings, 
where ‘the viewer cannot ascertain the degree to which other surfaces lie concealed 
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beneath the planar display’.
301
 There, in Picasso’s paintings, for example, the work of 
erasure stops only when the original image becomes totally invisible, 
indistinguishable behind the view of the completed picture. We can see then, says 
Chia, how ‘[i]n one case the process of becoming is incorporated into the painting 
whilst in the other the process has been eliminated’ and ‘[t]he painting is placed 
outside duration’.
302
  Bryson develops this distinction between these two attitudes  
 
‘to reflect on two logics of presentation: the Gaze which is fixing, prolonged 
and contemplative, and the Glance which is “a furtive or sideways look 
whose attention is always elsewhere”. Painting of the Gaze attempts to arrest 
and extract from the fleeting process. It is a vision disembodied …   [T]he 
painter: “arrests the flux of the phenomena, contemplates the visual field 
from a vantage-point outside the mobility of duration, in an eternal moment 
of disclosed presence”. The Gaze is penetrating, piercing, fixing, 
objectifying.  It is a violent act of forcibly and permanently “present-ing” that 
which otherwise would be a fluxing, moving reality.   Painting of the Glance, 
on the other hand, addresses “vision in the durational temporality of the 
viewing subject”; it does not seek to bracket out the process of viewing, nor 
in its own techniques does it exclude the traces of the body of labour … 
calligraphic work cannot be taken in all at once … since it has itself unfolded 




We can see, then, says Chia, how ‘Bergson's attempt to deconstruct the 
symbolic systems of representation in order to achieve an Intuition with mobile 
reality is a form of thinking in duration not unlike that exemplified by Bryson's logic 
of the Glance …   [B]oth these intellectual attitudes presuppose reality to be mobile, 
fluxing and flowing’.
304
   The glance takes in ‘dispersal – the disjointed rhythm of 
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 and it is precisely this ‘peripheral vision’, a ‘corner-of-the-eye 




The Deleuzian Inheritance 
 
Clearly, it is the assumption in favour of the ‘simple location’ of ‘things’ and their 
causal mechanisms that makes possible a ‘correspondence theory of truth’ between 
linguistic terms and the external world of objects they are used to represent. Yet, this 
‘representationalist epistemology’ clearly involves a transfer of focus away from the 
processes of change and towards the outcomes of change. Understood thus, change is 
really not much more than the temporary bridging of a series of various evolutionary 
stages. The basic ontological assumption here is that reality is essentially separate, 
substantial and stable. Without this assumption the correspondence theory of truth 
falls and, with it, potentially at least, the whole structure of causal and explanatory 
linkages and categories upon which it is built. This way of thinking, as we have seen, 
still dominates mainstream legal theory. MacCormick’s institutional theory of law 
with its framework of legal concepts regulated by a tri-partite structure of institutive, 
consequential and terminative rules, with its articulation of the requirement of formal 
justice in terms of the universalisability of reasons and a dependence on the idea of the 
possibility of wholesale rational resolution to rational dispute, owes much to this post 
Enlightenment-inspired world-view. 
 
Chia notes three dominant emphases that characterize the process-
metaphysical approach of writers such as Bergson and Whitehead. These are: firstly, 
‘an unequivocal commitment to a process epistemology and to … the heterogeneous 
becoming of things’; secondly, an adherence to ‘the logic of otherness’; and, thirdly, a 
‘principle of immanence’.
307
 The French writer Gilles Deleuze is clearly in the process 
tradition of Bergson and Whitehead. Deleuze’s main interest is with the articulation of 
a theory of change and transformation that, with the aid of a new vocabulary free from 
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 will help develop an understanding of pure heterogeneous 
becoming. His choice of the idea of a ‘rhizome’ offers an alternative conceptualization 
that, at first sight at least, appears resistant to the reductionist trends of modernist 
theorizing. As a ‘subterranean stem’, the rhizome is ‘absolutely different from roots 
and radicles’, says Deleuze. It ‘assumes very diverse forms, from ramified surface 
extension in all directions to concretion into bulbs and tubers. The rhizome includes 




This ‘rhizomic’ model appears to incorporate a way of thinking that is 
consistent with the main features of process thought identified above: heterogeneous 
becoming; otherness; immanence; indeed, rhizomes epitomize indeterminacy and 
heterogeneity. Whereas the growth of tree roots commonly exhibit a predictable 
pattern according to the principles of binary logic, ‘any point of a rhizome may be 
connected to anything other, and must be’, and this random connecting of any point to 
any other forms a bulb, or tubers. Here, change spreads by variation,
 
is restless, 
opportunistic and sudden. This subtle, agglomerative, often subterranean and 
heterogeneous form of change
310
 shows how ‘[r]hizomic change is anti-genealogical 
in the sense that it resists the linear retracing of a definite locatable originary point of 
initiation’.
311
 Change is ‘multiple, unending and unexpectedly other. There is no 
unitary point to serve as a natural pivot for constructing subject and object, for 
drawing boundaries that define inside and outside and that distinguish “macro” from 
“micro”’.
312
 Such terms, which both derive from and are the foundation of a 
logocentric analysis, give way to multiplicities that ‘have only densities, 
determinations and lines of connections that ripple outwards’.
313
 The pattern is not 
linear, but a three dimensional networking of change representing the opportunities 
for the actualization of possibilities for becoming.
314
 Change, transformation, is not 
pre-determined by any prearranged pattern.  
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This probabilistic approach to the dynamic of change is, as Chia observes, 
‘reminiscent of Prigogine’s powerful explanation of irreversibility and indeterminacy.   
Prigogine expressed deep unease about the inconsistency between the idealized, stable 
predictable world described by modern physics and the unstable, unpredictable world 
of living organisms. The real world, he claimed, evolved its ‘most delicate and 
complex structure’ only through irreversible processes of nature: ‘Life is possible only 
in a nonequilibrium universe’.
315
 Therefore, life, nature, the world must all be 
understood in terms of possibilities and not certainties. Change does not take place 




In the same way, ideas of causality require to be replaced with notions 
depicting the ‘coupling of events loosely analogous to the coupling of sounds by 
resonance’. This means developing a new, non-Newtonian vocabulary wholly 
‘incompatible with a trajectory description’, which requires instead a ‘probabilistic 
description’.
317
 Importantly, there is no determinism involved here. Outcomes can 
always be surprises, other than expected. As Hart
318
 observed, the nature and limits of 
thought and language can serve as the precursor of an element of the surprising: 
surprise, novelty, creativity are all in-built, of the very essence and meaning of change 
and transformation. Precisely because we insist on encoding our experiences of reality 
into explicitly articulated rules and symbols, shortcomings are thereby built into our 
working model of reality. However, this is not because our model is incomplete, and 
must continually be updated with an explicit rendering of what is already implicit 
within it; on the contrary, it is because our models tend to distort and misrepresent the 
changing nature of reality. True change has something of the unexpected, 
unpredictable, and therefore unanticipated nature of surprise about it; something of the 
character of ‘otherness’.       
 
According to Chia, the point is that ‘chance and necessity are not polar 
opposites’; rather, they ‘implicate and structure the possibilities for one another’. In 
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other words, they ‘are other to each other and express themselves through the 
operation of change. In the language of process metaphysics, we can say that chance 
leans towards otherness, necessity leans towards immanence. Thus, the change in 
continuity (otherness) and the continuity in change (immanence)’.
319
   
 
At least from the standpoint of a process metaphysics change, surprise and 
novel adventure are all essential conditions of reality, in particular of living systems, 
without which existence would not be possible. Therefore, conventional dualistic 
notions ought to be rejected:  
 
‘[c]hange implicates its other … [N]ot a “thing” or “entity” with established 
patterns, but the repetitive activity of ordering and patterning itself. It is the 
active intervention into the flux and flow of the “real” in order to abstract 
pattern and coherence out of an essentially undifferentiated and indifferent 
whole’.
320
    
 
This is what MacCormick’s theory fails to accommodate, preferring instead to 
identify institutions as objects, albeit ‘thought’ objects, but ‘things’ nonetheless with 
predefined arrangements and patterns of relations. Yet, for process thought, law is not 
only the outcome but also primarily the very act of stabilizing and simply locating, 
this ontological act of halting, holding and handling what is otherwise the 
indeterminate flux of lived experience. In this sense, law is inherently simplifying: the 
taxonomic complexity
321
 of theories of law and legal reasoning is a contradiction of 
process, rendering it as ‘substance’ by the application of pre-structured formulae and 
symbols of representation. Nonetheless, as law acts to constrain, constrict and control 
these otherwise unpredictable forces, the tension between law as simplification and 
reality as complexity acts as a creative mainspring for novelty and progress.  
 
So we can see how the social reality that we think of as existing independently 
is really a construct, comprised of artificial arresting and stabilizing institutional acts 
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and simple location. Each act ‘simply locates’ as it halts and holds outside of the 
durational experience a version of a moment of changing reality. As many such 
versions merge, creating denseness, we see the emergence of phenomena of 
familiarity and social habit. In this way, 
 
‘[a] socially constructed reality, alienated from our raw experiences, is 
achieved in which all those practical norms that govern the stance of human 
beings toward one another and towards their particular historical environment 
become more and more established. The slow and complex evolutionary 
formation of modes of thought … serve to orient us toward our environment 
and towards others in our social interactions. These are all effects of modern 





In this way, process thought understands law as a complexity-reducing and 
reality-constituting enterprise that constitutes and coordinates a world of its own 
making via an un-natural stabilizing of these natural forces. Nonetheless, it is also an 
extremely successful one: it is only in and through this mechanism for command and 
control of reality that any ‘things’ as such appear at all. So it is important to remember 
that  
 
‘[t]he concept of the entity can be preserved only by an optic that casts around 
each entity a perceptual frame that makes a cut from the field and immobilises 
the cut within the static framework’.
323
    
 
Indeed, weaken the frame and the object merges with its past and future in a changing 
field that defies rational alteration and refinement.  
 
Perhaps we can see this if we think, for example, of a flower. A flower is only 
a phase of evolution and transformation, ‘a continuous exfoliation or perturbation of 
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 It cannot occupy a single place, for it ‘is always implicated in the field of 
transformation of which it forms a part’.
325
 It is always changing, from seed to flower 
to dust:  
 
‘[t]he present state of the object appearing as the flower is inhabited by its past 
as seed, and its future as dust, in a continuous moment of postponement, 





Thus, we understand that change is immanent in every quantum moment of the 
process of an entity’s becoming and perishing. Understood in this way, law is an 
ongoing activity of resisting change, maintaining and stabilizing as ‘real’ a moment 
snatched from the continuing flow, preserving it sufficiently for persons to act and 
further their purposes against a barrage of competing external inducements. 
Simplification, complexity reduction and economy of effort in control of reality are 
the aims of law. In this way, as a result of their institutionalisation in law, all the 
multifarious aspects of our experience, including the self as person, obtain immediate 
self-identity and become malleable.  
 
However, what this also suggests is the possibility that legal ‘change’ might be 
effected without orchestrated external intervention; indeed, merely relaxing the 
constraints and ingrained behaviours that contribute to the perception of legal 
institutions as substantial may be enough to encourage change of itself. It is this 
relaxation of entrenched generalisations that a process approach would advocate and 
can explain. Utilizing a metaphor of ‘creative involution’, such as Wood employs, can 
help demonstrate such an alternative understanding of how legal change can and does 
occur.  
 
From a process perspective, law as an attempt to halt, hold and handle what is 
essentially a ceaseless flow, is a reduction achievement. It is an important and 
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necessary attempt to create a more secure, regular and predictable world from a 
fundamentally indiscriminate reality. In this sense law as institutionalization is 
primarily about legitimating social worlds, only subsidarily about coordinating 
activity. Counter-intuitively, perhaps, law is the exception, change is the rule.
327
 
Change always implies ‘surprise’ and otherness because of its essentially 
indeterminate character, a unique and never-to-be-repeated coalescence of a 
multiplicity of potentialities. Law, as essentially ‘rhizomic’ in nature, is the outcome 
of this creative tension between institutionalization and change. 
 
Thus, if we assume Chia’s distinction between dynamic and taxonomic 
complexity, we can see how the latter more correctly describes the method of 
ordering of modern Western legal thinking.
328
 Conversely, dynamic complexity 
recognizes that human experience can be much more complex and fluid than any 
descriptions based on static states account for. Dynamic complexity is qualitatively 
different from the discrete and stable states preferred by the taxonomic urge. Here, 
‘complexity arises from the increasingly bewildering array of possible combinations, 
but from the immanent in-one-anotherness of moments of experience and hence their 
intrinsic non-locatable and interpenetrative nature’.
329
   The past is inextricably 
bound up with the present. There is ‘a real persistence of the past in the present, a 
duration which is, as it were a hyphen, a connecting link … Continuity of change, 
preservation of the past in the present, real duration’.
330
 The difference between these 
two attitudes is analogous to that between qualitative and quantitative change. ‘I 
must willy-nilly, wait’, says Bergson, ‘until the sugar melts’; which implies that my 
sense of time in conscious experience is not that of mathematical time but ‘coincides 
with my impatience, that is to say with a certain portion of my own duration, which I 
cannot protract or contract as I like. It is no longer something thought, it is something 
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lived. It is no longer a relation, it is an absolute’,
331
 indivisible and inseparable from 
our own sense of becoming.    
 
So we think of time much like we think of space, as a homogeneous medium, 
but only because of a ‘trespassing of the idea of space upon the field of pure 
consciousness’.
332
 Only by the importation and imposition of spatial metaphors do 
we construe mathematical time. Our conscious experience of time is otherwise:  
 
‘nothing but a succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and 
permeate one another, without precise outlines, without any tendency to 





Experience, thought about in spatial terms, is translated as homogeneous. But 
duration  
 
‘prolongs the past into the present, the present either containing within it in a 
distinct form the ceaselessly growing image of the past, or, more probably, 
showing by its continual change of quality the heavier load we drag behind us 
as we grow older’.
334
    
 
Absent this endurance of the past in the present, there could be only instantaneous 
instants. 
 
We see much the same picture in relation to movement, when motion is 
thought of in spatial terms as divisible into discrete moments that represent the area 
traversed. But, as Bergson says,  
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‘the process by which [a body] passes from one position to the other, a 
process which occupies duration and which has no reality except for a 
conscious spectator, eludes space. We have to do here not with an object  but 
with a progress; motion, in so far as it is a passage from one point to another, 
is a mental synthesis, a psychic and therefore unextenxded process … We are 
thus compelled to admit that we have here to do with a synthesis which is, so 
to speak, qualitative, a gradual organization of our successive sensations, a 
unity resembling that of a phrase in a melody’.
335
        
 
We need therefore to distinguish between travelling over the ground and the ground 
over which we travel. Reduction to the latter is a denial of ‘duration’. This is 
precisely what lies at the root of the confusion in those childhood puzzles presented 
earlier. Analysis on the basis of static states may make it possible to focus and act but 
it is nonetheless a mistake to think of reality as essentially stable and with only 
intermittent periods of change. 
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TOWARDS A PROCESS RECONSTRUAL OF ‘THE MIDDLE’ 
 
We need now to bring this processual understanding to bear on the approaches to 
legal reasoning outlined above and the problems presented for analysis in Re A. As 
we have seen, a fundamental tenet of any process-philosophical approach is the idea 
that knowledge cannot be simply located as the successive quantitative movement 
from one homogenous, stable, or independent, state to the next; on the contrary, 
knowledge is a relational effect and fixed states are but specific cases in point. On 
this view, legal knowledge is not something that travels across the ‘gap’ between one 
pole and another; instead, the institutionalization of knowledge in law constitutes a 
particular context that emerges to mediate the tension between these two poles and 
within which individual terms (such as universal and particular, rule-determination 
and rule-application) assume subsequent and relative meanings. Thus, where 
knowledge is institutionalized in law, this should not be understood as the outcome 
of some pre-existent structuring or patterning of positions but as an establishing of 
‘internal resonance’.
336
 It is this ‘fixing of tensions’ that creates the abstracted 
structure that is subsequently commanded and controlled according to the conceptual 
categories of legal thought and representation.  
 
What this suggests is a sense in which what we have called the 
institutionalisation of law should properly be understood in terms of the means by 
which participants make sense of their social interactions.
337
 In this sense, 
institutionalisation comprises both the forces and tendencies that promote order and 
stability and the mechanisms that tend towards change and de-structuring.
338
 It is the 
continual fluctuation between these that momentarily results in an appearance of 
order, some thing achieved through reduction, but the two are really inseparable. 
Law, as a process of institutionalising information, is always-already the outcome of 
a previous process of institutionalising.  
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Two Views of Legal Knowledge and its Production 
 
Commonly, when we think of law we think of it as a coherent resource, as something 
to be applied. As we saw in Re A, there are three aspects to this: first, practical 
problems are confronted, recognized and addressed in a context governed wholly by 
the interests of the legal institution, problematised entirely as legal issues; second, all 
of this, including language, context, concepts and interpretations, is commanded and 
controlled in an essentially homogeneous, largely hierarchical manner; third, this 
hierarchical legal institutional structure prevails over the communication of 
outcomes, disseminated through legal institutional channels.
339
 In these ways, by its 
use of either/or distinctions, its courtroom terms and procedures and its control of the 
flow of decisions (through the doctrines of ratio decidendi, stare decisis and legal 
precedent), the legal community defines and deploys the criteria and measurements 




It is against this background that we must understand Bankowski’s 
suggestion that law’s external audience should become more involved in decision 
making: as the site of legal decision making becomes more important so it becomes 
necessary to seek a more collaborative approach. What we find here is much less a 
sense of the fixed separation of theoretical and practical and more the recognition of 
a managed flow back and forth between the two with a movement across disciplines 
and fields incorporating within legal decision-making ideas, methods and procedures 
otherwise considered as outside.
341
 In this way, knowledge sites become more 
dispersed and new knowledge producers begin to emerge.
342
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According to this approach, law requires a more flexible, relational, context-
based approach realised through the coming together of heterogeneous assets and 
continually shifting institutional forms and structures. This is something to be arrived 
at through participation, negotiation and mediation, and where results are 
communicated in and through the contexts in which they are to be applied. In this 
sense, this way of thinking about law might be considered more in keeping with the 
complexities of situations that law seeks to address. Here, legal practice becomes the 
difficult task of maintaining the middle position that opens up between abstracted 
representations and exacting contextual requirements, refusing simply to go one way 
or the other but always maintaining both the separation and the link, the continual 
movement or conversation to and fro, between them. 
 
 However, from a process perspective, two problems emerge with regard to 
this. In the first place, those advocating a new understanding of the relation between 
universals and particulars tend to overestimate the extent to which the determination 
of legal knowledge, and not simply its confirmation, may originate from outside the 
limits of the legal institutional structure. Notwithstanding the increased recognition 
of extra-legal influences, it is still the highly structured, hierarchically-ordered 
institutional framework that is the main site for generating, developing and refining 
legal knowledge. Changes in law take place by law and according to law’s legal 
structure, governed by the procedures and mechanisms that limit, order and subjugate 
according to law’s institutional practices and routines.
343
 That is why, in reality, very 
few of the advances predicted ever amount to anything very novel or surprising. 
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Superficial changes in the institutional context of law make little impact on the basic 
assumptions underlying and characterising law. Besides, while a more socially 
distributed form of legal knowledge might well be expected to generate a more 
relevant and socially applicable type of law, the degree of difference in the legal 
power/knowledge rhetoric always works, as we saw in Re A, to prefigure what counts 
as knowledge.
344
 It is precisely this ideological aspect of law that we found to be its 
most disturbing feature. Very little of what appears succeeds in altering law’s 
privileged and self-legitimating, autopoietic, standpoint.  
 
The second problem concerns the assumption, introduced earlier, of a one-to-
one relation of correspondence between living experience and legal representation. In 
common law decision making, legal practitioners have to provide justification for 
their legal decisions, attempting to turn thought back upon action. In doing so, they 
appear to engage in a sort of action-reflection, a process of re-deliberation or 
justification of the situations in which they perform.
345
 However, as Detmold and 
Bankowski show, with their depiction of the ‘anxious judge’, judges inevitably face a 
crisis of confidence and legitimacy closely related to the adequacy of their legal 
knowledge reservoir. This crisis of confidence highlights a disparity between 
traditional representations of knowledge and lived experience, and thus the 
impossible complexity and the incommesurability of legal decision making. While 
assumed forms of technical rationality are based on the presupposition of a 
correspondence of means to ends, those same means and ends often appear confused 
and conflicting.  
 
In this way, a gap opens up that must be closed. This is why, for Bankowski, 
judges need to attend to the ‘outside’, to bridge the gap between their professional 
knowledge and the demands of the real world. But even here, a judge’s reflection on 
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action is still always directed towards verbal descriptions, deliberate constructions 
that must be tested.
346
 It is in relation to these that Bankowski suggests that a judge, 
in deliberating, must remain open to the unfolding story; letting the story speak for 
itself, talk back. It is here, with selected information, that the judge works 
reflectively, always leaving things open to change. We find a similar notion 
underlying MacCormick’s sense of determining what the ratio of a decision is; that 
is, it is only when the enacted environment responds and a future judge answers the 
first that any real decision can be made about what the fuller meaning of the ratio is, 
what information will be retained for future use.  
 
This distinction between law and its external environment as a critical 
separation that must be closed is also one which Christodoulidis refers to. With him, 
too, we can discern a form of attending to the outside that underpins his idea of an 
enacted environment; however, here, it is more correct to say that any ‘outside’ is 
created by the decision to ‘draw a distinction’. For Christodoulidis, following 
Luhmann, a system’s environment is not so much something already external to be 
reacted to but it is created by the actor through the processing of information 
according to her focus on a particular task, by the process of selection. Selecting has 
to do with deciding what is relevant, what to deal with and what to leave alone. 
Something can only become the object of attention after this selection has occurred. 
This is how everything becomes noticeable and noticed, registering as occurring only 
after it has occurred. In decision making something is always acknowledged 
retrospectively, related to the specific concerns and motivations of the individual. In 
this sense, he is quite obviously correct: ‘justification is always justification a 
posteriori’. 
 
Given the disparity brought about by the lack of correspondence between 
living experience and legal representation, even paying attention to the particularities 
of a situation cannot fully account for the mutual inter-relatedness of elements in the 
originary assemblage. To achieve this will necessitate greater sensitivity to the 
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temporal dimension; in other words, it is crucially important that ‘paying attention’ 
always occurs retrospectively.  
 
Understanding Relatedness: Employing a Method of Creative Involution  
 
To think about creative involution is, as Wood suggests, to think differently. It is to 
treat relations as the primary objects rather than as linkages between separate things. 
However, this does not involve moving ‘from one actual term to another actual term 
along a single line, but from a virtual term to the heterogeneous terms that actualize 
it along lines of divergence’.
347
 It is this that Bergson refers to as intuition. For him, 
the key to true knowledge and understanding lies much more in asking new questions 
than in providing answers to already existing questions. While the latter practice is 
closed and regulated, the former is open-ended, its movement and flow forever 




Traditional understandings of legal knowledge as institutional continue to 
follow along the route of an ordered, linear progression characterised by the 
procedure of applying general rules to particular circumstances. Here, and within the 
hierarchical structure that emerges on top, each discrete part has its own place, 
function and methodology, and is organised in relation to all other parts. A flow of 
information is facilitated, enabling predictability. However, even within this tightly 
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identifying a beginning, middle or end.  
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fitting structure, legal practitioners and legal consumers all experience legal 
knowledge as a complex web of opinion, supervision, guidance, claim and control. In 
reality, all experience law, at some times more obviously than at others, as ‘a 
continuous and unfinished process whose intrinsic nature resists the regulative model 
…. self-organizing, non-linear and multi-stranded’.
349
 In this sense, contrary to 
received wisdom, law grows from the bottom up and not from the top down and 
there is really no settled structure or definitive order that we can identify absolutely 
as legal institutional knowledge. Rather, legal institutional knowledge appears as a 
continuous becoming naturally resistant to this attempt to identify rule and 
application, law and fact, universal and particular, or the relations between them. In 
other words, law appears more as a communication that cuts across our carefully 
guarded distinctions, expanding forever outwards. 
 
In a hierarchical model of structuring legal knowledge, the main emphasis is 
on the relative positions of distinct phases, stages or states. In this way, the method 
of investigation proceeds by way of the splitting up of a whole complex experience 
of interdependent and interpenetrating aspects into separate, immobile and distinct 
objects and behaviours with the assumption of the possibility of transfer between 
them. In contrast, on the alternative understanding outlined above, any investigation 
does not rely on some assumption about a whole being the sum of its connectable 
parts but on something beyond this, a middle place that is not defined, as in 
Bankowski’s model, as between set points, but is rather a pre-existing in-between 
where is nothing but tensions and fields of force, continuous movement. It is this 
incessant fluxing of the real which points to the intuitive, sympathetic understanding 
of which Bergson speaks. So, instead of assuming that the distinctions we observe 
between ‘things’ are straightforwardly given, the real problem is to understand how 
this division has come about in the first place, on the basis of which we assume that 
the subsequently divided pieces can be combined and recombined. Why has reality 
been divided this way rather than that, why have we given knowledge this shape and 
not that? In other words, the entrance of essential knowledge into our experience 
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requires the introduction of our consciousness within the continuity of the world.
350
 
Everything depends on the relative weight we assign to each quantum of reality 
arrested from the flow of direct experience. 
 
If we understand the structuring of legal institutional knowledge in this way, 
theories, concepts, doctrines, principles, values, rules and the rest, all become less 
clearly circumscribed. Knowledge no longer occupies clear-cut, stable positions 
adequately described and defined by clear-cut, established terms; rather, a 
complexity of real inter-connections, cleavages and coincidences intersect above, 
through and below the relative locations and meanings of all terms. What this means 
is that there is no single controlling mind, no hidden hand, no quantitative linear 
progression. In its place, we find that the mediums of information created by the 
institutional and institutionalising structure of law give way to a real interchange of 
ideas, a continuous swapping and substitution of meanings in which the limits of 
ideas, concepts and expressions are relentlessly in process of being shaped and 
reshaped. In this sense, the concrescence of legal institutional knowledge is forever 
ongoing, essentially transitive. Its continual reproduction and use is inextricably 
linked with the interpolation of our consciousness into the continuous succession and 
flow of the real world. This is the essential point that ‘institutional theories’ of law 
often ignore and, instead, impart to the creation and utilization of legal knowledge a 
concreteness that is misplaced; thus, legal ‘institutional facts’ appear to benefit from 
an independent existence and the relations between them are considered as 
connection (and, crucially, all of this is assumed prior to any discussion about their 
individuation). 
 
In reality, legal institutional knowledge is always an amalgam. Its outwardly 
homogeneous appearance as something defined and distributed, developed and 
deployed is always the result of a blend, a composite: it is both the sum of its parts 
and the degrees of difference of its terms. As such, legal knowledge is always 
indeterminate. Here, we cannot talk about applying a rule to factual circumstances, or 
even really of universals to particulars, because this derives from and depends on 
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notions of substance and immobility where we address ourselves towards ‘the ends 
of the intervals and not … the intervals themselves’.
351
 Legal institutional knowledge 
understood in terms of creative involution is law understood as an ‘open system’.  
 
Exploring the Temporal Dimension: Experiencing Duration 
 
According to Bergson we can conceive of time in two ways: either as pure duration 
or in spatio-temporal terms. In the latter, time fragments into separate parts, so that 
what we experience are characteristically bounded and distinct but connectable 
elements. We obtain this awareness by withdrawing ourselves from our involvement 
in the flow of experience and, having stepped out of it, then directing our attention 
back towards it. In contrast, pure duration is the experience of time as a ceaseless 
movement of flowing and fluxing,  
 
‘[a] succession of qualitative changes … melt[ing] into and permeat[ing] one 





When we reflect on the particularities of lived situations we do so by trying to 
comprehend action in terms of a simple, straightforward, uncomplicated state rather 
than by following the continuity of its real movement. It is really this spatio-temporal 
idea of time that Bankowski and Detmold, and MacCormick too, mobilize in their 
decision-making models. This presupposes the practitioner withdrawing to a position 
outside of the experience before and in order that her attention can be directed back 
to it and she can enter within it. Paradoxically, however, in directing attention to 
already lived experience Bankowski and Detmold, as well as MacCormick, appear 
only to reinforce this sense of a ‘gap’ between legal representation and actual lived 
experience, a view altogether at odds with Bergson’s notion of pure duration or 
durée. 
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As soon as we begin to focus on relations as things in themselves, rather than 
as linkages between separate things, then it also becomes clear how we should 
understand what we call the present; that is, as a temporal distinction between two 
horizons. Each present moment of experience is a tension between actual and 
potential, past and future: the present does not exist except in these terms. To better 
understand how the past as experience or memory endures in the present, we can 
note this passage from Deleuze: 
 
‘[W]e believe that the past is no longer, that it has ceased to be. We have thus 
confused Being with being-present. Nevertheless, the present is not; rather it 
is pure becoming, always outside itself. It is not, but it acts. Its proper 
element is not being but the active or the useful. But it has not ceased to be. 
Useless and inactive, impassive it IS, in the full sense of the word: It is 
identical with being in itself. It should not be said that it “was” since it is the 




Because the present never actually is, all our assertions about reflecting on actions in 
the midst of acting become, in this sense, merely evidence of a dependence upon an 
intellectual practice that reduces experience from the totality of lived experience in 
order to make it manageable. In this sense, a judge’s reflections in the midst of 
decision making are really no more than her experience converted into words, a way 
of presenting thought and action as if these were ontologically discrete and 
independent or autonomous categories. On this basis, even Bankowski’s attempt to 
provide a thoroughly pragmatic solution with his integrating and synthesizing 
‘inside-outside’ approach must ultimately break down. The dialectical model can 
never complete its task because we cannot ultimately and irrevocably say that either 
inside or outside exists prior, alongside or subsequent to the other, or that or how one 
is similar or dissimilar to the other. For this to be the case, we would need to be able 
to identify a boundary between the two, an edge or border that specifies their 
difference. But they are not identifiably separate. Our reflections in this way can 
produce useful knowledge, but not knowledge that provides an exact copy of the real 
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movement of living experience to which it refers. The point is that all such 
understandings of reality are inevitably based on a falsity. While it might be 
convenient to reflect upon an event as if the whole of the event occurred as an 
instantaneous revealing, so that we might look at a situation as a whole from its 
beginning to its end with all its separate parts laid out, as if somehow at some earlier 
point we could even suggest what it will contain in its later parts, in fact, reality 
unfolds only gradually, as a living experience.  
 
Charles Hartshorne makes the point that we cannot say about anything that it 
was possible or impossible beforehand because there is then no ‘it’ to which any 
such label might be attached. The object of the discourse is simply not there to be 
referred to in either way.
354
 What we are dealing with here, Hartshorne claims, is the 
law of the excluded middle. The criteria of the actual cannot empirically discover 
possibility. Taking something that exists now and reading it back into the past as if to 
say that it was possible then will not tell us anything about the past that could have 
been discovered by us then. To put it another way, there is always something more in 
the actual than in the possible; otherwise, why bother to actualize anything?  
 
Understood thus, reality is the continuous and qualitative accumulating of 
actuality. But this presents us with a further problem: on this basis, how does it make 
sense to talk in terms of reflecting on one’s decisions? A judge looks back on her 
own act of making a decision, but all this continuous qualitative accumulating of 
actuality is surely too much to carry forward repetitively: we have too much 
abstraction, too much reduction. Nonetheless, just because we abstract does not mean 
that anything ceases to exist. If we remember deciding then we also remember the 
process of deciding. The way to make sense of this is to think of the present in terms 
of subjective immediacy. Here, we can usefully employ a process/product 
distinction. A product is something positively prehended as an abstraction from 
process, a reduction. But this means that something else is always left out, negatively 
prehended. Product, as a reduction from process, cannot be properly understood apart 
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from this act of negative prehension.
355
 Without it or a similar notion any 
process/product distinction would be untenable. This is just another way of saying 
that being cannot be abstracted from becoming: the two are inseparable. In other 
words, we can deal with particulars only in terms of universals and not otherwise. 
This indivisible continuity is what Bergson refers to as real knowledge. It is the 
forever becoming of living experience. But to be known it must be grasped under the 
forms of what is concrete.  
 
Somewhat counter-intuitively, what is concrete is not and cannot be real. It is 
a perspective on the movement of reality, its symbolic reconstruction.
356
 Put simply, 
there is always more in reality than we can apprehend through the concrete. Every 
reconstruction by which we try to reveal the real movement of experience is 
inevitably incommensurable with the experience to which it refers. Where we often 
go wrong is in our assumption that there is as much or more in our concrete 
representations of reality than in reality unrepresented. However, no matter how 
sophisticated our reasoning, there will always be more in experience than our 
accounts of it can record. Our perennial problem is how to stop ourselves confusing 
the two. 
 
We can get close to an answer to this question if we recall that what we have 
termed the real is inseparable from the movement from potentiality to actuality in 
which it is realized.
357
 That is, it is only as we struggle to understand the real that we 
can discover ourselves as standing within the real: it exists, is present, precisely in 
the manner in which it is actualized. Everything hinges on this irreducible 
interpenetrating relatedness, this mutual constitution of the temporal and the spatial. 
The way that we understand the whole of something as comprised by the sum of its 
parts is only a perspective taken on it. The simple fact that this division into separate 
parts is something that must then actually be performed implies a temporal 
relationship between these; that is, the whole and the parts do not exist together at the 
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same time, except as potentiality. The division must be made or at least be capable of 
being made. Hartshorne puts it this way:  
 
'[t]he belief in a wholly determinate future is not translatable into action, and 
neither is belief in a wholly indeterminate one … Action can only consist, not 
in simple foreseeing, but in step by step deciding, of the future, with each step 
in its concreteness left open until the previous step has been taken, and even 
then not simply predicted but created, settled by fiat … The future, for all life, 
is what the past implies plus step by step decisions, none of which is 




Hence, ‘[m]odal distinctions are ultimately coincident with temporal ones. The actual 
is the past, the possible is the future’.
359
 On this view, 'our ability to understand 
universality or possibility, as well as particularity or actuality, is the same as our 
ability to grasp temporal distinctions …   [I]f temporal distinctions are modal 
distinctions, and if temporal order is independent of our thought and language, then 
so are the modal aspects of reality. And these are in part universal, not exclusively 
particular, aspects'.
360
 Moreover, ‘the precise qualities of particulars are themselves 
particular and unrepeatable … irreducibly relational and historical'.
361
 Just so, we can 
distinguish between the two: particularity is determinateness, universality is 
determinability. That is, ‘[o]nly the past alone is fully determinate within the limits 
of causal possibility. These limits are just the determinateness of the past as capable 
of being superseded by some kinds of successors but not by other logically 
conceivable kinds’. Alluding to an example of Bergson's, he describes this as 
follows: 
 
‘Before one cuts an apple in two, although there is not a possibility as 
determinate as either half which later results from such a cut, there is clearly 
the possibility of "somehow halving the apple". Actualizing a possibility is 
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providing a determinate for a less definite antecedent determinable. Actuality 
is thus truly more than antecedent possibility, given a proper understanding of 
the latter … [P]ossibilities are determinables not determinates. The apple can 
be halved somehow, but to suppose that the determinate how that 
subsequently results is included in the somehow is just to deny the 
distinction, determinable-determinate … Given a determinate how we can 
relate it to the somehow, but given only the somehow we cannot relate it to a 
determinate how … The "this" of an actuality simply has no advance status, 





What Bergson’s illustration proves is that both elements must be experienced or be 
capable of being experienced and this is only possible in the middle; that is, in the 
midst of a singular unifying temporality.
363
 Insofar as this may be understood to 
coincide with the creative advance in and through which we experience our own 
duration, our own continuity as living selves, then we can be relatively confident of 
correctly distinguishing the virtual and the concrete. We simply have to enquire as to 
whether what we are addressing can be qualitatively experienced and to situate 
ourselves in its flow, its unfolding continuity. It is this wholly qualitative conscious 
awareness of our reintegration into the duration of the things that marks out the 
difference between this and any quantitative representational scheme.  
 
Thinking Beyond the Determination and Application of Rules 
 
We can see then how we need our abstractions; they are useful constructs, tools. The 
problem arises when we begin to think of them as real, when we forget that they are 
symbols pointing to and participating in a reality beyond them. But we have 
forgotten how to think beyond the ‘things’ arrested from experience. As Deleuze puts 
it: ‘Proceeding “by dissociation and division”, by “dichotomy”, is the essence of 
life’.
364
 So the real problem becomes how to uncover the different processes by way 
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of which legal institutional knowledge becomes actualised, rather than how the terms 
of any dualism are associated or integrated. 
 
What is the relation of the universal to the particular? How do we decide 
whether a general rule applies in a particular case? How do the two meet? It is 
precisely this way of thinking, which understands the relation of particulars and 
universals as a meeting of oppositional terms or a synthesis of opposites, which is at 
issue here, proceeding as it does by way of linear progression from one immobility to 
another. Whether we think that it is by universals or by attention to particulars that 
our decision is controlled, or by any combination of these, any way of thinking that 
understands inner qualities or processes as determinate is not so much a discovery of 
movement and change as a slowing down of it; in other words, as we define we 
confine.  
 
Bergson’s real contribution here is his identification of two ways of thinking: 
the first assumes the possibility of reflecting on what is near, conceptualising reality 
and shaping it into credible and distinct objects;
365
 the second proposes that we allow 
ourselves to be placed within the flow of experience, to ‘enter into’ it and identify 
ourselves with it. It is this second way that Bergson calls intuition, which is similar to 
the way in which we might identify ourselves with a character in a novel.
366
 But the 
essential difference between our reading a novel and our reflecting on a decision in a 
court of law is that the former unlike the latter can actually be understood as present 
experience. Once this difference is grasped, Bergson’s model of ‘intuition' may be 
seen to open up a way for the reconstruction of legal institutional knowledge: first, 
legal theory and legal practice should be understood as imminent within each other; 
second, the differences between them are not external relations but should be 
understood in terms of internal resonance; third, our understanding of legal 
knowledge finds its basis in our awareness of durée.
367
 Perhaps the most important 
difference between representations of knowledge as real movement and relative 
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movement concerns the latter’s notion of movement as instrumental, quantitative and 
transitional as opposed to the former’s idea of it as continuous, indivisible and 
transitive.
368
 Of course, this does not mean that real movement is without 






The dominant highly structured, hierarchical model of institutionalising knowledge 
as law assumes almost unhesitatingly the ontological and epistemological inheritance 
from the rationalist tradition. Based largely on immobile and instrumental notions, 
law as structured institution orders a world of distinct states, stages or phases and, to 
analyze these, attempts to reduce the real movement of knowledge to its relative 
positions and functions between these. Because the flow of knowledge is a complex 
movement of ever-changing, immanent relations, it seems less demanding to analyze 
its singular, unifying flow in terms of discrete, immobile and stationary objects. But 
the flow of knowledge is not discrete, neither does it exist apart from the system of 
social relations in which it occurs. So we need to constantly remind ourselves of the 
uninterrupted nature of this flow, its lines of becoming that allow for and reveal the 
continual participation of every point within every other. This alternative approach 
based on process theory is not restricted by the number of connectable points that 
describe or compose it; it has no origin or destination, only middle. However, this 
middle is not to be understood as a position relative to other points, and from which 
these can be observed and negotiated; rather, it is a field of interactive tensions and 
stresses where, entering into the flow, we can follow its movements and changes. In 
this sense a process reconstrual of law can be both useful and practical. But this 
shifting of emphasis is really no more than a rediscovery of hidden tradition, in the 
absence of which we have all too often allowed ourselves to assume uncritically, 
often unwittingly, the idea of knowledge as instrumental, always-already convenient 
and available. We need to rediscover this healthy alternative understanding. 
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However, even the more socially aware forms of understanding the legal 
decision making process still rely to some extent on this idea of separate but 
connectable domains. Paying attention, as Bankowski calls it, requires more than 
simply identifying prior positions and taking up a mediating position in between. It 
must also include an understanding of how this ‘middle’ pre-exists as a field of 
interrelations and interpenetrating tensions, ontologically prior to any of the 
abstracted points that we then describe and attempt to ‘connect’. Engaging with and 
immersing ourselves within this complex flow of knowledge and experience will 
require a more sophisticated understanding than the idea of any transfer and 
exchange of knowledge between two separate but connectable poles allows. It will 
require thinking about the way we think about law, thinking from within the flow, 
not so much adopting the position of an ideal, impartial spectator as adopting the 
position of each and every ordinary, partial, involved participant, understanding a 
narrative’s flow from within. And what this suggests is a thorough-going empiricism 
in which primacy is conferred on process, change, movement, complexity, 
transformation and flux: the becoming of things over being, process over substance, 
change over order and stability. This is what Bergson refers to as durée: the 
indeterminate region in which there is no longer any sense of connections but where 
the interrelations exist in their own right prior to any identification of abstracted 
points. It is this field of relations that must, if anything, be understood substantially. 
Law, understood simply in terms of the institutionalizing of patterns of behaviour in 
terms of a system of rules, can never be anything more than this structure that is 
created and utilized retrospectively. In what follows I will demonstrate how process 






TWO WAYS OF THINKING; TWO TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
Traditional notions of law rely on familiar dichotomies: thought and action, meaning 
and application, rule and fact. One example of this is the dialectical relationship of 
correspondence between universals and particulars. When law is conceived in static 
terms, the legal task is understood in terms of negotiating the gap between these two 
essentially separate but connectable domains; that is, securing the flow of 
knowledge, the delivery of communications, between them. Informed by this 
substance-based immobility, an important challenge for legal theorists and 
practitioners is to maintain the integrity of legal knowledge involved in this ‘transfer’ 
between one domain and the other. We can see how Ward LJ attempts to do this with 
his concluding remarks in Re A, offering his description of the justifying relationship 
between reason and decision that helps to secure and seal the gaping hole that has 
opened up in the seamless web of law (though nearly undoing himself as he appears 




As a result of this, much of any sense of urgency within the legal theoretical 
arena has naturally gravitated towards the need for a more sophisticated 
understanding of the relationship between these separate poles (rules and facts, 
universals and particulars), But the problem with such an understanding, 
sophisticated as it is, is, as we have seen, that the underlying notion of legal 
knowledge on which it is based is still one of correspondence between connectable 
positions. Legal knowledge is still understood as something to be passed on, 
expanded and developed to meet the practical requirements of everyday life, a ‘form’ 
of knowledge directly ‘applicable’ to action in practical situations. Such a view 
unashamedly confers ontological priority upon categories of order, stability and 
communicability, constructing and categorising a world of disparate entities to which 
legal knowledge can then be applied in a top-down hierarchic, causal mechanistic 
way. This type of approach to legal decision making precludes us from seeing the 
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extent to which rule determination and rule application, universals and particulars, 
legal categories and living experience, already permeate each other, benefiting from 
this interpenetrative difference.  
 
However, taking our cue from Henri Bergson, I have argued that we should 
not say that law is a system of rules applied to facts or, indeed, any form of reflection 
on this. On the contrary, rule determination and rule application, legal universals and 
legally relevant particulars, the ways in which we understand certain particulars as 
instantiating certain universals, our system of laws and our processes of decision 
making, are all ‘snapshots’ of reality, images extracted from an otherwise 
continuously moving and changing flow, simply ways that we break into this, 
halting, holding and handling what we abstract, in order to try and make sense of its 
elusive, enigmatic, otherwise inexpressible qualities. We can understand this as we 
realise that even our attempts to ground the act of giving justifying reasons for a legal 
decision in the particulars of the lived situation to which that decision refers is 
already something beyond the decision itself. A decision cannot be ‘caught’ because 
once a decision is made, it is gone: it is momentous, and all that we observe of it is 
its trace, the multiplicity of points through which the movement has passed, rather 
than the unity of the action experienced. In this sense, law can never deliver the 
reasons to justify a decision. Some gap always remains, the distance represented by 
the question concerning the appropriateness of that universal continuing into these 
particulars. (In the same way, we cannot capture the living experience of 
conjoinment in the legal representation of it). Rather, we always miss the target we 
aim at, the decision making act always remaining a decision already presented. 
Clearly, there is a flow of knowledge, but, on Bergson’s view, not in the sense of 
some derived relationship connecting discrete spatial positions.  For that to be true 
we would have to be able to completely isolate the different elements that occupy 
those positions so that we could identify them conclusively as like or unlike each 
other, spatially distinct and bounded (and to be connected they must be separate, they 
must each have a boundary and there must be a space between them). In spite of this, 
we continue to adhere to precisely this sort of unrealistic approach when we think 
about law as a system of known rules applied to facts. In addition, I have suggested 
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that utilizing Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the rhizome can help us to see how 
the movement or spread of information in law is best described as a forever jumbling 
up of distinct phases, stages and patterns, a complex form of growth like that 
associated with the roots of certain plants.  
 




 highlights five features of Deleuzean ‘rhizomatics’ that may 
help to show the relevance of this way of thinking about legal knowledge. First, the 
rhizome involves the bringing together of diverse elements. Second, the rhizome 
brings together elements that are not usually thought of as belonging together: it is 
based on heterogeneity. Third, the rhizome is not reducible to a series of points or 
individual parts: it is ‘a non-localisable relation sweeping up the two distant or 
contiguous points, carrying one into the proximity of the other’.
372
 Fourth, the 
rhizome is ‘subject to ruptures, breaks, discontinuities anywhere within it while 
retaining its self-organizing structure. Fifth, and finally, the rhizome cannot be traced 
back to a principal root or source. Rather, it is a form of nomadic mapping that 
‘moves across the landscape without fencing in the land’.
373
 Rhizomes appear 
without recognisable beginnings or ends but are always an in-between; a middle that 
allows for the continual participation of all points within each other, even if in reality 
one point does not become the other, or achieve correspondence with it. In this way, 
the apparent stabilities of universals and particulars might be exchanged for the 
awareness that although we live in a world of change the processes of change are 
imperceptible to us. In this sense, the relationships between universals and 
particulars, rule-determination and rule-application, operative and evidentiary facts, 
legislation, adjudication and enforcement are not simply connective; rather, they 
involve the becoming of law through a movement that is neither universalist nor 
particularist, neither containing nor instantiating but always somewhere in-between. 
In this way, the assumption of a boundary between the legal and the extra-legal, law 
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and life must give way to an understanding based on interconnections between 
different patterns of relations. 
 
 As an institution, law relies on explicitly formulated rules for its functioning, 
but law’s institutional context relies on much more than explicitly formulated or 
formulatable rules. Through socialisation, judges internalise law-specific distinctions 
and their legal expertise is learned within the context of their discursive practice. 
This forms an unarticulated background that undergirds a judge’s representation of 
their decisions. In this sense, the application of a rule is really not an individual 
achievement at all but derives essentially from collectively shared meanings, within a 
tightly related network of communications in and through which these shared 
meanings are attained. In this chapter I suggest that attempts to manage judicial 
decision making actually involve rhizomic systems of communication rather than 
series of linear connections. My aim is to demonstrate that the kind of continual 
movement being alluded to here already permeates the practice of law, at all levels, 
thus helping to prepare the way for a novel understanding of the diffusion of legal 
institutional knowledge. 
 
It is often said that law is the prime example of a hierarchical institution, 
where normative procedures structure, order and shape all of its aspects. A 
taxonomic and classificatory urge controls the admissibility of its constituent parts - 
its formal and substantive rules, its rules of evidence, its requirements of coherence 
and consistency, its customs and practices, principles and values - all neatly ordered 
from the top down. Accordingly, legal professionals can be seen to approach their 
work in a pseudo-scientific manner, with judges in particular concerned to find the 
best possible ‘fit’ of rules to facts, bridging the gap under the watchful eye and 
guidance of their peers and counterparts, whose control is exercised through 
procedural techniques such as the doctrine of precedent, ratio decidendi, and so on; 
indeed, any appreciation of law as an institution depends on a proper understanding 
of this hierarchical ordering of decisions. Simply looking to an individual judge’s 
decisions in isolation will tell us very little. In such an environment only those 
aspects of a decision that can properly be said to form part of the ratio of the decision 
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are authoritative, everything else is obiter dictum. The more that a form of reasoning 
can be considered part of the ratio of a decision, the more chance it has of being 
taken up in future decision making. The more impressive an individual judge’s 
justification of their decisions, the greater the impact and the more authority their 
reputation acquires.  
 
But there is a flip-side to all of this, too. As we see in Re A, decision making 
takes place under pressure of time and a lack of resources (and there is the inevitable 
threat of one’s decisions being scrutinised by one’s peers on appeal). The peculiar 
nature of the rules of evidence, and burdens of proof, and their corresponding impact 
on the public acceptability of decisions all, from time to time, provide sources of 
frustration for the judicial decision maker. Therefore, in the real world of judicial 
decision making there is a true sense in which, in tailoring his decisions, a judge ‘cut 
his suit according to his cloth’. So law is a system of rules, yes, but it is a very 
peculiar system of rules, with the hierarchical ordering of its doctrine of precedent 
and ratio decidendi, examples of this. Precisely because of this, frustrations appear 
over and again, and we find that from time to time a decision is ‘justified’ where the 
facts and the rules do not overlap but public opinion or social mores have moved on 
to a position where the reasons given are deemed sufficient to persuade that the 
decision is acceptable, or a decision is deemed right and proper and in line with 




In this way, much of a judge’s work in judicial reasoning can often involve 
cutting across recognised boundaries, developing new lines of precedent. Sometimes 
it will seem appropriate to question whether this is a new line of thought or a 
development of a previous one Here, there is always a tension between the universal 
and the particular and, in such an environment, where the direction of the task seems 
co-determined by the interaction of these, this can often lead judges and others to 
reflect, as we have seen, that definition and the application, theory and practice, are 
perhaps not really quite as far apart as they are sometimes thought to be.  
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But it can be rather unsettling to consider theory and practice as something 
other than two distinct things, two poles apart. In the first place, this presents a 
challenge to the dominant, hierarchical theories of law as institution. In the second 
place, this may also suggest that the ideological reading of the 'communicational 
transparency'
375
 of law as a cumulative flow of information between areas of 
production and exploitation is itself a false one; that is, law, its manufacture and use, 
has always operated rhizomically. We can see how such a challenge to traditional 
understandings of law might be presented by looking at Edward Levi’s study of legal 
decision making.  
 




 the notion ‘that the law is a system of known rules applied by a 
judge’ is no more than pretence; rather, ‘the kind of reasoning involved in the legal 
process is one in which the classification changes as the classification is made. The 
rules change as the rules are applied’. Moreover, ‘the rules arise out of a process 
which, while comparing fact situations, creates the rules and then applies them’.
377
 
So in this sense, ‘the basic pattern of legal reasoning is by example. It is reasoning 
from case to case’ by means of a ‘three-step process’ whereby ‘a proposition 
descriptive of the first case is made into a rule of law and then applied to a next 
similar situation’.
378
    
 
As Levi points out, this method of reasoning brings to view ‘characteristics 
which under other circumstances might be considered imperfections’, in particular, 
that ‘change in the rules is the indispensable dynamic quality of law’.
379
 And yet, 
although ‘it cannot be said that the legal process is the application of known rules to 
diverse facts’, nonetheless ‘it is a system of rules; the rules are discovered in the 
process of determining similarity or difference’, and ‘the existence of some facts in 
common brings into play the general rule’ even though ‘no such fixed prior rule 
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   Moreover, ‘there is an additional requirement which compels the legal 
process to be this way ….   The categories used in the legal process must be left 
ambiguous in order to permit the infusion of new ideas’.    In this way, ‘laws come to 
express the ideas of the community …. molded for the specific case’.
381
    
 
 Levi maps out the development of danger as a legal category, and the flow of 
ideas and definitions in and out of the legal system. First, a distinction is drawn, 
observed (though not articulated), and then refined. Afterwards, in a later case, the 
distinction finally achieves code value within the system. As Sean Smith observes: 
‘[p]atent dangers are illegal: they give rise to liability. Latent dangers are legal: they 
give rise to no liability. The one distinction is superimposed on the other …., the 
distinction between patent and latent re-enters the legal system. It now has 
orientation value’ and ‘can be used to guide further operations of the system’.
382
 But 
it is important to realise that this ‘[r]e-entry cannot “solve” the paradox [of 
observation]’, writes Smith, ‘it merely disguises it’.
383
 Although the concept ‘is 
treated as fixed and unchanging …. the context or precise nature of the distinction is 
constantly shifting’.
384
 Indeed, by explicit reference, implicit reference and an 
‘additional distinction (!) between explicit and implicit case reference’ we now learn 
‘how to reconstruct the history of these cases. The “authority” is Dixon. The 
“development” is Winterbottom. The Longmeid case, therefore, represents the re-
entry of the distinction between patent and latent dangers in the legal system’.
385
   
Finally, in the next phase, the distinction ‘becomes condensed and confirmed ….  
Not only are different cases treated as identical, but the same distinction gains in 
authority from its repeated application in … new contexts and acquires additional 
meaning’. Eventually, ‘[e]ven the confirmations … get condensed’, the distinction is 
‘turned … into a contradiction', and there is ‘a crossing of the code values 
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Particular ‘attention must be paid to the process’,
387
 says Levi, what is 
important is the mechanism of transformation. The law is both certain and uncertain, 
changing and unchanging It is an example, we might say, albeit a sophisticated one, 
of an ancient abstraction, the unchanging subject of change: ‘[t]he law forum is the 
most explicit demonstration of the mechanism required for a moving classification 
system’ based on ‘the presentation of competing examples’.
388
 So, while it is true 
that, ‘[i]n case law, when a judge determines what the controlling similarity between 
the present and prior case is, the case is decided’, nonetheless, it is with ‘a set of …. 
satellite concepts that reasoning by example must work’. And, crucially, ‘no satellite 
concept, no matter how well developed, can prevent the court from shifting its 
course, not only by realigning cases, but by going beyond realignment back to the 
overall ambiguous category written into the document', a procedure which, 'in other 




 Levi’s account of the process is clear and precise: the ‘movement of concepts 
into and out of the law’ begins with the recognition of similarities and differences, 
and the emergence of a word which, when accepted, ‘becomes a legal concept’. Even 
so, ‘its meaning continues to change’, since ‘the comparison is not only between the 
instances which have been included under it and the actual case at hand, but also in 
terms of hypothetical instances which the word by itself suggests’. At this point, 
‘reasoning may … appear to be simply deductive’, though ‘[i]n the long run a 
circular motion can be seen’
390
 where concepts are built up and fixed before finally 
breaking down again. During breakdown, ‘there will be the [inevitable] attempt to 
escape to some overall rule which can be said to have always operated and which 
will make the reasoning look deductive’. But ‘[t]he statement of the rule’ is mere 
‘window dressing’, and ‘it can be very misleading’, for ‘it will have to operate on a 
level where it has no meaning’.
391
 For instance, ‘[p]articularly when a concept has 
broken down and reasoning by example is about to build another, textbook writers, 
well aware of the unreal aspect of old rules, will announce new ones, equally 
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ambiguous and meaningless, forgetting that the legal process does not work with the 
rule but on a much lower level’.
392
 
    
In seeking to expose the ‘“lower level” operations of the common law 
process’, Levi, Smith observes, ‘stresses the contingency of change’, noting ‘how the 
legal system fumbles its way in an environment which is in principle inaccessible to 
it and can only be reconstructed using its own categories, its own distinctions’.   
Through its use of ‘distinctions, the legal system … break[s] up the “seamless web” 
of decisions based on decisions, construct[s] lines of argument, trends and patterns of 
development … observes everything, including itself’.
393
 Here, with the construction 
of trends and patterns, the system receives its pedigree, and we discover ‘one way of 
neutralising the paradox of the legal system’.
394
 To put it another way, as cases are 
ruled in and out as authority, ‘history has to be rewritten’.
395
 ‘The key thing to note’, 
says Smith, ‘is that these are not separate operations but separate ways of looking at 
the same operation – they occur simultaneously …   This is redundancy …., the 
attempt to reduce the element of surprise in the system … to convince that a 




 For Levi, therefore, the attempt to ‘soar above the cases and find some great 
overall rule which can classify the cases as though the pattern were not really a 
changing one’
397
 is ‘mere window-dressing’.
398
 But, for Smith, Levi 'dramatically 
underplays the significance of legal reasoning’ being always ‘at pains to stress the 
contingency of the system’. For Smith, rather, ‘the decisional structure of law 
requires a certain style of reasoning’, and systems theory describes this ‘particular 
account of reasoning as taking place within the context of the common law process, 
and of the common law process within the legal system as a whole’.
399
 It thus 
‘compels us to look at the role of law in society and therefore, here, the role of 
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common law and legal reasoning in society … [L]egal reasoning is important not 
because it is caught up in resolving the internal paradoxes of the system, but because 
it ultimately provides the link between law and community, between system and 
lifeworld’;
 
… although ‘there is good evidence that courts do resolve paradoxes, and 
… this distinction between law and community … is just another way of resolving 
the paradox. But … the question for systems theory now becomes whether this is a 
good way of solving the paradox, and to ask whether there are not better ways’.
400
    
 
 What Levi shows us, concludes Smith, is that ‘[l]egitimation does not come 
through legal reasoning but through the legal process. It is law as system … that 
legitimizes itself'. What this means is that ‘there is no simple exchange of ideas 
between law and its environment. Any idea has to be read together with the past and 
the future decisions of the system which gives it is legal sense … What is important 
is not so much the substantive values of the ideas themselves, but the institution of a 
procedure of revisability … a procedure [that] provides the forum for the making and 
the unmaking of ideas …’
401
     
 
Taking account of Levi, we can affirm the notion that judges’ actual 
experience of decision making better resembles a Deleuzean rhizomic web than an 
hierarchically ordered structure of linear progression, its natural tendency to resist 
systematization, to spread out, integrate and incorporate in all directions, a ‘self-
organizing, non-linear, and multi-stranded’ organism, growing, as it were, ‘from the 
bottom up and not from the top down’.
402
 In this way, the metaphor of the rhizome 
helps to promote this sense of an assemblage of incongruent parts, the bringing 
together of elements not normally considered as belonging together. This might help 
us to understand how it seems that so much of a judge’s work in decision making 
actually involves developing lines of thought that cut across boundaries. Just as the 
rhizome is not reducible to an ordered sequence of individual component parts but is 
‘a non-localisable relation sweeping up the two distant or contiguous points, carrying 
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one into the proximity of the other’,
403
 so, in the courtroom, the rule that is, 
supposedly, to be ‘applied’ to the facts is actually just as much in wait of its 
appearance on the basis of these facts. In this way, the process of judicial decision 
making as a whole is perhaps more accurately described under the metaphor of the 
rhizome given this inherent vulnerability to irruption, disruption or interruption, all 
without fatally undermining its continuing capacity for self-organization.  
 
Furthermore, in the same way that a rhizome does not appear to have any 
identifiable start point, so, as Levi claims, concepts, definitions and lines of 
reasoning seem to move freely across the judicial landscape without identifiable start 
or end points. In constructing their opinions, judges can actually be seen to use 
deliberate engagement strategies within their obiter remarks to achieve this. For 
example, a point of view is expressed that does not contribute to the overall ratio of 
the case, and may even be part of the minority view, but which is intended to set out 
an alternative strategy. While it might not impact on the case at hand in any 
significant way it may nonetheless be picked up later and used by another judge 
somewhere else in support of a future decision. In this way, although it does not have 
the force of a ratio in terms of the doctrine of precedent, it is accorded informally and 
assumed unofficially to have some credible force simply by way of the reputation of 
the judge, and, by extension, the status of the court in which it was delivered. Like 
the analogue of the rhizome, it is simply not possible to reduce the organization of 
legal knowledge in common law reasoning to a single source; instead, it cuts across 
established lines creating, combining and integrating. 
 
While such a view may be considered a challenge to both dominant 
hierarchical and ideological theories of legal institutional decision making there is 
really nothing new in this. The simple fact is that legal knowledge has always 
operated as a rhizomic system of interconnections and intersections across and 
between professional groups. It is simply quite false to think that law consists in the 
simple application of known rules to legally relevant facts.  
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The ‘Becoming’ of Law in Legal Decision Making 
 
A second effect of viewing the organization of legal knowledge as a continuous 
process of communication follows on from this. As we have seen, under a traditional 
common law model of legal reasoning, legal institutional knowledge is understood as 
a connecting of two or more separate points. Yet, as Bergson states, and as our look 
at Levi and Re A has confirmed, we cannot say that knowledge progresses in any 
uniform way along a pre-arranged pathway. rather, instead of some rigid adherence 
to the dogmatic assertion that a rule is applied wherever the conditions of its 
application are met, where the emphasis is on the halts, ‘universals’ and ‘particulars’ 
as in some way ontologically prior to our understanding of the nature of the 
relationship between them, we should perhaps more correctly say that ‘there is a 
becoming of law from universals to particulars’. In this way, our attention is drawn 
away from any suggestion of a transition between two definite points, or, indeed, of 
any notion of simple correspondence, and only towards that ‘irreducible line that 
passes in and between the two … carrying them both away in a creative process 




For legal decision makers the continuity of becoming from rules to decision 
is realized through engagement with particular local fact situations. In this way, not 
only does the decision and its effects, both legal and personal/social, get 
communicated but a whole network of interrelations works together to make this 
happen. It is not just about communicating decisions, it is more about a type of 
personal, social and political engagement: reasons need to be accessible and 
meaningful for law’s audience, its users. In Levi’s study we can see this emerging. 
Legal decision makers, at whatever level, mostly do try to relate their decisions to the 
concrete situations before them. In this sense, the development of law and legal 
change does not occur in abstraction, but in and through the real world where men 
and women live and work. In reality, rule determination and rule application, 
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Perhaps we need to reassess our adherence to the logic of institutionalization that 
segments legal knowledge into separate phases. There is a good case to be made for 
an account of law and legal decision making that cuts across these quite arbitrary 
divisions and focuses more on their immanent relations. This is important because 
while it is true that we do act and think in law as though we possessed a storehouse 
of ready-made, clearly defined legal knowledge awaiting its application and 
implementation, nonetheless, as we have seen this idea is not as helpful as we 
sometimes think, for the delineation of legal knowledge is not quite as distinct as it 
appears. In our examination of both the macro and micro levels of decision making, 
in Re A and in Levi’s account of decision making, we can begin to see how this 
comes about.  
 
First, an obvious tension appears in law’s prescriptive framework: from the 
beginning it is clear that there is an uncomfortable coupling of two very different 
versions of events running in parallel. There is a deep suspicion that this tension 
exists because these two versions or understandings of what is going on belong to 
two quite different worlds, and that the objective events or circumstances to which 
they refer and from which they derive their meaning are really quite different 
‘entities’ in each. While decision makers continue to profess adherence to the 
established institutional order to satisfy the burden of decision making beneath the 
weight of an ever-changing social, political, cultural and religious climate that 
relentlessly requires results under pressures of time, etc, it is clear that, in making 
those decisions, judges actually articulate a wider, more complex, more openly 
receptive approach than is often suggested by the simple and straightforward 
application of rules to factual situations. There is more to decision making than is 
accounted for in the ‘official’ version.  
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Second, as we saw in Re A and in Levi, the connections between legal 
concepts, doctrines and procedures described in legal judgements are not always as 
straightforward and obvious as they are assumed to be.  Therefore, alongside of the 
official, hierarchical, institutional version of how law operates appears a more 
pragmatic account that better corresponds to what we actually find to be the case, an 
‘unofficial’ version that helps to engender trust, legitimate and domesticate the 
official version. As well as being institutions, formal legal contexts are also 
‘practices’, shared traditions in and out of which legal practitioners live and work, 
and in this latter sense, the structure of legal  knowledge takes on a more narrative 
form.  
 
Third, by utilizing the notion of becoming, it is possible to cast a spotlight on 
some of the difficulties involved in the making of decisions in real-life situations. For 
example, there is a problem in deciding where exactly thinking, deliberating, 
reasoning about a case ends and acting within it begins, and a gap between rule 
determination and rule application that has important implications for decision 
makers and addressees of decisions alike. We have seen how, in rule-based law, 
law’s decisional imperative and the collapse of the supposed symmetry between 
addressor and addressee that alone could redeem the rule-based form, collapses and 
how, then, because of this, a continued adherence to rule-based law-giving performs 
a travesty that cannot be compensated for. Here, we see how law is violent, a double-
edged sword, cutting into and out of the continuing flow and flux of life with its 
requirement for the rational resolution of rational conflict and its use of abstractions 
and representations to perform this; manipulating, controlling and transferring across 
fields, misrepresenting on the one hand and silencing on the other. But it is precisely 
because of this that judges must then begin to equip themselves bravely with abilities 
honed through experience and training to translate ideas across fields and disciplines, 
blurring boundaries, entering into the living narratives that are coldly set before 
them, frozen from time. Any judge will need to be ‘a man for all seasons’ if he is to 
sit straddling all the different social, cultural political, cultural, religious and even 




In this sense, perhaps the most urgent task facing judicial decision makers, 
law makers and other legal professionals is to re-engage with legal institutional 
knowledge as it really is, and not just as it is sometimes supposed to be; that is, not in 
terms of an either/or preconception of reality as separated into prior domains that 
structure and prefigure reality determining what is experienced, but as a 
simultaneously ‘not only/but also’, interpenetrative, relational account of legal 
determination and legal application. But this is not as easy a prescription to follow as 
might at first appear. We are much more inclined towards order, stability and 
predictability than we are to opening ourselves up to experience and entertain 
elements of the novel and the surprising, its irruptions, disruptions and interruptions. 
Most of all, what this suggests is that we need to stop thinking about law under the 
terms of its decisional imperative and more in terms of a forum for encouraging free 
and unrestricted dialogue, an opportunity for distilling and discovering ideals that 
will lure us into future commitments.  
 
Is this still “Law”? On one reading, Christodoulidis’s perhaps, maybe not. 
But if we are able to harness such a re-constructive understanding of ‘law’ in this 
way it might be possible to find a way in which to illuminate some current disputes 
while also remaining continually open to the possibility that some of our most deeply 
held doctrinal commitments no longer offer living possibilities. Perhaps the 
incommensurability of legal decision making with which we have been struggling is 
not so much a herald of the undoing of law as it is a statement of the conditions for 






MICHAEL POLANYI’S ‘TACIT KNOWLEDGE’ 
 
What is ‘Tacit Knowledge’? 
 
In his seminal volume, Personal Knowledge’, Michael Polanyi writes that  
 
‘[t]he act of knowing includes an appraisal; and this personal coefficient, 
which shapes all factual knowledge, bridges in doing so the disjunction 




One of the strengths of Polanyi’s thought is its strong rejection of dualistic 
tendencies; such as between theoretical and practical knowledge.
407
 For him, ‘[a]ll 
knowing is personal knowing – participation through indwelling’.
408
 Therefore, the 
idea that there could be such a thing as ‘objective knowledge’ is mistaken and 
destructive; rather, all knowledge involves the active participation of the knower. 
The act of knowing is skilful action.  
 
For example, imagine that I wish to construct a model airplane. In order to 
achieve this from a boxful of plastic pieces of different shapes and sizes I might 
make use of a set of diagrams and instructions. Each diagram is an explicit 
representation of something other than itself, a model airplane. It is, in this way, 
similar to a system of rules, aimed at bringing about purposeful action. But in order 
to utilize the potential of those diagrams I will first need to be able to relate them to 
the physical world outside of them: I must read the diagrams. In fact, I must do three 
things: identify the pieces that I have, choose what I want to make, and decide how 
to put them together. According to Polanyi, all such acts are acts of skilful judgement 
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and they are both cognitive and sensual.
409
 The diagrams assist me in constructing 
the model, matching individual pieces to their diagrammatic representations, but this 
still requires some personal judgement on my part to match the two, a mental and 
physical effort, in short, a skilful action. Personal judgements such as this are 
involved whenever we try to bring together our experience of the world and our 
abstract representations of it.
410
 We often say that certain laws can predict certain 
outcomes, but what we really mean is that we can predict certain outcomes by using 
these laws as tools. The outcomes are not given; rather, they need to be calculated, 
checked and authenticated, comparing expectations with results, calculating margins 




In arguing that our tools of perception, intuition and reasoning are not self-
applying but require an action on our part in order to apply them, Polanyi, like 
Whitehead,
412
 emphasizes the importance of the physical body in the act of knowing: 
 
‘the way the body participates in the act of perception can be generalized 
further to include the bodily roots of all knowledge and thought … Parts of 





In this sense, Polanyi argues that all acts of knowing are skilful presentations by the 
human agent which involve a ‘personal coefficient’.
414
 Moreover, each skilful 
performance ‘is achieved by the observance of a set of rules which are not known as 
such to the person following them’.
415
 Consider the driver of a motor vehicle. 
Although not well-acquainted with the scientific principles of internal combustion 
such a driver may nonetheless be quite capable of driving proficiently. She will move 
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off, effortlessly, from a stationary position and continue driving along a busy road, 
maintaining the car in a forward direction with good speed and with minimum 
discomfort to her passengers, accelerating and decelerating, changing gears up and 
down as necessary. Of course, if she were able, she might formulate rules based on 
scientific principles to explain why it is that the car responds in particular ways to the 
different actions she performs but it is not at all obvious that knowing any of these 
scientific rules would necessarily make her a better driver; much less, that she would 
require to know anything about these rules simply to drive. As she learns to drive and 
becomes more proficient at driving any such knowledge will usually be held ‘at the 
back of her mind’, not focused on but taken for granted, accepted and held 
unconsciously. Just so, we might say that skills such as driving are not normally held 
to be accountable fully in terms of their particulars; indeed, these are often unknown 
to the person exercising the skill. Knowing how a car works will not of itself make 




According to Polanyi, every ‘mental effort … tends to incorporate any 
available elements of the situation which are helpful for its purpose’, even without 
the actor knowing them in and of themselves. Thus, it has a heuristic effect:  
  
‘we feel our way to success and may continue to improve on our success 
without specifiably knowing how we do it – for we never meet the causes of 
our success as identifiable things which can be described in terms of classes 




Here, two types of awareness are involved. Polanyi uses another example to explain. 
Suppose that I am engaged in hammering a nail into a piece of wood. While I am 
aware both of the hammer and the nail, my awareness of the hammer is different to 
my awareness of the nail. Driving the nail into the wood is the main object of my 
concentration and I watch and correct my action as the effects of my hitting the nail 
drive it further into the wood: I am focally aware of the nail. I am also aware of the 
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hammer: I feel it clenched tightly in my hand. However, feeling the hammer in my 
hand is not the main focus of my concentration: 
 
‘I know the feelings in the palm of my hand by relying on them for attending 
to the hammer hitting the nail. I may say that I have a subsidiary awareness 





In other words, in performing an action, I am aware of some things that are not the 
main focus of my attention. More precisely, ‘in an act of tacit knowing we attend 
from something for attending to something else’,
419
 which is why we always ‘know 




We can compare this understanding of skilful engagement with the legal 
method of deductive syllogism. On the one hand, we should note that on this 
understanding tacit integration cannot be undone: it is certainly possible to shift 
one’s attention away from the object of one’s concentration while driving a motor car 
or hammering a nail, often with significant results, but this will not take one back to 
the point of not knowing how to drive a car or hammer a nail. On the other hand, in 
the deductive syllogism we find that we can proceed step by step in a logical way 
from premises to conclusions and back again always without loss. In other words, 
because all the logical connections hold the direction is reversible. Now, if we think 
of a particular instance of judicial decision making, it should be clear that the 
moment of decision in which the judicial decision is made is essentially one of tacit 
integration, while the subsequent act of providing justifying reasons for that legal 
decision is essentially, as MacCormick argues, of the nature of explicit or deductive 
inference. Clearly, the two are not the same. While the latter may build upon the 
former and may even explain it for legal purposes, this, as Christodoulidis observes, 
comes too late to justify it, for there is no going back. What is purportedly a 
justifying reason may indeed provide a reason to explain why the decision, already 
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made, may now be used as a relevant datum for new decisions, but that is a quite 
different thing to saying that it provides the justifying reason in and through which 
that decision was made.  
 
Clearly, much of this also taps into the familiar debate concerning the 
‘judicial hunch’
421
 and, in that respect, precisely what part is being played here by 
‘discovery’ and what by ‘justification’. This distinction was first made by H. 
Reichenbach in order to differentiate between the description of the origin of a 
proposition (the ‘context of discovery’) and the demonstration of it (the ‘context of 
justification’); indeed, Reichenbach argued that  
 
‘[t]he act of discovery escapes logical analysis; there are no logical rules that 
could be applied to the construction of a “discovery machine” that would 
assume the creative function of genius. But it is not the logician’s task to 
explain scientific discoveries; all the logician can do is analyse the relation 
between the facts as given and a theory that is presented to her or him that 





All of which brings us back once again to the problem highlighted by 
Christodoulidis. 
 
The Structure of Tacit Knowledge: Similarities with Whitehead 
 
As Polanyi describes it, the character of tacit knowing as ‘vectorial’
423
 appears to 
embody the same sense of creativity that we find in Whitehead’s analysis of the three 
phases of concrescence in the becoming of an actual occasion of experience.
424
 
Polanyi explains what he means by reference to the way that a blind person might 
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feel their way by tapping with a stick, or the way that one might use a probe to 
explore a darkened cavern: 
 
‘Anyone using as probe for the first time will feel its impact against his 
fingers and palm. But as we learn to use a probe, or to use a stick for feeling 
our way, our awareness of its impact on our hand is transformed into a sense 
of its point touching the objects we are exploring … . [A]n interpretative 
effort transposes meaningless feelings into meaningful ones, and places these 
at some distance from the original feeling. We become aware of the feelings 
in our hand in terms of their meaning located at the tip of the probe or stick to 




Of course, we could illustrate this with numerous examples from everyday 
experience. Tacit knowing permeates all of our daily living, from casual acts of 
observation to performing simple physical tasks. But the point is that, as we take on 
more specialized tasks, in order to accomplish these we find that we must first have 
internalized
426
 new knowledge:  
 
‘when we learn to use language, or a probe, or a tool, and thus make 
ourselves aware of these things as we are our body, we interiorize these 




In other words, by ‘indwelling’ in the tools that we use, we are able to use them as 
extensions of ourselves to increase our own powers and press outwards to further 
extend the boundaries at which we make contact with the world around us.
428
 But for 
this to come about, for our use of such tools to become ‘natural’, this must be 
something in relation to which we necessarily offer uncritical acceptance: we do not 
and cannot question their usefulness. On the contrary, their usefulness is always 
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something presupposed, taken for granted, something which cannot be stated; 
otherwise, we could make no claims and assert nothing. As Polanyi puts it, 
 
‘assertion can be made only within a framework with which we have 
identified ourselves for the time being; as they are themselves our ultimate 




So, internalizing a tool to use it instrumentally in pursuit of some aim or goal 
enables the user to obtain new experiences that facilitate greater efficiency in 
carrying out appropriate tasks. Consider the novice rider. She has been told how to 
hold the reins, how to maintain balance and posture in the saddle and stirrups, where, 
when and how to give pressure when she wishes the horse to move and change 
direction or movement in a certain way. She feels the reins in her hands, her feet in 
the stirrups, the body of the horse beneath; but she has not yet learned how to 
correlate the responsive movements of the horse with their own bodily actions. 
Again, by contrast at the other end of the scale, an experienced equestrian will appear 
so much more skilled in riding, moving gracefully with her horse as if they were one. 
This is because all those skills that appear to the novice as things to be remembered 
and attended to with concentration have become actions of which the experienced 
rider has become unconscious. They are skills that have been mastered and need no 
longer to be focussed upon but are now used ‘naturally’ for the purpose of guiding 
and instructing the horse. Having thus developed an unawareness of certain actions 
the experienced rider is now able to concentrate more on what is going on around, to 
notice changing conditions underfoot and to observe the actions and positions of 
others, and generally to move on to perform and enjoy an ever-expanding horizon of 
equestrian experience. As Polanyi states,  
 
‘by the effort by which I concentrate on my chosen plane of operation I 
succeed in absorbing all the elements of the situation of which I might 
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otherwise be aware in themselves, so that I become aware of them now in 




This, then, is how we get things done, becoming efficient and proficient 
through developing an unawareness. We can learn all there is to know about the 
working mechanisms of a motor car or the anatomy of a horse, and how to make 
proper use of these, but until we have actually succeeded in putting all of this into 
‘the back of our minds’, we will not finally have acquired the skilful ability 
necessary to master and experience fully the art of driving or riding. As Polanyi says, 
 
‘[t]his lapse into unconsciousness is accompanied by a newly acquired 
consciousness of the experiences in question, on the operational plane. It is 
misleading, therefore, to describe this as the mere result of repetition; it is a 
structural change achieved by a repeated mental effort aiming at the 





This is not to suggest that Bakowski is wrong to say that we must ‘pay attention’ to 
the story; on the contrary, it is to affirm that in order to be free to ‘pay attention to 
the story’ we have to develop an unawareness of the methods and the tools that we 
employ. Focussing on the methods and tools of legal argument simply causes us to 
stare at a situation and to deal clumsily with it.
432
 Instead, we need to develop the 
ability to glance rather than gaze and to recapture the dynamic of movement in each 
story by skilfully entering into in this way. As our consciousness of some things in a 
certain context contracts, so our consciousness of other things expands and enlarges. 
In the same way that particulars such as ‘releasing the clutch’ and ‘keeping your 
heels down’ are known subsidiarily to those persons involved in the skills of driving 
and riding we must also learn and develop the skills to enable us to attend with 
confidence to the art of judicial decision making.  
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In this sense, then, we can affirm all knowledge to be contextual and 
operational, related to action within that context: in the context of driving I know 
about releasing the clutch; in the context of riding I know to keep my heels down in 
the stirrups. Moreover, it is in these contexts that I have a subsidiary awareness of 
these. Of course, if I were also a bicycle designer, or a motor car engineer, or a riding 
instructor, the focus of my attention would be significantly different, and rightly so. 
But that is just another way of saying that in some situations, and depending on 
context, I have a subsidiary awareness of certain particulars; in others situations, and 
depending on context, they constitute the focus of my attention. In this sense, my 
knowledge may be described correctly as recursive.
433
 Depending on context, I must 
have the ability to absorb, internalize and use unconsciously certain things in pursuit 
of some other purpose or goal; changing context, I must be able to turn or re-turn 
back on my self and concentrate on these.  
 
In mathematics, the recursive application of a function to its own values will 
generate an infinite sequence of values. So here, too (in theory at least, though there 
are institutional checks to limit it), if a judge also happens to be a mother and a 
driver, she will have acquired different bodies of knowledge in respect of each of 
these, and each of these, with their own relevant degree of abstraction, come together 
to provide the judge with her depth of knowledge and understanding and expertise. 
But the extent to which an individual judge will draw upon each of these depends on 
the present context of decision making. Each of her various bodies of knowledge and 
understanding exists independently and cannot be replaced by or reduced to any 
other. That is to say, her practical knowledge cannot be replaced by theoretical 
knowledge. 
 
MacCormick and ‘Tacit Knowledge’ 
 
Although MacCormick agrees that legal reasoning is a form of practical reasoning 
his use of the metaphor of communication whereby ideas are understood as objects 
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that can be extracted and packaged or communicated to other people by means of a 
structure or channel of communication appears to reduce legal reasoning to a sort of 
technical knowledge. For him, the form of legal reasoning associated with his 
institutional theory of law is that of deductive reasoning. Clearly, judges do learn a 
technique for the presentation of the results of their decision making in their formal 
legal training but they also learn and gradually assimilate more than technical 
knowledge, even if they don’t realize this. They not only learn how to present and re-
present their decisions in the accepted institutional forms but also begin to acquire 
rudimentary forms or basic skills for decision making that will later be further 
developed and refined, skills in the art of decision making that represent a knowledge 
that cannot be precisely formulated in propositions but which will, nonetheless, 
become manifest in their decision making (which is one reason why judges tend to 
develop recognisable ‘styles’ in decision making).  To regard such practical 
knowledge as having content capable of being defined with precision so that it may 
be converted from a thought in the head of the judge to explicitly formulated 
propositional knowledge is to confuse the distinction between knowledge and 




 puts the point very well when he says that 
 
‘a pianist acquires artistry as well as technique, a chess-player style and 
insight into the game as well as knowledge of the moves, and a scientist 
acquires (among other things) the sort of judgement which tells him when his 
technique is leading him astray and the connoisseurship which enables him to 
distinguish the profitable from the unprofitable directions to explore’. 
 
But Polanyi goes even further. For him, since a judge could not possibly know all the 
rules pertaining to the activity she is engaged in, then, although these ‘rules … can be 
useful … they do not determine the practice …;’ rather, ‘they are maxims, which can 
serve as a guide … only if they can be integrated into the practical knowledge of 
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[decision making]. They cannot replace th[at] knowledge’.
435
 In other words, it is 
because the knowledge necessary to the activity of decision making is not able to be 
stated in any detailed way that it must be handed down from master to apprentice. 
That is why, for him,  
 
‘[t]o learn by example is to submit to authority. You follow your master 
because you trust his manner of doing things even when you cannot analyse 
and account in detail for its effectiveness. By watching the master and 
emulating his efforts in the presence of his example, the apprentice 
unconsciously picks up the rules of the art, including those which are not 
explicitly known to the master himself. These hidden rules can be assimilated 





Thus, to the young law student, for example, everything is alien, because the relevant 
and requisite knowledge for how to do law has not yet been internalized. 
Nonetheless, over time the student does begin to assimilate that knowledge and 
becomes subsidiarily aware of what they are doing in answering legal problems. In 
this way, they can also begin to turn their attention to and become focally aware of 
what is really going on in the case at hand, instead of simply trying to ‘answer’ the 
question. Now, a different type of understanding develops and knowledge is used 
instrumentally: it is tacitly known and unquestioningly used.  
 
Just so, it is clear that the activity of thinking about decision making is 
different from decision making, just as the activity of finding justifying reasons for 
decisions is qualitatively different from the moment of making of those decisions. In 
seeking to present justifying reasons for her legal decisions, a judge is no longer 
involved in precisely the same activity; namely, the making of the decision. Contra 
MacCormick, Polanyi argues that, ‘the particulars of a skill appear to be … logically 
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 in fact, ‘the specification of the particulars would logically 




However, we do still speak of a judge, afterwards, reflecting on the decision 
that she has made, discussing her decision making with and for her colleagues, and 
articulating it in written judgement as explicit legal knowledge. But this is surely 
mistaken. Of course it is the same decision that is referred to, but here the judge is no 
longer describing the decision-making event, the moment of decision, in its entirety, 
but only that technical part of it that can be articulated in the form of rules, 
principles, values, and so on; that is, embedded and embodied in propositional 
statements. In contrast, what is tacitly known cannot be put into words, it is the 
‘ineffable’
439
 part of the skill that is performed in the event of the decision as it is 
made. We can see, then, the force of Polanyi’s argument that subsidiary particulars 
are unspecifiable, that they always exist in conjunction with the focus to which one 
attends from them: 
 
‘Subsidiary or instrumental knowledge … is not known in itself but is known 
in terms of something focally known, to the quality of which it contributes, 
and to this extent it it unspecifiable. Analysis may bring subsidiary 
knowledge into focus and formulate it as a maxim or as a feature in a 
physiognomy, but such specification is in general not exhaustive. Although 
the expert diagnostician, taxonomist and cotton-classer can indicate their 
clues and formulate their maxims, they know many more things than they can 
tell, knowing them only in practice, as instrumental particulars, and not 
explicitly, as objects. The knowledge of such particulars is therefore 
ineffable, and the pondering of a judgement in terms of such particulars is an 




Thus, tacit knowledge cannot be transferred or transformed into explicit knowledge.  
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Contrary to MacCormick’s argument in relation to the instance of Solomonic 
wisdom, stating Solomon’s act of judging in propositional form does not capture in 
any detailed form the essence of Solomonic wisdom or, even, its moment of 
decision. Such skilful knowing has in it an ineffable element based on personal 
insight (intuition, call it what you will) and will not submit to (/admit of) articulation. 
But does this mean then that we cannot speak about decision making as a practical 
activity, and that such skills will inevitably be ‘mystical’ experiences outside the 
forum of reasoned debate? 
441
 Of course not: what we actually do when we engage in 
reflection on our practical activities of judging is re-visit the distinctions 
underpinning them, highlight previously unnoticed or unconnected aspects, 
understand afresh and relate to the situation we are in, in a new way.  
 
What all this points to is that our engagement in the practical activities of 
decision making takes place in and through our participation in social practices under 
the tutelage of those more experienced than us.
442
 This is how we come to know the 
‘hows’, the ‘whats’, the ‘wherefores’ and the ‘whys’ of that practice: we acquire its 
knowledge and gain its understanding by having our attention directed, through a 
hidden ‘persuasion’. In this way, we keep getting re-told what we already know, we 
are taught again a language that we have already learned but cannot yet speak. 
Perhaps this is what Augustine meant when he complained that although, when he 
thought about time he knew what he meant, if someone were to ask him to give an 
account of time he could not, and what Wittgenstein also understood and put so 
perceptively, when he wrote: ‘Something that we know when no one asks us, but no 
longer know when we are supposed to give an account of it, is something that we 
need to remind ourselves of’.
443
 Quite possibly this is why the practice of decision 
making continues to fascinate us: we constantly practice it but we need forever to be 
reminded of it. Indeed, when we recursively interpose our understandings in the 
process of finding justifying reasons for legal decisions we do in fact give light to 
previously unseen or un-emphasized distinctions that our everyday use of language 
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often easily passes over.
444
 In this way, the simple, familiar, but often unnoticed 
aspects of decision making, the things that are there but always remain hidden, can 
be talked about; the ‘ineffable’ can be described and previously unnoticed or 
forgotten aspects viewed afresh in new connections, in a new way and in a new light. 
By such means we find that decisions are assisted and the law helped to relate to new 
circumstances in new ways and to provide new directions. 
 
I think we misunderstand tacit knowledge, which is at the heart of judicial 
decision making, if we think of it as MacCormick does as knowledge awaiting 
articulation. Tacit knowledge is ineffable; it cannot be reduced to what is articulated 
or articulate-able. It exists in our subsidiary awareness of something when we are 
focally aware of something else. We cannot attend to subsidiary particulars or 
examine them directly. If we try, their meaning escapes and it becomes like trying to 
catch a moment of time. If we do focus on particulars, it is only in the sense that we 
are engaged in activities in which we have a subsidiary awareness of them; for 
example, we are focussed on the flight of an arrow in its unitary motion but 
subsidiarily aware that it is forever occupying different positions. If we try to focus 
on any one of its positions independently, our awareness of its flight disappears. In 
other words, in trying to focus on the particulars of a decision after that decision has 
been made we are not focusing on them as they are in the original moment of 
decision, for they derive their meaning from their association to that original focus of 
decision. When we focus on the particulars of a decision we do so in a new context 
of decision under which lie a new set of subsidiary particulars. Thus, the notion that 
we can focus on a set of subsidiary particulars and transform them into explicit 
knowledge cannot be sustained. So we can talk about the decisions which we make 
and our reasons for making them, but only in so far and to the extent that we refrain 
from insisting that in so doing we are somehow transforming tacit knowledge into 
explicit knowledge; instead we must understand this whole process as an ongoing 
process of considering how we give consideration to certain things. That is, not so 
much in terms of a process of providing rational conclusions to rational arguments 
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but as the continual uncovering and discovering of ideals that will lure us into further 
commitment. 
 
In this way, written judgements help us understand how we relate to each 
other and the world in the web of legal settings that we have woven for ourselves. 
They help not only to remind us of how but also of why we do things in the ways that 
we do and they encourage us to develop our understanding of this in order that we 
might do these things differently, with more clarity and better. In this way, 
previously unnoticed distinctions emerge and we can highlight their importance. So, 
what we need to promote in considering justification of judicial decisions is not the 
institutional explication of tacit knowledge, which is something of a contradiction in 
terms, but this process itself; that is, the opportunities it offers for new ways of doing 
dialogue and interaction, new ways of making distinctions, of connecting and re-
connecting. In other words, ‘the end of the process is the process itself’. 
 
In conclusion, tacit knowledge in the context of decision making cannot be 
stated in a captured form; it cannot be transformed or transferred, only demonstrated 
in what we do. New knowledge comes about not when what was hitherto tacit is 
made explicit but when our judicial decision-making process is interrupted and shot 
through with new social forms of mutual and reciprocal action and influence. So the 












LEGAL INSTITUTIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
 
In this chapter I will describe the different types of institutional knowledge that exist 
in law, how they interact with each other and how they may be seen to be founded on 
different features of the legal institutional context. I will argue
445
 that while it is true 
that the propositional structure of legal knowledge is fully realized within formal 
legal contexts this tells us only part of the story. As well as being institutions, formal 
legal contexts are also practices; that is, shared traditions in and out of which legal 
practitioners live and work. In this latter sense, legal knowledge has a narrative 
structure, maintained by story, anecdote and example. However, these two features 
of legal institutional knowledge sit uncomfortably alongside each other: there is an 
uneasy tension between the propositional form of legal knowledge fundamentally 
associated with law as an institution and the narrative form of legal knowledge 
associated with law as a shared tradition or practice. In order to survive as a practice, 
law requires its institutions to be strong but these same institutions, by their very 
nature, as they strengthen and become more autonomous, begin to act as a corrosive 
influence on the shared tradition; nonetheless, without its foundation in a shared 
tradition law as an institution is weak and unproductive and incapable of functioning. 
Thus, some equilibrium must be achieved, its tension negotiated and maintained.  
 
The Propositional Structure of Legal Knowledge  
 
Examples of propositional statements in statute are :  
 
‘If a person – 
(a) drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a road or other public place, 
or  
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(b) is in charge of a motor vehicle on a road or other public place, 
After consuming so much alcohol that the proportion of it in his breath, blood 






‘Any person who, being a person to whom [Civic Government (Scotland) Act 
1982, s. 57] applies –  
(a) has or has recently had in his possession any tool or other object from the 
possession of which it May reasonably be inferred that he intended to commit 
theft or had committed theft; and  
(b) is unable to demonstrate satisfactorily that his possession of such tool or 
other object is or was not for the purposes of committing theft, shall be guilty 





At common law, the following statement by Lord Sutherland exhibits a similar 
structure and has been taken for the purposes of decision making in Scots Criminal 
Law to provide a working definition of ‘wicked recklessness’: 
 
‘If you act in such a way as to show that you don’t really care whether the 
person you are attacking lives or dies, then you can constitute this degree of 
wicked recklessness which is required to constitute murder. It may, in the end 
of the day come as a considerable surprise to you, and indeed a matter of 





In each of the above examples, the preceding conditional statements operate 
to identify as significant recurring events or behaviours that serve to provide a basis 
for the formulation of rules to guide future adjudication. Such recurring events are 
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assumed to be patterned, ordered and non-random, made up of elements that are 
objectively available and which can be re-presented in an abbreviated form. That is, 
the elements are seen to be ordered according to a pattern that can be replaced with a 
rule to capture its information content, doing away with the need to list repeatedly 
the whole contents of that pattern. In this way, the mass of observed events and the 
statements made about them can be compressed into a small number of propositional 
statements with the same informational content, permitting economy of effort, 




However, for social reality to permit its abbreviated representation in this 
way, and for propositional knowledge to be possible, the world must first be capable 
of being understood in such regular, patterned and non-random terms. In what sense 
might we affirm this to be the case? According to Peter Berger and Thomas 
Luckmann, 
 
‘[a]ll human activity is subject to habitualization. Any action that is repeated 
frequently becomes cast into a pattern, which can then be reproduced with an 
economy of effort and which, ipso facto, is apprehended by its performer as 
that pattern. Habitualization further implies that the action in question may be 
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For Berger and Luckmann, institutionalization provides the context for linking 
habitualization and typification: it occurs ‘whenever there is a reciprocal typification 
of habitualized action by types of actors’.
451
 Within such contexts, intentions and 
purposes are assigned to actors and, when certain actions recur, these intentions and 
purposes are also held as recurrent. Reducible to role and rule, behaviour becomes to 
a large extent routine and predictable and ‘[t]he institution posits that actions of type 
x will be performed by actors of type x’.
452
 In this way, the social world is seen as 
submitting to an ordering and regularity that makes it possible for us to arrest from it 
patterns and routines and to represent these formally, in an abbreviated way. 
 
Clearly, the more that human social life becomes institutionalized, the more 
concentrations occur, then so the more accessible to regular pattern and ordering it 
becomes and the easier it is to represent this in an abbreviated form as propositional 
statements.
453
 In this way, rules become a means for the prescriptive ordering of 
human behaviour in specified circumstances.
454
 As Twining and Miers put it, a rule 
‘prescribes that in circumstances X, behaviour of type Y ought not to be, or may be, 
indulged in by persons of class Z’.
455
 Therefore, rules, as generalizations, connect 
types of behaviour by types of actors to types of situations.
456
 To affirm that a rule 
exists is to generalize, to institutionalize behaviour is to affirm the existence of 
rules.
457





Legal Rules and Facts 
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What, then, is the relation between general categories and the particular instances 
they seek to relate? Obviously, any particular object, action or event is subsumable 
under a whole range of separate, though not mutually exclusive, categories; for 
example, I am Scottish, white, married, middle-aged, bespectacled, driver, ex-army 
officer, dog lover, keen gardener, and so on. However, not all of these or my other 
attributes are always necessary in order to offer a full and relevant description of me 
in every situation. Only a very limited set of descriptors will often be all that is 
required, and my choice of action in any given situation will not depend so much on 
any of these generalizations as on the type of situation that I find myself in or the 
discursive context in which I am described.
459
 Indeed, we may go even further and 
say that I am not always the same person in all of my different situations in life: there 
is not one over-aching community to which I belong and by which I am adequately 
or completely described but I belong to a number of different communities and I am 
a different person in each one of them. Within these situations, I as I am in these 
situations make my choices and my possibilities for future choosing are shaped by 
and depend on the possibilities that I choose to actualize, make concrete, in each 
present moment of choosing.  
 
This is an important point. Through my ability in any given situation to 
generalize in one direction, to choose A and thus to actualize its possibilities, I not 
only accept the consequences for my future choosing that are given by my choosing 
A but also, by default, I choose not to actualize other possibilities, ~A. Therefore, in 
this sense, we can say that particular situations or discursive contexts make 
institutional action possible, for saying that I am a white married male is quite 
different from saying that I am a bespectacled driver, and the presence of these 
different particulars will assume greater or lesser significance depending on the 
context chosen. In some contexts, the fact that I share particular characteristics with 
other persons will have significant consequences;
460
 in a different context, and 
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depending upon the context, they might assume greater, lesser or no significance at 
all.  
 
Put differently, generalizations as category descriptors are necessarily 
selective: inclusive as well as exclusive, suppressing as well as revealing. But, what 
determines which generalization will constitute a given rule’s factual predicate is its 
purpose: the goal prescribed or the evil proscribed by it. What is significant about 
institutional rules is that while their consequents are forward-looking (meant to be 
applied to future instances) their factual predicates are backward-looking (in the 
sense of having been derived from regularities viewed retrospectively) or forward-
looking in the limited sense of being based on current assumptions about future 
behaviour. But there is a difficulty here. While propositional knowledge can provide 
an explanation retrospectively as to why a social system functions as it does, it 
cannot prospectively inform actors as to how to apply any given set of rules or how 




The reasons for this have been famously stated by Herbert Hart
462
 and 
developed by others. First, there is the inherent instability of language and 
representations of meaning. Any illusion of stability is only temporary, and new 
definitions and new symbolic representations are forever emerging to overtake, 
overshadow or erode old established ones.
463
 In other words, while on the one hand a 
social system such as law tries to fix its definitions and representations with regard to 
its purposes, inevitably, at some point, definitional control passes over to the context 
in which it is set. Thus, if we affirm the inherent and ultimate instability of 
                                                                                                                                          
should get the same terms as her friend because to all intents and purposes the two women are the 
same. But she is told that she is not the same as her friend, she does not have the same hair style or 
colour, the same cardigan, etc. She leaves in disgust and is next seen passing the building society 
branch’s premises, stopping to view a large sign that promises the same rate for everyone. 
461
 This creates an asymmetry that can be removed only if it is acknowledged that the future will only 
ever replicate past instances. And yet this is impossible, for novelty, surprise, the unexpected, always 
creeps in; otherwise, systems atrophy and die. Thus, even overtly deterministic and supposedly closed 
social systems such as law cannot achieve this desired bias absolutely but must remain essentially 
open systems, where this asymmetry is only temporarily averted or avoided. 
462
 See Hart (1994). 
463
 For example, definitions can be eroded from within, with legal interpretations and definitions 
changing (for example, Riggs v Palmer 115 NY 506; 22 NE 188 (1889)) but also from without, with 
social and scientific advances (see Maclennan v Maclennan, 1958 SLT 12). 
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knowledge representations in institutional contexts then we must also acknowledge 
the same in respect of its functional rules. Second, as Charles Taylor notes,
464
 if it is 
to be suggested that a rule must always be followed in the same way repeatedly in 
the future, then what determines this cannot itself be a rule.
465
 Rules, as guides for 
social action in open social systems, are fundamentally imperfect tools. Since a 
definition of a rule cannot itself determine how, on every occasion, it is to be applied, 
and there is no point in pursuing the argument ad infinitum by formulating ever more 
new rules to determine the use of the first rule, we must conclude that the application 
of rules cannot itself be determined through a rule; that is, it must be rule-less.  
 
To put this more concretely, suppose that law books containing codified rules 
were issued to all judges.
466
 The abstract representations of actual situations 
imagined behind these codified rules will be only weakly related to the actual 
situations that later confront the individual judges. The application of rules falls to 
take place in social contexts the details of which can not possibly be known in 
advance and fully to the rule codifiers. Moreover, simply because some 
generalizations are selected, it does not mean that those that have been suppressed 
are irrelevant. This will depend on the circumstances within the context. In certain 
combinations of circumstances, these may become central,
467
 and there is no way of 
knowing beforehand what particular combination or type of combination of 
circumstances will make a certain feature salient. Only the decision maker faced with 
making the decision in respect of the actual circumstances of the case before them 




 So not only is what is going on in an institutional context not static and 
indeterminate, but the rules governing situations are bound to be to some extent of 
limited utility. That is to say, all sorts of things are going on at the same time that 
                                                 
464
 Taylor (1995), p.57. 
465
 See Witgenstein ((1958), the application of rules is rooted in practices) and Gadamer (1980), to 
understand in concreto one requires practical wisdom or phronesis). 
466
 As has often been suggested in the United States in relation to sentencing practice. 
467
 See Schauer (1991), p. 22. 
468
 Detmold (1989) makes a similar point when he talks of the anxiety of encounter that a judge faces 




cannot be described in advance, and can only be known at the time from the 
particular perspective of the observer as an involved participant.
469
 In this way there 
is no escaping the difficulty that arises from new circumstances and even the most 
informed and imaginative codified systems will always come up against the same 




MacCormick agrees that if we can identify regularities of behavioural 
patterns then it should be possible to state these in the form of conditional, ‘If, Then’ 
propositional statements which will be valid under certain stated conditions. This 
introduces a dimension of certainty and formality into the equation producing 
‘explicitly articulated norms’, or rules, with the general form: ‘Whenever OF 
[operative facts], then NC [normative consequence]’.
471
 This accords well with the 
idea that we noted above; namely, that propositional knowledge is necessarily 
concerned with generalizations, connecting ‘types’ of behaviour, circumstances and 
environments. However, the ‘actual’ circumstances of any behaviour are always 
bound to be in some sense unrepeatable, so that the particular decision-making 
context within which adjudication is made in respect of any such behaviour is also 
itself always bound to be, in that sense, unique. So how can a judge acquire the 
necessary knowledge of any particular set of circumstances to link these to rule-like 
generalizations in order to formulate a decision? In judicial decision making, how do 
the universal and the particular meet? 
 
We might suggest, to begin with, that rule-like generalizations could be 
subjected to ever more refinement and in this way shaped to meet the specific 
requirements of a particular situation. But as we have already seen this does not solve 
the problem: even conditional generalizations are universal within the scope of their 
applicability.
472
 In other words, universal statements, as generalizations - where time 
and space have effectively been removed - cannot be made to ‘touch’ the local 
                                                 
469
 Therefore, not as an impartial spectator.  
470
 ‘Regardless of scope, any rule uses its generalizing factual predicate to make it applicable to all of 
something’, (Schauer (1991), p. 24).  
471
 MacCormick (2007), pp. 24-25. 
472
 See Schauer (1991), p. 24. 
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knowledge of conditions of time and space. Therefore, I will argue
473
 that in decision 
making judges do not simply use instrumentally already existing propositional 
knowledge in the form of explicitly articulated norms, or rules, but they also draw 
upon the reservoir of their own factual knowledge and upon a collective knowledge 
of which they may or may not be wholly aware, and create new knowledge. These 
sources of knowledge are used differently by different judges in different decision-
making contexts, and the variety of ways in which such resources can be used to 
inform decisions can potentially create an almost limitless pool of new knowledge. 
 
My claim here is significantly different from MacCormick’s, who suggests 
that judges construct the rules upon which the justification of their decisions is based 
on the basis of principles and values underlying legal institutional normative order 
and are thus not really creating new knowledge or rules but rather making explicit 
what was hitherto only implicit in that order and system of rules. This attempt to 
classify institutional knowledge and to continually draw out its implications 
exemplifies a positivistic view of law. Here we find legal analysis in decision making 
concerned primarily with the construction and testing of ideas, the introduction of 
new ways of understanding the system and its environment. On this basis, knowledge 
is articulated explicitly or implicitly and more or less abstracted from practice. Thus, 
in MacCormick’s model of legal reasoning, ‘new’, or explicitly articulated 
knowledge is created in precisely this sense, by extracting or revealing implicit 
knowledge through a process of drawing out and testing possibilities 
(universalisability and consequences) and converting this into concepts (rules) that 
are justified in terms of the institution’s overriding mission or purpose (principle). 
Those concepts are then made more tangible (legal rule coherence) and disseminated 
(consistency, non-contradictoriness).  
 
Such a model undoubtedly advances our understanding of legal institutional 
knowledge, helping to demonstrate the interaction of various aspects of legal 
knowledge, but at the same time it possesses some severe limitations which stem 
                                                 
473
 In doing so, I suggest that the argument presented by Tsoukas (see above n. 445) should be 
extended to inform our understanding of what is going in formal legal contexts and in the practice of 
judicial decision making generally.  
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from a tendency to think in terms of ‘forms’. That is to say, the taxonomic urge that 
produces systems of classification is based on the assumption that it is possible to 
identify similarities and differences between distinct, independent objects of study, 
and for this type of thinking to be possible conceptual categories are also assumed to 




Beyond Thinking in Forms: Relating Tacit and Explicit Knowledge  
 
According to Ilya Prigogine, ‘order and disorder are created simultaneously’.
475
 By 
the same token, tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge are not two different types 
of knowledge but they are mutually constituted.
476
 While explicit knowledge is 
always grounded in tacit knowledge, tacit knowledge is not explicit knowledge 
‘internalized’, something rather weakly and precariously held; rather, tacit 
knowledge, or the tacit dimension, is a dimension of all knowledge. One cannot split 
knowledge into tacit and explicit knowledge: they are inseparable. My knowledge is 
possible precisely because of the social practices in which I engage: they are 
mutually defined. What we call the ‘social’ is not an aggregate of individuals’ 
experiences, but a set of background distinctions undergirding individual action. 
 
 In this way, we can see how a judge’s decisions are really part of a complex 
practical activity involving both language and procedures. Looking at a judge’s 
decisions over time we can observe how she follows certain rules and procedures and 
how these rules and procedures do not just lend shape to her decisions but function as 
normative constraints, criteria against which her decisions are assessed and guided. 
As a judge, she knows to follow these rules and, because she has been trained to 
follow them, she possesses certain skills that make it possible for her to engage in 
such norm-bound activity.  This is just another way of saying that she engages in a 
particular ‘discursive practice’. Such practices are what they are by virtue of the 
background distinctions embodied within them and whose meanings are established 
                                                 
474
 See Chia (1998). 
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 Prigogine (1989), p. 398, quoted in Tsoukas (1996), p. 16. 
476
 See Tsoukas (1996), pp. 15f. 
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through their use in the discourse.
477
 Thus, in a courtroom, for example, much of the 
interaction between counsel and judge would likely be unintelligible and futile unless 
one had some idea of the meaning of the words, phrases and gestures used and how 
have tended to be used within that discourse over time. So not only does a judge 
possess certain skills that make it possible for her to engage in norm-bound activity, 
but she also knows how, when and in what relation to use them because there is 
something in her mind that tells her how, when and in what relation to do so. In this 
sense, a judge is ‘primarily a subject of representations … about the world outside 




But if a thought lies in the mind of a judge telling her how to follow a rule, 
how is it possible that some rules have been misapplied, or misunderstood? As we 
have seen, it is unsatisfactory merely to say that a further rule is necessary to 
determine how the first rule should be applied. It is equally unsatisfactory to suggest 
that all possible interpretations and misinterpretations of a rule could shown in 
advance, for that would mean every judge having an infinite number of thoughts in 
their head even to follow the simplest of instructions.
479
 The only reasonable option 
is to accept that ‘the application of rules cannot be done by rules’;
480
 rather, as 
Tsoukas claims, we have to accept that every act of human understanding must be 
seen as based on some ‘unarticulated background of what is taken for granted’.
481
 A 
judge’s understanding finds its roots in the practices in which a judge participates; 
misunderstanding might be seen to arise from a lack of or inadequate engagement 
with a common background. Thus, knowing and understanding how to follow a rule 
and procedures is implicit in the activity in which a judge engages: it comes with 
familiarity. We might say that it is the social and professional activity of judging, not 
the individual thinking judge, which is where the ultimate ground of such 
understanding lies. 
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 See Taylor, (1993), pp. 45ff. 
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Tsoukas (1996), p. 16. See Taylor (1993), p. 47. 
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At this point, let us recall Polanyi’s notion of how this unarticulated 
background is related to human understanding. When I have an awareness of 
something, I have a focal awareness of it; I know it as a whole. But I know 
something by integrating particulars that are known to me subsidiarily; that is, I 
tacitly integrate those particulars.
482
 In this way, tacit knowledge has a ‘from-to’ 
structure. This is important: the subsidiaries remain ‘essentially unspecifiable’.
483
 




 identifies three themes in his discussion of the industrial firm as a 
distributed knowledge system that bear directly on our present argument and may be 
adapted in relation to judicial decision making. First, following Polanyi, ‘all 
articulated knowledge is based on an unarticulated background’, a collection of 
subsidiary particulars resident in the forms of life or social practices that we 
participate in and which are tacitly integrated by us as participants in those forms of 
life or social practices; thus, a judge’s decision, her opinion or declaration, is made 
possible because and only because of the tacitly accepted background that she 
inhabits. Second, a judge’s capacity for rule-following is founded on her own 
unarticulated background; in other words, the rules that an observer would be able to 
identify or represent in a practice are different from the rules that actually operate to 
guide the judge as an agent in that practice.
485
 Third, our awareness of this 
unarticulated background through our having been socialized into a practice by 
others is ‘not only cognitive but embodied’.
486
 The skills that we usefully employ are 
acquired ‘through training our bodies to relate in certain ways to the world’. Thus, 
‘the process of learning is constitutive of what is learnt’.
 487
 Through socialization 
into a practice we internalize a set of background distinctions constitutive of that 
practice and, through dwelling in these, live both in our own memory and in all of 
those experiences through which that language has been acquired by us.  
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 In this way, tacit knowledge has three elements: subsidiary particulars, a focal target, and an agent 
that links the two (Polanyi (1975), p. 36).  
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Law as a Social Practice: Understanding How and Why Judges Decide 
 
Viewed as a social practice several features of legal decision making are important. 
First, the normative expectations associated with being a judge and held by others 
above, below, and across legal systems. To enquire about these is to ask questions 
about how a judge has been socialized into her particular role, both formally and 
informally. Second, the patterns of recognition, discernment, and adjudication 
acquired by an individual judge and brought to bear on particular decision-making 




 refers to 
this as ‘the habitus’ which, as  
 
‘a product of history, produces individual and collective practices – more 
history – in accordance with the schemes generated by history. It ensures the 
active presence of past experiences, which, deposited in each organism in the 
form of schemes of perception, thought and action, tend to guarantee the 
“correctness” of practices and their constancy over time, more reliably than 
all formal rules and explicit norms’.  
 
For Bourdieu, the ‘active presence of the whole past’ ensures for social practices 
both continuity and ‘a relative autonomy with respect to determinations of the 
immediate present’.
490
 In simple terms, every contact leaves a trace: history leaves its 
mark on us and every time we act we do so through the habits of thinking acquired 
through past socialization; our habits of thinking are formed ‘through our 
participation into historically constituted practices’.
491
 So to find out why a judge 
decides in a certain way we really need also to ask about the past socializations to 
which she was subjected to in and through her involvement in a number of social 
practices (for example, family, school, religion, and so on); in other words, her 
habitus. Third, to complete our investigation into how and why the judge decides as 




 Bourdieu (1990), p. 54. 
490
 Ibid., p. 56. 
491
 Tsoukas (1996), p. 18. 
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she does, we will also need to ask about the particular context within which the 
normative expectations and the habitus are triggered, the active unfolding of her 




Looking at a judge’s behaviour in decision making as a whole we will 
observe regularities: actions and patterns of actions in decision making will be 
repeated. The normative expectations associated with being a judge, together with 
her past socializations, will have developed ways of thinking and deciding that are 
triggered every time she engages in decision making. In which case, we might be 
tempted to develop rules about her behaviour and to conclude that these rules 
completely describe, or represent, her practice. But these rules will be created from 
the point of view of a spectator and there is always something more to an actual 
practice than can be conveyed by any representation of it, a persistent asymmetry 




Of course, our spectator might well be able to infer the existence of certain 
rules and procedures (doctrines of ratio decidendi, stare decisis, precedent, and so 
on) that inform a judge’s decision making from studying that judge’s decisions, but 
there will also be much else that a judge does that will not be adequately represented 
by these. Ostensibly, she is a member of an independent judiciary but she will, 
nonetheless, also be conscious of a wider, more complex network of human social 
and political relationships that will be just as important to her and bear directly on 
her ability to do her job efficiently and well. There is, indeed, something about a 
judge’s role that cannot be captured simply with rules, however regular and patterned 
it might appear. To assume otherwise would presuppose that we had the ability to 
foresee all future occasions of decision making and were endowed with a language 
through which to faithfully reflect it unequivocally. But we do not know all the 
answers to all the future questions, much less do we know beforehand what questions 
will later be asked.  
 




 Ibid.,, see above n. 465.    
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So, in decision making, judges make use of the explicit rules provided for 
them by the law as enacted, but the actual activity of decision making takes place in a 
social context the actual details of which cannot be known beforehand. 
Consequently, in striving towards a decision, a judge needs to attend not only to 
those strict and rigid aspects of the law as laid down, or what Bankowski calls its 
machine-like quality, but also to the human social and political context within which 
her decision making is set, the wider effects of applying a particular rule here and 
now; for example, the impact of that law on the life of the accused. At the same time, 
she will be acutely aware of the need to create and maintain public trust in the law 
and the legal system and also of the need to maintain her own reputation in the 
community of judges. In any given situation of decision making any or all of these 
(and other) concerns might appear as relevant and important, but there is no way that 
she can say in advance which or when.  
 
We can see then, how, in spite of the normative expectations and social 
dispositions associated with being a judge, a mix of consistency and diversity will 
still be found across decision making generally: different judges will negotiate the 
tensions between role expectations, dispositional attitudes or habitus, and the actual 
situations where these interface with each other, in different ways. Through explicit 
rules formally associated with being a member of the judiciary, together with training 
and socialization, the law seeks to define the normative expectations of an individual 
judge’s role and homogenize decision making, but these normative expectations are 
rarely if ever identical to an individual judge’s habitus, since each judge’s 
dispositional attitudes or habitus is the result of past socializations that are different 
for each judge.
494
 So, when normative expectations and dispositional attitudes are 
triggered, and interface with each other within actual decision making situations, 
how this happens will always be unrepeatable and unique. A judge will always be 
confronted with specific choices under specific conditions and the way that those 
conditions are made relevant will always be distinctive to each specific context and 
situation. She will select out what she considers to be relevant in relation to her role-
related expectations and relevant in relation to the local context or conditions and 
                                                 
494
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fuse the two together, which is precisely what she does when she attempts to identify 
the ratio of a previous decision and use it, or not, in the present case.  In this way, 
every moment of her decision making contains within it the essence of the past, the 
whole of its social structure, but how that structure is instantiated in the present 
unique moment of deciding is always a local matter. This is what Whitehead 





In light of all of this, one might be tempted to conclude that decision making 
must become an impossible task, if concrete situations are infinitely concrete, 
particular situations are infinitely particular, relevant features are infinitely relevant, 
and there is no limit to the ways that a social practice can be described from an 
infinite number of viewpoints and perspectives. But the reason that this does not 
paralyse us is precisely because the legal institutional context within which these are 
articulated acts as a halt on this,
496
 imposing limits on how each of these may be 
described. However, merely because some descriptions are selected and others are 
not does not mean that those others are not also present or that they may not be 
relevant in other sets of circumstances. I may choose to select as relevant in the 
present circumstances features that I will disregard in a future circumstance 
depending on my purpose in any given case. Equally, I may choose to disregard now 
features that in another instance and under different conditions I will later consider to 
be relevant. The point is that I cannot know in advance what those relevant 
descriptions are going to be: my characterization and my reasons for decision are 
inseparable from the occasion of my deciding.  
 
‘Closing the Gap’ in Judicial Decision Making 
 
We can pull much of this together by considering, for example, the role of ratio 
decidendi in relation to the Common Law doctrine of precedent. Here, courts draw 
upon a shared pattern of decisions in relation to particular types of situations and the 
system of precedent is closely tied to the legal situation in which it is generated to 
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enable judges to make sense of their particular environment. In other words, it arises 
because of the judges’ need to communicate by word and act and because of the 
uncertainties of the institutional set-up in which that communication is to take place. 
Thus, a system of precedent is essentially a discourse developed over time within a 
particular judicial context, and consists of a set of background distinctions tied to a 
particular field of law. Those distinctions relate to a number of characterizations and 
issues
497
 that a judge must comprehend if she is to be able to deliver a justified 
decision and, through a process of socialization, a judges internalizes those law-
specific distinctions. But judges are also presented with an almost infinite number of 
meanings unrelated to their legal-specific roles but which they must nonetheless 
familiarize themselves with if their roles are to be efficiently pursued. Internalizing 
these distinctions is not simply a matter of learning by rote or of gaining knowledge 
from law books but is learned within the context of the discursive practice. Legal 
expertise in this sense is gleaned from and embedded within legal conversation, 
interaction and institutional procedures; that is, it forms an unarticulated background 
that underlies and undergirds a judge’s representation of their decisions and operates 
to allow the justification of decisions, a form of ‘tacit knowledge’ that permits a 
judge to construct within an otherwise dis-ordered array of conflicting or unrelated 
circumstances some sort of institutional ordering. It is the judge’s habitus, the set of 
dispositions acquired over time which ensures within the present the active presence 
of past experience. 
 
But a system of precedent offers decision makers more than just a language, 
it also provides structure, syntax. That is, the core of a system of precedent is much 
more than can be represented by the sum of its parts. It concerns not just the 
accumulation of individual decisions but also the way that these cohere within a 
rational structure and, in this sense, such a system can never be wholly rigid; indeed, 
it must guide as much as direct in order to allow for finely balanced shiftings of 
emphasis and meanings as necessary.  
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Now precisely because of the unique character of every new decision making 
situation every judge will inevitably have to improvise. Those uniquely different 
circumstances may prevent a judge deciding in the way that the system of precedent 
implies, and a case may have to be ‘distinguished’. It is in this way that a judge is 
called upon to close the ‘phronetic gap’,
498
 to cross the ‘particularity void’;
499
 that is, 
through a personal judgement about the relevance of a ratio to her present decision. 
This tension between the legal-specific habitus and the particular local circumstances 
of decision making explains why a judge’s decision is not always, or ever, either a 
simple replication of previous decisions or an altogether completely new invention 
by the judge. It is created by a judge out of the tensions experienced by that judge 
with those resources in this particular situation.  
 
However, it is important to note that what is being suggested here is not that a 
judge’s habitus is tied solely to the legal system but it also includes the whole of her 
entire history of past socializations and the tensions that these may produce; for 
instance, the personal private experiences of a judge or the tensions between 
normative role expectations and dispositions acquired through extra-legal 
socializations. An example would be Lord Atkin and his presentation of the 
‘neighbour’ principle in Donoghue v Stevenson. To understand this fully would also 
require some understanding of Lord Atkin’s religious disposition, his historically 
formed habitus. The neighbour principle is the outcome of a correspondence of 
appropriatenesses.
500
 It is a contingent outcome of decision making in a specific 




In this chapter I have utilized the analysis employed by Tsoukas in the field of 
organization studies to note how the different types of institutional knowledge that 
exist in law may be seen, similarly, to be founded on different features of the legal 
institutional context. While the propositional structure of legal knowledge is fully 
                                                 
498
 Taylor (1993), p. 57. 
499
 Detmold (1989). 
500
 Cf. Gunther (1993). 
 173 
 
realized within formal legal contexts in terms of law as institutions, these formal 
legal contexts are also practices, shared traditions in and out of which legal 
practitioners live and work, and, in this latter sense, legal knowledge has a narrative 
structure that is maintained by story, anecdote and example. In this way it has been 
possible to extend that analysis to demonstrate: 
 
(a) The resources that a judge uses in decision making are, to a large extent, 
constructed by that judge in the process of decision making.
501
 How they can be used 
depends on how they are viewed, which, in turn, is a function of the knowledge 
applied to them. In this sense, we can see how law functions as system in which the 
bearer of legal institutional knowledge is law’s customs, habits and practices. 
 
(b) As institutional actors, judges make use of a knowledge that is not and cannot be 
known completely and entirely by any single judge.  
 
(c) Legal institutional knowledge is itself inherently indeterminate: not only can the 
factual knowledge of particular circumstances of time and place not be envisaged as 
a whole, but no-one can know in advance what legal institutional knowledge is or 




(d) Legal knowledge is dispersed in another sense, too, in that it is partly derived 
from the wider context in which a judge is set and is continually reconstituted (in 
Levi’s terms, ‘the classification changes as the classification is made’) through its 
decisions. Therefore, it is not and can not be self-sufficient. This is because of the 
nature and structure of social practices within law, which are made up of the 
following: role-related normative expectations, dispositions acquired by past 
socializations, and the local circumstances in which a decision is made. While law 
has some control over normative expectations, with procedures constraining judicial 
discretion ensuring a degree of consistency across decision making contexts, it has 
no control over the dispositions acquired through past socializations in extra-legal 
settings. Moreover, these role-related normative expectations and dispositions of 
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judges are instantiated within particular contexts the character of which may not be 
known in advance in any detached way but is fashioned only in and through a 
particular judge’s encounter with them. In this sense, not possessed by any single 
judge, partly dependent on or originating within extra legal contexts and always 
incomplete, law’s knowledge is forever continually evolving. 
 
(e) There is an inevitable tension between role-related normative expectations, 
dispositions acquired through past socializations, and contexts of decision. This 
results in a persistence of shortfalls, deficits, or gaps between them: between 
‘universalist’ and ‘particularist’ practices;
503
 between ‘formal’ and ‘substantive’ 
rationality;
504
 between the ideal and the actual; between ‘rules-as-represented’ and 
‘rules-as-guides-in-practice’;
505
 between ‘the model of reality’ and ‘the reality of the 
model’.
506
 Such aporias, gaps, or voids are closed only through judges exercising 
their discretion in judgement, selectively including and excluding
507
 different 
features of each of these three characteristic elements of social practices and 
attempting to link them together. It must also follow, therefore, that how these 
elements are linked together in decision making is always contingent and evolving, 
vague and indeterminate: judges will inevitably differ. However, understood in this 
way, what requires explanation is not divergence of opinion in decision making but 
the processes and procedures that ensure similarity or conformity and the progressive 
development of consistent and coherent judicial action; in other words, how, the 
tensions are negotiated and brought under control by the system.  
 
(f) Understanding law as a dispersed knowledge system in this sense helps us to 
understand what legal institutions are and, consequently, what legal decision making 
is about. Subject to constant change, law as an institution is inherently creative. Its 
institutional agents, the judges, adhere to a practice of rule-following that is 
contingent and context-related or situational. Thus, throughout, both rule-following 
and novel adventure, continuity and change, uniformity and creativity, are always 
                                                 
503
 Detmold (1989). 
504
 Weber (1964). 
505
 Taylor (1993). 
506
 Bourdieu (1990), p. 39. 
507
 Cf. Luhmann and Christodoulidis. See also Norrie (1996), (2001).  
 175 
 
present. In this way the practice of law becomes a never-ending process of 
harmonizing purposeful decision makers whose particular decisions stem from their 
own application of their (at least partly) distinctive interpretations to the situations 
confronting them. Those decisions can often presage unanticipated consequences and 
precipitate paradoxical interpretations that are further interpreted, and so on. In this 
way, given the dispersed nature of legal institutional knowledge, co-ordinated 
decision making depends not on the accumulation of knowledge within the higher 
echelons of the legal institutional structure, but on ordinary decision makers forever 
inventing new ways of tapping into and sharing each other’s knowledge. To 
acknowledge this is to recognize the importance of maintaining law as a discursive 
practice, a common form of life in which individual judges as decision makers share 
an unarticulated background of shared understandings. 
 
In the next chapter I will develop this approach to an institutional perspective 
on law to reveal further aspects of the judge’s role as institutional actor and decision 
maker and how these impact on her role in negotiating the tensions inherent in legal 





THE JUDGE AS INSTITUTIONAL ACTOR AND DECISION MAKER 
 
Stanley Fish argues that contemporary thinking about law, as with thinking across all 
disciplines, has fallen victim to what he calls ‘theory–hope’. In the end, all ‘the 
troubles and benefits of interpretive theory … disappear in the solvent of an enriched 
notion of practice’.
508
 According to Fish, all that theory can ever hope to do is offer 
an after-the-fact explanation of already firmly held beliefs which function to allow 
and confirm within an ‘interpretive community’
509
 those convictions which its 
rhetoric asserts. The reason that we are able to interpret a text is because we belong 
to an interpretive community which supplies us with a particular way of interpreting 
it. Moreover, because we can never escape our communities our readings of a text 
are always in this sense culturally constructed. So we can never know of each other 
whether we belong to the same interpretive community, for that would require that 
each act of communication itself be interpreted. Thus, what is important is how an 
utterance affects a hearer, not any question about locating the meaning that is 
assumed to reside within it. In this way, arguments appear intelligible and 
convincing.  
 
Fish’s response to Ronald Dworkin’s rendering of the process of 
constitutional interpretation, the judicial use of precedent, demands mention here. 
According to Dworkin,
510
 the interpretation of the constitution, and therefore the role 
of precedent in judicial decision making, can be likened to the production of a serial 
or ‘chain novel’, in which judges take turns consecutively to add one chapter upon 
another. With the steady accumulation of chapters each subsequent writer’s freedom 
and choice in interpretation becomes increasingly constrained: the author of the last 
chapter is more constrained in relation to that task than her fellow authors, since she 
                                                 
508
 Fish (1989), p. ix. 
509
 As Balter notes, Fish’s notion of ‘interpretive community’ may be understood as exhibiting 
similarities to Perleman and Olbrechts-Tytecha’s  notion of the universal ‘audience’ against whose 
primary criteria we determine whether an argument is reasonable (Balter (2001), p. 384). 
510
 Dworkin (1986). 
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has to contribute her chapter under the accumulated burden of their chapters; the first 
author is unconstrained.  
For Fish, however, this understanding of what is going on is erroneous. A 
reader’s approach to a text can never be completely subjective. On the contrary, an 
internalized understanding of language shared by native speakers generates 
normative constraints in respect of their experience with language. In this way, 
Fish’s argument questions Dworkin’s understanding of the role and function of a 
doctrine of precedent. Indeed, for Fish, since all our attempts to gain access to the 
meaning of a text stumble on the fact that our interpretation is based upon the 
interpretive community of which we are a part, then a system of precedent cannot 
truly constrain judges; rather, constraints in judicial decision making must arise out 
of the process of judging itself. Moreover, since all judges appear equally 
constrained, we are left with the question of whether, at any point in this process, 




 ‘Fish’s theory of interpretive communities provides 
valuable insight into the norms of the legal community’ and how the legal 
interpretive community ‘legitimizes a way of thinking about the law that is 
inculcated into its practitioners at each level of participation from law school through 
judgeship. Central to this socialization is the judicial opinion … studied by law 
students, read by lawyers, and written in respect to other opinions by judges’. In this 
manner, a judge ‘begin[s] the discourse with a particular case’ and ‘past cases are 
read in relation to the present circumstances’. While the legal community ‘expects 
that the present case will be understood in relation to the past, …the present case also 
molds the past’. That is to say, a writer is free to manipulate a text on which her 
opinion is based, provided this manipulation can be justified within the bounds of the 




‘Interpreters are constrained by their tacit awareness of what is possible and 
not possible to do, what is and is not a reasonable thing to say, what will and 
will not be heard as evidence in a given enterprise; and it is within these same 
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constraints that they see and bring others to see the shape of the documents to 
whose interpretation they are committed.’ 
 
Tacit Knowledge and Socialization: Understanding Interpretation 
 
As we have characterised it, modern accounts of legal decision making proceed on 
the basis of an assumption that a judge will look at an ordered sequence of events, 
produce a context-based arrangement of these showing the relations between them 
and make a judgement as to their significance in respect of that context or theory. In 
this judgement process, what appears as straightforwardly presented to the senses is 
subjected to our craving to re-order, re-arrange and re-design, to create new 
perspectives on knowledge and new knowledge.
513
 However, this attempt to see 
things differently and to disclose hidden meanings always takes place from within a 
particular standpoint or tradition. We draw distinctions against shared backgrounds, 




 or ‘horizon of meaning’
516
 where 
certain evaluative criteria are found to control, and we do so by bringing to the fore 
the parts we are interested in and ascribing significance to them.
517
 Training and 
practice allow us to produce ever more delicately balanced and nuanced distinctions 
and judgements until, over time, we acquire an ability to make judgements on the 
basis of very finely tuned accents and emphases. Polanyi
518
 makes this point when he 
describes the training of a medical student: 
 
‘He watches in a darkened room shadowy traces on a fluorescent screen 
placed against a patient’s chest, and hears the radiologist commenting to his 
assistants, in technical language, on the significant features of these shadows 
… [H]e can see nothing that they are talking about. Then as he goes on 
listening for a few weeks, looking carefully at ever new pictures … a 
tentative understanding … dawn[s] on him … [E]ventually, if he perseveres 
                                                 
513
 See Bell (1999), p. lxiv, quoted in Tsoukas (2001). 
514
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 Polanyi (1962), p. 101. Fish (1989), p. 98. 
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intelligently, a rich panorama of significant details will be revealed to him … 
He still sees only a fraction of what the experts can see, but the pictures are 
definitely making sense now and so do most of the comments made on them’. 
 
This understanding is the result both of personal exposure to the material and 
of the specialized terminology that the student is taught to apply to it. What appears 
initially to preconceptual experience as a mere shadow is gradually processed 
through successive stages of revision and refinement, as the student relates his 
knowledge to the picture and to the words of his instructor. In this way, he 
progressively rearranges, reorders and redesigns his descriptions, and his 
descriptions of descriptions, recursively modifying and transforming every 
successive representation. Over time, newer distinctions are created and, as a result, 




As we have already noticed, we find a similar thing takes place in the legal 
context. For any judge to be able to discern a legally significant pattern of events 
from a collection of data, she must draw upon a collectively produced and sustained 
body of legal knowledge. This is because the significant categories implicated in her 
individual action as a judge derive their meanings from the ways in which they have 
been used within that particular form of life that we refer to as the legal community. 
For example, as a student of the law she learns how to recognize certain features of 
the law of contract because she is taught to use the category contract within a certain 
domain of action. Knowing how to act and judge according to law is assumed to be 
precisely this: learning how to make proficient use of the categories and distinctions 
that constitute the domain of law. In other words, judges, as students of the law, learn 
first of all, upon entering the legal sphere, to assimilate the distinctions appropriate to 
law; that is, they engage in a discursive practice and learn how to use its normative 




This capacity to exercise judgement derives from an understanding of 
context, and of having become knowledgeable in respect of the significance of 
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certain acts within particular contexts, achieved as a result of having undergone a 
process of socialization.
521
 We know how to recognize and do certain things because 
we have learned how to recognize and to do them. We have an awareness of the 
normative expectations relevant to them and an intuition of the consequences that 
follow from breaking these. We might say that our ability to exercise judgement 
comes in large part with our appreciation of theory, our ability to generalise a finding 
across contexts.
522
 This application of a set of generalizing principles across contexts 
involves judgement, and the capacity to do this is knowledge. So, when a judge 
applies a set of legal principles to a particular factual situation, she uses theory to 
generalize across contexts, which then becomes an additional basis for exercising 
judgement. 
 
Working with Rules 
 
Judges apply rules in specific decision-making contexts. However, there is nothing 
within a rule itself that can fix its application in a particular case: 
 
‘there is no “fact of the matter” concerning the proper application of a rule, 





In a passage bearing similarities to Edward Levi’s argument, Barry Barnes argues 
that to follow a rule is to extend an example: 
 
‘To understand rule-following or norm-guided behaviour in this way 
immediately highlights the normally open-ended character of norms, the fact 
that they cannot themselves fix and determine what actions are in true 
conformity with them, that there is no logical compulsion to follow them in a 
                                                 
521
 Berger and Luckmann (1966). 
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particular way. Every instance of a norm may be analogous to every other, 
but analogy is not identity: analogy exists between things that are similar yet 
different. And this means that, although it is always possible to assimilate the 
next instance to a norm by analogy with existing examples of the norm, it is 
equally always possible to resist such assimilation, to hold the analogy 
insufficiently strong, to stress the differences between the instance and 
existing examples. If norms apply by analogy then it is up to us to decide 




In this way, the application of a rule derives essentially from and contributes 
to a collectively shared meaning. But for this to occur, members of an institution 
‘must be constituted as a collective able to sustain a shared sense of what rules imply 
and hence an agreement in their practice when they follow rules’;
525
 in other words, 
the justification or purpose beneath a rule needs to be made clear and its meaning 
integrated within the institutional collective. Law exists as an institution as a tightly 
related network of communications in and through which shared understandings are 
attained.
526
 On this view, it is institutional knowledge as the collected and collective 
wisdom or knowledge of the judges as a whole that enables each individual judge to 
put the sources of law to their respective uses and to develop and employ their own 
distinctive ways of thinking and acting. 
 
This essentially Wittgensteinian view of rule-following bears close 
similarities to Polanyi’s idea of personal knowledge, since no matter how abstract the 
formalistic notions that judges use are their effective use depends ultimately on 
social definitions.
527
 For Polanyi, all abstract systems, however simple or 
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Even in the sciences, what we find is ‘a set of formulae which have a bearing on experience’ (p. 
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comprehensive, involve an essential element of human experience; that is, an 
encounter with the real world mediated through human judgement:  
 
‘even the most exact sciences must therefore rely on our personal confidence 
that we possess some degree of personal skill and personal judgement for 





In other words, if we affirm some degree of ‘personal participation as the universal 
principle of knowing’
529
 then all knowledge becomes, in one way or another, an art, a 
skilful achievement.
530
 Inasmuch as judicial decisions, like abstract mathematical 
formalisms, require formal justification by the comparison of predictions with 
measurements there will be gaps between theory and observation that require to be 




How should we understand this skill? 
 
As we have seen, to gain knowledge of something is, according to Polanyi, to 
integrate a set of particulars of which one is subsidiarily aware. So, to make sense of 
something, we depend on some aspects of it subsidiarily and concentrate on our main 
aim focally; that is, we tacitly integrate certain particulars in order to comprehend 
something focally as a whole. In this way, knowing has a ‘from-to’ structure: the 
particulars bear on the focus to which we attend from them. Nonetheless, subsidiary 
awareness and focal awareness are mutually exclusive, so that if we shift our focal 
attention towards the particulars that we had previously been aware of only 




                                                                                                                                          
49).Cf. Toulmin (1999), who argues that abstract systems do not sustain themselves but are grounded 
on collective definitions and depend on human judgement). 
528
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529
 Ibid.,, p. 44. 
530
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We may recall that there are three elements present here - subsidiary 
particulars, a focal target, and a linking agent.
533
 – and, because ‘the relation of a 
subsidiary to a focus is formed by the act of a person who integrates one to 
another’,
534
 then practical knowledge is always ‘personal knowledge’, knowledge 
that has to be applied as a tool.
535
 As we become more familiar with the use of such a 
tool so our awareness and understanding of how to use it instrumentally increases 
and we begin gradually to feel it as an extension of our own body. Through this 
process of assimilating the tool, ‘indwelling’,
536
 we begin to make sense of our 
experience and, as we become more unaware of using our tools, so our awareness of 
the uses to which they may be put increases and we develop and refine our ability 
and skill to use them instrumentally. This refinement in the purposeful use of our 
skills and abilities provides a form of ‘justification’, which enables us to develop 
further our understanding of the situation before us. Thus, we can see how, in this 
way, a judge might properly develop the ability to ‘read’ a situation before her. In 





Bringing this to bear more directly on our present discussion of decision 
making, we might say that the particular type of knowledge that a judge possesses 
could be described as the capability to draw distinctions within a certain area of 
operations based on her grasp of context and theory. In decision making we are 
concerned with three things: the concrete settings within which decision making 
occurs (the ‘facts’); the normative background against which decision making takes 
place (‘the ‘rules’); the historical continuity of the community of decision makers 
(the judge(s)). Legal institutional knowledge is the capability that individual judges 
have developed as members collectively of the judiciary to draw distinctions in the 
process of decision making in respect of particular concrete situations through the 
use of generalizations whose application is tied to shared understandings and 
experiences previously acquired and developed within and by the professional 
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community of decision makers to which they belong. As propositional statements 
and shared communal understandings are used and experiences are processed 
individually and collectively in a reflexive manner so they are pushed into subsidiary 
awareness and individual judges, as members of this community, dwelling more and 
more in them are able to progress and turn their attention towards new experiences 
within their own particular area of operations. 
 
In particular, we can see how opinions expressed obiter, remarks and ideas 
shared in extralegal contexts, together with the provision of more formal justifying 
reasons for decisions all come together to create an environment in which communal 
professional judicial ties are strengthened, collective memory improved and 
individual knowledge augmented. Within this environment, individual judges draw 
upon the wealth of each other’s accumulated experience and knowledge of decision 
making, consulting with each other on professional judicial decision-making matters 
and also communicating less formally and naturally with one another, creating a 
culture and an environment of ‘storytelling’ that reflects and reinforces 
communication. 
 
In this way, a shared background, individual learning and storytelling are all 
linked together in decision making. Judges draw upon a generally accepted body of 
law provided in the form of statutory texts, printed decisions, rules of evidence, court 
procedures, and so on, much of which is codified in one way or another, officially or 
unofficially. So if, for example, a defendant in criminal proceedings pleads guilty in 
relation to a particular offence she will often receive a standard sentence, which 
suggests that lesser crimes are capable of being handled lower down the judicial 
ladder. At these lower levels, often the most difficult question requiring answer is 
how quickly this workload can be shifted.
538
 Here, justices and magistrates may be 
expected to draw on all the resources available to them, whether printed in official 
documents or taken from their own life’s experience, to find the answers to nearly all 
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of the questions likely to be posed. In diverse ways they are encouraged and expected 
to draw upon each others’ experiences and upon their own knowledge of the judicial 
process and decision making. Here, an environment of story telling strengthens the 
bonds between decision makers and reinforces community ties and the collected and 
collective memory, thereby enriching and enhancing individual knowledge.  
 
Nevertheless, not all of the questions or legal issues presented in cases before 
a court are straightforward and unambiguous. Where ambiguity occurs, judges need 
to be proficient at articulating the facts before them to clarify the precise nature of 
the legal questions being addressed and requiring answer. For example, is a 
skateboard a vehicle under the terms of a regulation prohibiting vehicles in the park? 
Most experienced judges would be aware of the reasons for the regulation and how 
these relate to its proper functioning in society and, through proper questioning, 
would be able to ascertain the extent of the uncertainty that required to be addressed. 
A judge’s ability to discern the nub of the problem in this way, to determine the crux 
of the legal issue by making ever finer distinctions, is a skill that is acquired, 
developed and refined through training and experience in the practice of legal 
decision making.
539
 In other words, through experience and through participation in a 
‘community of practice’, a judge develops a ‘sense’ of what is going on, and of what 
is at stake, which is properly a legal skill that over time becomes instrumentalized. It 
is something that allows her to reflect on things as they are going on, a skilful 
intuition that she can develop and use as ‘an extension’ of herself and which permits 




Over time, judges develop a greater degree of sophistication in relation to 
these perceptual capabilities and the structure of authority and responsibility that we 
find in the judiciary develops. They learn how to recognize how certain concrete 
facts bring to light certain legal issues and how then to think in appropriate terms and 
                                                 
539
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categories. In this way, more experienced judges will often become admired for their 
ability to discern instrumentally nuances of difference, to draw ever more refined 
distinctions and decide on the basis of these: even their obiter remarks are referred to 
as if authoritative and quoted as such. Recognizing nuances and being able to come 
to a decision quickly on the basis of these becomes an important part of a judge’s 
skill. As part of the ‘tacit’ dimension of a judge’s knowledge, it goes a long way to 
account for why a judge decides a certain issue in a particular way. It is, in a proper 
sense, ‘intuitive’, insightful’. It is, in fact, what accounts for the moment of decision 
in which a judge decides and is one reason why her decision must then be justified 
by way of providing justifying reasons for her decision. But, as part of the ‘tacit 
dimension’ of a judge’s decision making, it reflects a knowledge that cannot be told; 
hence, Ward L.J.’s confession in Re A that he ‘found it exceptionally difficult’ and 
‘especially arduous’,
541
 struggling to his description of the case as ‘very unique’.  
 
What we are dealing with here is knowledge that is difficult to put into words, 
let alone into the form of propositional statements. Of course, Ward L. J. does make 
use of a form of words and a recognised structure of argument, and he draws on the 
sources of law to justify his decision, but does so in a manner that makes it clear that 
it is his personal professional judgement that is being exercised to identify the 
problem, however much that judgement has been moulded by the prevalent legal 
culture.
542
 All of this reflects the fact that in law we are just as much concerned with 
the act of decision making as with the decision maker and the decision itself; that is, 
it is that decision maker who is here making that decision in respect of these persons, 
events and circumstances in this case that is of significance, not just the bald decision 
itself.  
 
One important aspect of the doctrine of precedent that is of relevance here is 
the way in which the course of legal decision making goes on regardless of the 
choice of decision. This is not simply because it flows on like a river forever 
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coursing along the path of least resistance but because each new case presents a new 
and unrepeatable opportunity for decision making with its own unique set of 
possibilities that might be actualized. Each decision is, to a degree, influenced or 
constrained by what has gone before and is now received as data, but there is 
freedom to choose not determinism; indeed, judges are drawing on a whole variety of 
different sources of data and information provided for them in written and oral form. 
Such data is offered as separate items of fact and information. What we see in 
decision making is the transformation of this data and information into legal 
knowledge by the judges: its conversion and presentation into propositional ‘If, then’ 
statements. 
 
To create ‘If, then’ statements, judges must take into account the particular 
context of the instant case and make a judgement under pressure of time
543
 as to what 
the proper outcome must be. In doing this, they are not mindlessly applying general 
rules to particular facts but making an appropriate judgement as to how the body of 
rules must be adapted to include the circumstances at hand, however obvious that 
might sometimes appear to be. All of which is really just another way of saying that a 
norm requires a decision to claim its instances or that, to put it in Whitehead’s terms, 
‘the many become one and are increased by one’.
544
 Thus, formal rules, as data in 
this encounter of experience, demand the exercise of human judgement to create new 
experience that is subsequently drawn upon and appealed to in later moments. If we 
accept Polanyi’s claim here that all knowledge is personal, then, as far as institutional 
knowledge is concerned, there is always a question of appropriateness involved in 
the harnessing of knowledge for decision.
545
 This is precisely what distinguishes 
knowledge from information in legal decision making: the former necessitates an 
active rearrangement of the latter on the basis of context or theory. 
 
Consider this example: a judge hears a case knowing through experience that 
cases of a certain type with facts of a certain order present legal issues that fall to be 
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determined in a particular way. But the same judge knows from her own experience 
of previous cases, and to some extent also from the collected and collective 
experience of the community of decision makers to which she belongs, that there are 
difficulties that are often experienced by parties to such cases that are not apparent 
from a simple reading of the facts that fall for legal determination under the rules as 
prescribed. There may also be problems in relating the appropriate legal rules to 
those facts that could not have been envisaged by those responsible for making 
previous decisions, far less by those who constructed the relevant statutory authority. 
To decide in the obvious way would clearly be to create an injustice,
546
 and the judge 
knows this. But how does the judge know this? If we follow Christodoulidis’s 
argument then we must acknowledge that ‘the incalculability of justice is a result of 
the elision that every exercise of judgement enacts, of what finds no adequate 
register in judgement’?
547
 However, this ‘knowledge’ is not to be found in or derived 
from official written legal sources; on the contrary, it is knowledge derived from the 
judge’s personal experience of encountering particular types of problems and, having 
worked those out, heeding their lessons. It is part of the development of her skill of 
understanding how to recognise and utilise appropriate responses in making 
decisions. 
 
All of this implies that judges may have to improvise to meet the demands of 
decision making under pressure of time and lack of resources and the expectations of 
their public and political audiences. In doing so, they may often have to use cases 
selectively to ‘construct’ the legal authority for the decisions they are making.
548
 In 
this sense, the ‘sources of law’ being appealed to as authority are not the formal, 
officially recognised sources of law but are more correctly described as informal, 
since in a very real sense law is being constructed ‘on the hoof’. The type of 
knowledge involved here is a form of knowledge that is generated in the process of 
                                                 
546
  See Riggs v Palmer and Donoghue v Stevenson. Christodoulidis (2006) asks what is it that lets the 
judge know that an injustice would be created, and refers to Ricoeur, stating that the cry that this is 
unjust cannot itself be heard in law (UPLR, pp. 110-111). This argument can only be sustained on a 
view of law that, on the argument presented here, gives too much to law in the sense of its 
determinism. As Hartshorne (1970) and (1987) has shown, absolute determinism is a logical 
impossibility.  
547
 Christodoulidis (1995), p. 38. 
548
 Cf. Levi (1948). 
 189 
 
decision making, fuelling decision making and carrying it under its own momentum, 
rather than some pre-existent body of knowledge that forms a basis for decision 
making and from which decision making proceeds.  
 
To press this point further, legal knowledge in this sense is not merely 
something that is to be found in the formal written sources of law but is rather 
something that continually evolves in the minds of individual judges and through the 
stories that they tell and share and which sustain their community of practice. Of 
course, such knowledge is often eventually given symbolic representation as 
institutional knowledge, cast in a relevant form through its structured use in decision 
making, and presented as propositional knowledge.
549
 Nonetheless, while all of this 
happens, and quite properly so, it is equally clear that what this points towards is the 
fact that abstract generalizations, however necessary, are not and cannot in 
themselves be sufficient to capture the complexity of institutional knowledge in its 
entirety. In legal decision making, some creative element always accompanies every 
decision. 
 
What makes knowledge institutional is its codification in the form of 
propositional statements. However, institutional knowledge is always put into action 
in particular concrete situations and contexts. Therefore, the possibilities for 
individual judgement to be exercised and for novel adventure to emerge and be 
entertained are always open. That is to say, the world is not a closed system. It 
permits of new experiences and more advanced forms of learning and progression, 
and this gives knowledge its forever temporary and always provisional, ready-but-
not-ready character. In this way, every application of general rules to particular facts, 
events or circumstances involves the instant case particularities in the constitution of 
its general principle in the sense of its being applicable to an instance that never 
before existed: the rule is supplemented, increased, by those instant case 
particularities and also in a very real sense determined by it. Levi understands this 
when he says that the classification changes as the classification is made; Gadamer 
makes the same point, maintaining that a general principle is ‘always supplemented 
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by the individual case, even productively determined by it’
550
 so that each 
‘application is neither a subsequent nor merely an occasional part of the phenomenon 
of understanding, but codetermines it as a whole from the beginning’.
551
 This 
suggests that what is at stake is not really the application of general rules to particular 
facts, but that we understand generalizations only as and when we connect these 
generalizations to particular concrete circumstances of the cases under consideration. 
We know and understand the general rule in and through the act of connecting it, 
relating it, to the present particulars. Thus, every act of applying a general rule to 
particular facts is a creative act, an act of creative interpretation in decision making.  
 
What is more, a condition for any judge to undertake decision making is that 
she belongs as a bona fide member of the relevant legal institution. This professional 
organization that has its own intricate conceptual structure and theoretical framework 
of understanding, comprising generic categories and their interrelations, something 
that every judge must keep in mind when engaging in decision making. But even this 
does not deny the fact that each act of decision making is a personal, interpretive, 
expositional and creative act; indeed, it helps to underline it. In characterizing or 
categorizing a situation before her in a particular way, a judge already begins to 
explore the question of suitable responses:
552
 she decides to characterize it this way 
rather than that way because she ‘feels’ it to of a certain kind or ‘type’. Of course the 
situation may be a new one, and in some sense it is always bound to be. However, it 
might strike her as new not just in the sense in which all situations are new but also 
in the significant sense that it does not quite exhibit those characteristic features that 
would suggest its ‘fit’ with previous instances of a similar type. Here, in starting to 
characterize the situation before her in a certain way she is already making a 
difference both to the category to which she refers and also, at the same time, to this 
new instant situation by the very fact of viewing it through, framing it with and 
imposing upon it, this template. Quite often (and quite likely) she may be wrong: her 
initial judgement is but a tentative ‘shout’, a well-educated guess. It is merely a 
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hypothesis by which she attempts to extend an already formed analogy or theory to 
include this instance as an example. All she can do is test her hypothesis by 
considering the consequences. What results? She needs to consider these. Perhaps 
she must revise her hypothesis and test again, and so on. All of this abstract 
categorizing and re-categorizing, first this way and then that way, is a necessary part 
of her search for a decision and its formal legal ‘justification’. In the end, her 
universalizing may fail to find a ‘match’: the particularities of the present case may 
evade capture by her categories if only just because they are abstract categories. The 
question is: can she close the difference? Yes, of course, she will. This is what she is 
trained to do, personally skilled to do. It is she who must close the difference; indeed, 
it is only she, or another such as she who can close the difference.  
 
Now what all of this points to, is the fact that we need to revise our 
understanding of what is going on here: somehow the idea of an unreflective 
institutional practice of applying general rules to particular cases must be 
transformed into a reflective one.
553
 The skill of legal decision making needs to be 
augmented by an understanding of what judges are doing when they practice that 
skill. If legal judgement is, as surely it is, a form of practical judgement then this is 
entailed in affirming that. Legal decision making must not be thought of as simply an 
unreflective practice, for it involves judges determining, often with great difficulty, 
how to observe the rules of their practice and the practice of their rules (the abstract 
rules of law and the historically formed, collected and collective, understandings of 
the community of which they are a part and to which they belong). Bankowski
554
 
alludes somewhat to this when he talks critically of the person who says ‘I know 
nothing about art but I know what I like’. If such a person was asked to explain what 
they meant by the statement that they knew what they liked, they would have to 
resort to, for example, indicating what it was about a particular painting that they 
liked. In doing this they would have to state it in terms appropriate to the art work, 
which would in fact show that they knew something about art after all. Their liking 
of a piece of art would show that they liked it but they could not know this unless 
they were able in some way to articulate it; that is; unless they knew something about 
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art. So judges do not simply apply rules to facts, they also have to think about what 
they are thinking about and about how they are thinking about it. It is not enough just 
to make a decision, it must also be justified; it is just not acceptable for a judge to say 
‘I can’t tell you why this is the right decision, but I know that it is’. Equally, the idea 
that a judge could become a judge having mastered unreflectively the practice of 
judging is a non-starter. The practice of judging as involving the production of 
justifying reasons for decisions entails that the deciding should be able to be carried 
over, understood and employed by other judges: finding the ratio, articulating and 
elucidating the reasons for a decision, amounts to an engagement with and not blind 
observance of the rules and principles of law. All of this relates to what we have 
argued about communal understandings, practices, habitus, and so on, and it is 
primarily about turning an unreflective practice into a reflective one. 
 
Today, technological advances and mass communication make possible ever 
more refined forms of abstraction that demand ever more sophisticated forms of 
codification of general rules for efficient and effective decision making. In this ever-
changing environment, our institutional abstractions must be able to help us navigate 
and negotiate the difficult pathways of life’s experience. Yet this is only one side of 
legal decision making. The other side, which I have been arguing for here, is that of 
the importance of creative personal understanding, a method of decision making 
obtained and employed by judges using the exploration of possibilities rather than by 
following set rules: heuristic knowledge. MacCormick is forever pointing towards 
this but always stops short of openly acknowledging it; Detmold thinks of it as 
mystical; Bankowski actively seeks a way of articulating it; Christodoulidis argues 
that it belongs to the realm of ethics and denies its possibility in law. It is a sense in 
which judges depend on much more than a structure of general rules, principles and 
procedures of law, but engage their own personal experiences, skills, outlooks and 
understandings as well. It is precisely because of this that law as an institution in a 
sociological sense must endeavour to encourage, promote and sustain a sense of 
communal understanding, its collected and collective spirit, to harness the 
provisional and improvisational inventiveness, expertise and creative imaginations of 
individual judges within an overarching and undergirding sense of corporate, 
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communal, membership and responsibility. Here, the effective development of legal 
institutional decision making requires that the relation between personal creative 
knowledge and propositional knowledge be mutually supporting and sustaining: 
propositional knowledge is utilized by judges and instrumentalized in appropriate 
application within particular cases, thereby achieving representation as tacit; 
individually held and exercised creative knowledge must also be set forth in a way 
that can make it (institutionally) accessible to a wider audience. Therefore, 
developing legal institutional knowledge is not simply about the proper ways of 
handling or manipulating difficult ‘pieces’ of information, but also, and perhaps 
more importantly, about the nourishment and fortification of the social practices that 





LEGAL CONTEXTS AS ‘PRACTICES’ 
 
One widely accepted understanding of the institutional control of law is in terms of 
its capacity to stabilise and maintain relationships and expectations over time.
555
 In 
this sense, almost paradoxically, it is the dynamic nature of law as a social institution 
that is being highlighted. On the one hand, as a result of its application over time, and 
given the unpredictable nature of contingent social life, law is forever being 
confronted with new problems and new situations that it must constantly respond 
to.
556
 On the other hand, this dynamic nature of law as a responsible and responsive 
institution stems from the social values that undergird the legal system; thus, 
changing societal values will result in or be evidence of a restructuring and 




 Every individual judge is appointed to occupy a particular place within this 
legal institutional setup which, according to constitutional theory, is subject to 
regulation in two separate but related ways. First, the legislature as a political body 
sets the norms underlying legal institutional functioning and in this way the legal 
institution is made to adhere and correspond to the purposes and desires set for it by 
the body of elected representatives of the people. Second, the executive maintains the 
legal system to permit it to function within the circumference of the norms set by the 
legislature and to implement these. In this political conversation over the nature and 
performance of the judiciary, two different but interrelated sets of judgements are 
continuously being made: the first concerns the reality of the legal system, its proper 
purpose and function; the second is more instrumental and concerns its operation. In 
Parliament, this endless conversation concerning these two judgements takes place 
all the time under the shadow of an acceptance that the final say will always be with 
the former. In performing the duties of her office every individual judge, as a 
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member of the judiciary, has in mind this endless political conversation and, to an 




Now since the problems that legislatures deal with are always a problem for 
someone, then, in responding to a given situation, or the threat of one, we might 
reasonably assert that politicians, as elected representatives, will generally have in 
mind questions concerning how these actual or potential situations might be shaped 
in relation to their own particular purposes or goals. In this way, lawmaking by the 
legislature may be thought of as a socially grounded method of perception and 
action, founded in social practice but reflecting particular change-resistant self-
understandings. So while, on the one hand, the subjective side of lawmaking may be 
seen to embrace the idea of creativity and change, on the other hand it exhibits a 
profound resistance to change due to its inherently self-referential nature. As a result 
of this contrast, the role of a judge must be understood not only to involve taking 
account of the reality judgements of lawmakers but also, in view of the endless 
political conversation referred to above, assisting in the redefining and introducing of 
new self-understandings through control of data and the way it is interpreted and 
presented. 
 
Law, as Niklas Luhmann
559
 reminds us, is a social system, and social systems 
are constituted by self-understandings expressed through commonly held and 
articulated sets of background distinctions. According to Charles Taylor, ‘the 
language is constitutive of the reality, is essential to its being the kind of reality it 
is’.
560
 In so far as our theoretical frameworks may be said to alter the background 
distinctions that make up the self understandings of our social systems, they may also 
be said to modify the social systems themselves. In other words, there is an internal 
relationship between the categories of thought that we use to approach reality and the 
practices that we seek to address and manipulate. In an important sense, our 
theoretical frameworks, our models and categories of thought help to constitute the 
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world that we then experience. Thus, a social practice, such as the way that fellow 
judges within a common legal system relate to each other and each other’s decisions, 
is what it is in and through the main self-understandings that practice embodies; that 
is, these self-understandings are ‘constitutive of the social matrix in which 
individuals find themselves and act’.
561
 As the former change, so also do the latter. 
This means that the distinctiveness of a social system originates, at least partly, from 
the frameworks of understanding and categories of thought that have grown up in 
particular circumstances over time. But where do these self-understandings come 
from? How do they develop? What sustains them?  
 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of a ‘practice’ helps point a way to an answer: 
 
‘By a “practice” I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of 
socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal 
to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those 
standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, 
that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, 







‘Tic-tac-toe is not … a practice in this sense, nor is throwing a football with 
skill; but the game of football is, and so is chess. Bricklaying is not a practice; 
architecture is. Planting turnips is not a practice; farming is. So are the 
enquiries of physics, chemistry and biology, and so is the work of the 




In the context of our discussion here, two features of a practice emerge as specially 
significant. First, a practice is a complex, cooperative and coherent association of 
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human beings bound together by rules and persistent across time. Second, every 
practice creates what MacIntyre calls ‘internal goods’; that is, goods that cannot be 
known or acquired in any way other than by participation in that particular 
practice,
564
 which means that ‘[t]hose who lack the relevant experience are 
incompetent thereby as judges of internal goods’.
 565
   
 
Obviously, internal goods are distinct from ‘external goods’, which are only 
randomly associated with practices and may be obtained in ways other than by 
participation in a particular practice; for example, wealth, rank, notoriety, and so on. 
In this way we can see how the key features of a practice originate from within; that 
is, the practice is self-referential. Those ‘internal goods’ that make a practice that 
particular practice and not any other practices are grounded in the particular 
experiences that its participants gain from their involvement in the practice and, 
insofar as this is true, the values and cognitive categories that have evolved within a 
practice will specify and dictate the way in which its members relate, jointly and 
severally, to their external environment.  
 
We might compare, at this point, MacIntyre’s understanding of practices with 
Luhmann’s account of social systems. For Luhmann, social systems interact with and 
relate to the environment that they perceive to exist externally. But while changes in 
its environment may trigger a response within a social system, this response is 
conditioned by the system’s own significant structure. That is to say, social systems, 
through their own ‘internal goods’ (to use MacIntyre’s phrase), allocate significant 
patterns and pattern variations to their environment and react to these patterns and 
pattern variations. Knowledge emerges within a system as a result of this activity; 
not as a passive response to an objectively given environment but through a system’s 
interaction with its environment. When faced with a change in its environment, a 
system will react in terms that reflect its own internal organization: a change in one 
part of a system is coupled with changes in other parts. In this way, a system will 
always react to preserve itself, facilitating its own self-production by establishing 
continuous patterns of self–referential interaction. Thus, law as a social system in 
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this sense will always react to its environment in relation to its own internal 
organization.
566
 It will determine what it perceives and, likewise, what it perceives 
will thus determine the system. Therefore, wholesale change is difficult: a system 
will always react to preserve itself. Alternatively, significant change may take place 
generally across a system if the system continually receives information or generates 
information internally about itself.
567
 
   
Changing Social Practices 
 
To the extent that we might agree with this analysis, we may say that new practices 
and new ways of doing things are mutually constituted in a recursive manner; or, to 
put it another way, when new descriptions gain acceptance among actors then new 
ways of doing things arise; when new ways of doing things arise then new 
descriptions also emerge; and so on. Thus, new ways of thinking about a practice 
will give rise to new ways of articulating it and thus also, potentially, to new ways of 
acting. In this sense, there can be no permanent character to social practices; rather, 
since they consist of the articulation of a set of self-understandings, then, when the 
underlying way of articulating how those practices’ functions change, so will the 
self-understandings communicated in and through them.
568
 So, if we view what 
judges do as a social practice in these terms, then we can perhaps begin to understand 
in a new light the obiter comments that judges make in delivering their judgements. 
What we find is a set of ‘internal goods’ developed over time, the main features of 
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which are those associated with the work of judicial decision making. To disturb the 
system, and thus activate it with a new set of self-understandings as to what judging 
is all about, would require the influence of one who ‘straddles’ the threshold between 
inside and outside, and who might therefore be described as from the outside but 




But how might this be brought about? In the UK, for example, we have seen 
how the use of tools such as statistics on clear-up rates, league tables and waiting list 
targets have shaken up not only the criminal justice system but also the education 
system and the National Health Service. This has taken place by forcing participants 
to respond to the messages expressed through these tools in ways that focus on these 
tools themselves. With attention directed more towards the tools than the essential 
workings of the systems, these rates, tables and targets gradually assume an 
importance independent of their initial projected use, and instead are thought of as 
important in and for themselves. As can be seen from the political fallout
570
 
generated by these measures in the UK, they can have quite unanticipated effects, 
changing the systems quite radically in the long run.  
 
In such cases those seeking to effect significant change commonly (a) have a 
particular goal and purpose in mind that they are able to articulate in a relevant way, 
and (b) are able to provide the system with information about its operation and about 
other systems. In this way they are able to create the conditions necessary for the 
implementation of the changes they wish to see taking effect. What is happening here 
is that a discourse is being founded to structure the debate that necessitates the use of 
their key categories. When that debate becomes so structured as to necessitate the use 
of their key categories, change becomes inevitable. From this point on, any attempt 
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to object will fail to register since the very language in which any objection is 
composed and through which it is articulated will have to be consistent with those 
objects that the resistance strives in vain to oppose. In other words, when the way a 
participant talks and acts changes the practice changes too. 
 
We can see then how institutions such as law may be seen as more than 
simply viewpoints onto the world; rather, they are collectively recognized methods 
of perception involving a set of cognitive categories, values and interests that 
originate in social practices, which are themselves founded on internal goods and 
self-understandings that have evolved historically and which are manifested as sets 
of background distinctions shared among members. Such practices are, of course, 
self-referential.
571
 Interaction is with members’ perception of their environment 
rather than with any objectively identifiable environment, these perceptions 
emerging from the way that the practice is ordered and structured; that is, from the 
cognitive categories, standards and interests in terms of which it has evolved over 
time. In other words, to put it rather bluntly, in terms of the way that law functions as 
a practice, judges decide the way they do because they think the way they do, and 
they think the way they do because they decide the way they do. Law is a self-
referential system, concerned with the persistence and survival of its own identity. 
 
Therefore, to interrupt this cycle and to change practices, one would first 
have to recognize how it is that social practices are dependent on the language 
through which they are expressed, how it is that they may be said to be 
impressionable, for it is in this sense, if at all, that we might affirm it to be possible to 
introduce novelty; that is, through developing a coherent, credible and justifiable 
discourse equipped with those novel distinctions, definitions and self-understandings 
that will constitute the new institutional identity of the practice under modification. 
This battle over ideas, over the form and content of communication, must be engaged 
in with a vision of a new institutional identity, with a new conversation and a new 
purpose in terms of which those proposed changes could be conceived as possible. 
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In the second place, as we have already noted, regular information about the 
functioning of other systems or about the system itself might also offer the potential 
for challenging or changing this customary self-preserving behaviour of a social 
system. How? Not through any coercive behaviour but by means of ‘persuasion’. 
Such information, regularly received, might harbour the possibilities for institutional 
change through its potential for encouraging a system to be introspective to the 
extent of precipitating new descriptions of itself to engender new possibilities and 
patterns of acting. This reflexive aspect of institutions may resonate within that 
institution and lead to transformation, or at least prepare the way for future 
transformation. In this sense, institutional change, at least in terms of law as an 
institution, may be seen then to be as much about changing understandings as about 
changing procedure: it must involve the embracing and the articulation of a vision 
and a definition of a new institutional reality and the ability and the expertise to 







CHAOS AND COMPLEXITY 
 
Some years ago, towards the end of the Balkan conflict, I was stationed in Sarajevo 
with the NATO peace implementation force. As a result of the hostilities, much of 
the city’s infrastructure supporting its public services was totally destroyed and daily 
life had either ground to a halt or become utterly chaotic. In particular, driving along 
the city’s main highway and neighbouring streets was like manoeuvring around a 
giant-sized fairground dodgems track. With no electricity supply, there were no 
traffic lights: a large number of vehicles travelled at dangerously high speeds, their 
drivers negotiating not only junctions but also pot-holes, other vehicles, pedestrians, 
and many other obstacles. Nonetheless, seldom was there ever a serious accident or 
collision. Left to itself, the traffic had become a self-regulating system. So much so 
that when the traffic lights were eventually made to work the drivers had become so 
used to this self-regulating system that they appeared to have forgotten what to do. 
Sometimes, nearly all of the drivers ignored the lights completely: as they changed 
from red to green and back again they made little impact on the continuous flow of 
traffic. At other times, the flow of traffic simply petered to a halt, everyone unsure 
whether or not anyone else was observing the changes. In fact, it seemed that when 
everything was chaotic the traffic flowed well, but when the lights operated 
everything became dis-organized: its settled state was a form of organized chaos.  
 
Perhaps we might more correctly describe it as undesirably organized. The 
problem was not that one system represented order and the other disorder, but that 
one kind of order appeared undesirable but worked and the other kind of order 
although desirable clearly did not. Left to their own devices, patterns emerged among 
the drivers that satisfied everyone’s criteria, and the resulting (dis)order appeared fair 
and efficient. It may not have equated to what we commonly expect in terms of a 
properly ordered traffic flow but it was ordered, nonetheless. The point is that our 





MacCormick’s discussion of the social practice of ‘queuing’ and its 
subsequent institutionalization deals with precisely this issue. However, the main 
point that I want to highlight here is not that this happens but how and why it 
happens, and for what purposes. MacCormick’s discussion illustrates well our 
common impulse to recognise, impose and institutionalize patterns but results in a 
way of thinking that regards order and disorder as opposites. The upshot of this is 
that what becomes institutionalized is what appears to be classifiable and 
generalizable according to institutional categories, expected and predictable by a 
controlling agent. Behaviour at variance with this becomes thought of as 
incomprehensible, unpredictable or chaotic. However, on the view being argued for 
here, institutionalization and surprise are not polar opposites. Because something 
could not have been predicted does not necessarily imply a lack of order any more 
than its predictability would imply order. Which is simply another way of affirming 
that pattern does not exclude novelty. Indeed, far from being polar opposites, order 
and disorder, like universals and particulars, appear to implicate each other.  
 
To many legal theorists, law appears to fall naturally on one side of this 
pairing. But if the argument being presented here holds then the dualism is a false 
one and law might well be less deterministic than it appears to be. In this sense, far 
from reinforcing the Newtonian, mechanistic world-view underlying modernist legal 
theory, this argument would suggest that a revision of that understanding is urgently 
required. The suggestion being presented here is not that our idea of reality as a unity 
needs to be abandoned, but that the version of that idea of unity as derived from and 
expressed in a predominantly Newtonian mechanistic vocabulary needs to be 





 observes, diversity, change and adaptability, rather than hierarchy, 
rigidity and standardization are coming much more to the fore within contemporary 
scholarship. Gradually, a new language with a new attitude towards and an 
appreciation of ideas such as non-linearity, disorder and noise, fragmentation, 
unpredictability and marginalization is emerging. We find a change in attitude that 
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appears much more receptive to a sense of the chaotic and an awareness of dynamic 
process, an outlook more in sympathy with notions of the unpredictable and the 
novel and much less ready to impose a division of order and disorder. But with this 
new outlook we need to radically rethink our ideas concerning the use of law as a 
tool for intervening in the world. 
 
Much has been said here about the Newtonian approach, but this now needs 
to be augmented with a fuller description of what that approach entails. In the first 
place, as Toulmin points out, the Newtonian style is characterized by the search for 
the universal, general, timeless ‘decontextualized ideal’.
574
 The ontological 
description is that of discrete, objective units linked through norm-like associations 
discoverable through abstract conceptual representation that can aid predictability 
and help to minimize elements of surprise. In this way, the subject under 
consideration becomes controllable. As Tsoukas argues, such a view ‘assumes an 





Such a view makes use of idealized models, created through abstraction, to 
estimate the complex behaviour of real entities. This assumes both that the behaviour 
of real entities will permit such an assessment of their various contingent factors and 
that by abstracting from the time dependent historical pathways of their causal 
relations fairly accurate prediction is nonetheless possible. And all of this rests on 
that rather sweeping generalization that we considered at length earlier; namely, that 
within instituionalized forms every activity of a certain type can be treated in the 
same way and that it is legitimate to do this. 
 
To take an example, consider Mrs Donoghue in Donoghue v. Stevenson.
576
 In 
MacCormick’s account of the reasoning in Donoghue we find an argument being 
constructed in reverse to account for the judges’ reasoning. We are directed to 
understand how it is Mrs Donoghue as ultimate consumer, not Mrs Donoghue as a 
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vulnerable old Scottish lady or any other combination of actual real time background 
qualities and descriptions, that is significant. But Mrs Donoghue the ultimate 
consumer does not exist in a social vacuum in the way that this abstract conceptual 
reconstruction of her would seem to suggest. She, Mrs Donoghue, is not this a-
contextual and a-historical representation that is given of her; indeed, one is almost 
tempted to interject: ‘Will the real Mrs Donoghue please stand up!’ In a similar way, 
we might argue that in  respect of the conceptual reconstruction of the manufacturer 




What is clear from MacCormick’s account of the reasoning in that case, is 
that it is the purpose for which the institution of law is intended that determines the 
ways in which the various purposes of the characters involved are related; that is, 
their relative positions within the legal institutional structure. But what this implies is 
that the legal institutional answer does not arise as a solution to the social problem 
from which it derives; rather, the institution reconstructs the problem according to its 
own aims and purposes and defines and modifies the limits of its relations, thus 
making it more malleable. However, none of this can be discovered from a simple 
viewing of these objects in their institutional incarnations. Such an analysis would 
reveal only the ‘fact’ that the system or institutional answer was created by and given 
in response to the environmental conditions; it would not reveal the underlying 
process by which one is modified or adapted by the other.  
 
So we need to ask what demands the institutional perspective is making of the 
real life scenario that gives rise to it. Why does it abstract from concrete reality 
sometimes this way, sometimes that, and what are the implications of this? On the 
basis of the analysis engaged in earlier in terms of the importance of ‘practices’, what 
other factors, both within and without the story influence the decision? How is this 
particular set of real-life concrete relations related to the broader issues of legal 
structures and doctrines and social cohesiveness in which this particular scenario is 
set? If we choose to focus solely on the decontextualized abstract model we will not 
even begin to find a way to address any of these questions. 
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Clearly, some degree of generalization is unavoidable. Here we notice again 
the movement from what we might describe as simple data (the multitude of 
descriptions and items of information that could be given in respect of a particular 
situation) to legally relevant facts (facts that can register in the legal decision making 
context) to legally significant facts (those facts that are important to the actual 
decision or its future authority and use; that is, as part of the ratio). In MacCormick’s 
view such generalization is not only inevitable, it is essential
578
 and the very idea of 
legal institutions presupposes this. But the problem is that in order to see with any 
degree of clarity how and by what means that real-life concrete situation that is 
before the court can be represented in these a-temporal non-specific terms much of 
what makes that real-life event exactly what it is, its uniqueness, has to be dropped 
from view. The open-ended life narrative that gives rise to a particular episode has to 
be transformed into a scenario that is presentable before the court. In this process, the 
episode loses some of its particular features and characteristics and gains others, at 
least in the sense that the narrative structure imposed upon it by its institutional re-
presentation embellishes it with a beginning, middle and an end. Within this 
structure, individual facts are relevant and important in relation to and in terms of the 
aims and purposes for which the court is constituted. Thus, it is not difficult to see 
how, in this context, generalization and abstraction, this consequent reduction to role 
and rule, might be seen as an obstacle to a fuller understanding of the complexities of 
real-life situations, rather than an aid. Thinking about a situation in a legal context 
provides the thinker with a way of thinking that structures how that situation is 
thought about. The narrative structure imposed by law corresponds with the a-
contextual, a-historical mode presupposed by law but not with the time-bound, 
context-specific situation experienced by those involved. In this way, the mode of 
thinking allows the thinker to construct certain expectations but it limits them to a 
certain type: those that can be expressed as universalistic expectations. Such a 
privileging of the a-temporal, a-historical, and generalizable comes at a price; 
namely, the loss from view of the temporal, the contextual and the historical. 
Accordingly, theorizing about law that finds its roots in a post Enlightenment–
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inspired mechanistic model of the universe generally assumes that the actual 
situations which are represented by legal institutions as institutional phenomena 
operate in a social vacuum. The narrative structure that they are assumed to have is 
in fact a narrative structure imposed by law, and this is the only narrative structure 
they are permitted to have. Without this, as we have seen most clearly in relation to 
Re A, they cannot be heard in law.  
 
Legal decision making illustrates very clearly how this rational translation of 
multi-faceted, open-ended, real-life phenomena into the data appropriate to legal 
speech and then into legal decisions and thereafter into legal justifications that 
validate, corroborate and legitimate the institutional mechanism and structure, takes 
place. But we are only beginning to understand how such decision making is 
decidedly self-referential and why this is a problem. Judges must justify or ground 
their decisions in law. But, as we have seen, at some point the infinite regression 
brought about by thinking of law as a system of known rules that can be 
straightforwardly applied to factual circumstances, persons or events must be called 
to a halt; which is partly why we are then able to see how judges’ decisions must be 
rooted in their forms of life, within a historically developed body of collective 
knowledge that cannot be fully represented. It cannot be otherwise, for, as Derrida, 




Chaos Theory and Contemporary Theorising about Law 
 
The world that is being depicted now in much of contemporary philosophy is a very 
different one from that represented by the Newtonian mode of thought. We can 
illustrate this difference by referring to some of the distinctions already mentioned 
which map the difference between Newtonian ideas and chaos theory. Chaos theory 
is a mathematical theory with widespread application. It has been described as ‘the 
qualitative study of unstable aperiodic behaviour in deterministic nonlinear 
dynamical systems’.
580
 According to Chaos Theory,
581
 each complex system is 
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unique, with multiple interactions and feedback loops between elements. They are 
dynamic, which means that they exist in changing environments and therefore need 
to be adaptable. They evolve and, as they do, become more complex. Here, each 
element responds to local information and not to broader system information, and 
interactions are non-linear; that is, they contain multiple components that are rarely 
explainable in simple cause and effect relations.
582
 Moreover, because complex 
systems constantly change in unpredictable ways as a result of non-linearity, it is 
impossible to make accurate predictions;
583
 instead, they contain attractors
584
 which 
operate like magnets for chaos, attracting and causing turbulence like rocks in a 
stream. Therefore, we study them and how they emerge as a means for 
understanding; that is, we study how order emerges from chaos in the form of self-
organisation: as patterns, habitual activity, and so on. 
 
More exactly, a system is termed dynamic when the state of the system,
585
 
changes with time. Normally, ‘[t]he rules specifying how the system changes … are 
… written in the form of differential equations which represent the rate of change of 
its variables … [which] allow[s] one to calculate the state of the system at other 
times, given its state at one specific point in time. The rate of change of each variable 
is expressed in either linear or non-linear terms’. In this respect, while linearity 
dictates that ‘a unit change in variable X will always cause a specific change in 
variable Y …, non-linearity means that the change in variable Y brought about by a 
unit change in variable X will depend on the magnitude of variable X’. In other 
words, ‘non-linearity means that a small change in a system variable can have a 




                                                                                                                                          
581
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 For example, as in Lorenz’s famous ‘butterfly effect’. 
583
 As with, for example, the weather. 
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 Called ‘strange attractors’ because of their irregular shape patterns. Cf. Deleuze and Guattari 
(1988). 
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a point in time. 
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 See Tsoukas (1998), p. 297 
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The character and utility of linear equations may be regarded as 
corresponding to that of syllogistic or propositional statements in law; propositional 
statements can also be reduced to a general formula from which, provided the initial 
condition and temporal duration of the period being studied are known, the future 
state may be calculated. Contrastingly, non-linear equations are not subject to any 
general formula from which solutions for successive temporal points may be 
obtained; therefore, rather than being concerned with the prediction of future states 
from present ones, mathematical formulae for non-linear systems are focussed more 
towards the various accounts of their broad patterns of continuing behaviour.  
 
To say that a system behaves in an unstable and aperiodic manner is to say 
that ‘it never repeats and it continues to manifest the effects of any small 
perturbation. Such behaviour makes exact predictions impossible and produces a 
series of measurements that appear random’.
587
 In this way, the question of how such 
an unstable system will evolve depends on these ‘small perturbations’, and small 
changes in original conditions can produce unpredictable results. 
 
When the variables indicating a chaotic system are represented as Cartesian 
coordinates, with a single point describing the whole system, then as the system 
changes the point traces out a trajectory. The state towards which a system tends – 
the set of points in phase space “attracting” the trajectories - is called an attractor’. 
For a chaotic system, the attractor has ‘an irregular shape’; thus, it is called a strange 
attractor. Moreover, ‘[t]he existence of strange attractors shows that chaotic systems 
combine pattern with unpredictability, determinism with chaos, order with disorder 
… [C]haos theory has made it possible , as well as legitimate, to overcome hitherto 
accepted conceptual dichotomies’. Finally, ‘[t]he pattern of a strange attractor is 
produced by the systematic operation of feedback … the iterative operation of a 
function upon itself’, which results in the emergence of properties that could not 
have been predicted beforehand. That is to say, ‘chaos theory shows mathematically 
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that with simple non-linear deterministic equations … small changes in initial 




The important point for our purposes here that we might draw from this 
introduction to the basic elements of chaos theory is that prediction in relation to 
non-linear systems is impossible, since this would require an element of accuracy in 
relation to initial conditions that simply cannot be given, and this has clear 
implications for legal reasoning.
589
 What this means is that institutional actors do not 
enjoy the efficient capacity for decision making that institutional theories of law have 
often credited them with. The institutional capacity for reasoned judgment is founded 
on the un-reasoned corpus of shared understanding that the context-dependent social 
institution of law has developed over time. A judge’s reservoir of knowledge evolves 
from a set of initial conditions that, however capricious, nevertheless provide the 
foundation for all her understanding. It is thus that concrete communal tradition, not 
its a-contextual and a-historical abstraction, which is the condition sine qua non for 
judicial comprehension, decision and action. 
 
What this suggests is that the boundary between law and politics is actually 
much more blurred than is usually supposed. It is precisely because our knowledge is 
incomplete that politics is possible. If we could gain an objective standpoint, some 
Archimedian point from which to survey all that happens in the world, then perhaps 
there would be no need for collective deliberation or communal action. Much of 
what we recognise as political activity would, along with the courts of law in which 
we seek agreement despite dispute and dissatisfaction, would likely disappear. 
Therefore, in this sense at least, we can see how courts of law are inherently political 
entities, how judicial decisions are always political compromises; that is, they are 
always imposed as matters of opinion, not of knowledge as such. 
 
Really, it is only because we do in fact affirm the impossibility of any kind of 
accurate prediction that we are able to acknowledge any sense of human freedom: 
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everything is, potentially, calculable, which Bankowski (2001) refers (see chapter 9). 
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freedom is meaningless if we affirm determinism; determinism makes no sense if we 
affirm freedom. Rather, freedom is what helps us to make sense of the world and our 
place within it. That we are free to act really implies a non-deterministic world, but 
one in which acts, however unpredictable, are nonetheless intelligible. We do things 
and we make things happen. We make intelligent decisions and we make sense of 
them afterwards. That is why legal reasoning is a form of practical reasoning.
590
 Not 
because we are able to represent our decisions according to some symbolic code but 
because in and through them we are able to progress, to navigate and negotiate our 
passage through this world of which we are a part. As Aristotle was acutely aware, 
understanding, imagination and practical judgement skilfully supersede the ability to 
predict. 
 
Why do we find this so terribly difficulty to come to terms with? One reason 
is that we have erected a barrier of propositional statements, deductive syllogism, ‘If 
X, then Y, in circumstances Z’, that stands in the way. We cannot operate this system 
without dividing the world up into separate pieces, transforming what is essentially 
an undivided flow and flux into objects, re-presenting process as manipulable 
substance. Without such modes of abstraction, the instrumental application of 
propositional statements would not be possible. In this sense, law makes freedom, 
choice and creativity epistemologically redundant and dispensable, since all that 
decision making involves is instrumental application. Between these two worlds, the 




The Temporal Dimension 
 
                                                 
590
 Compare with MacCormick’s argument why legal reasoning is a form of practical reasoning. 
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 The significance of the problem that is being suggested here is the highlighting of what 
Christodoulidis calls law’s inherent deficiency. But a further question is whether law, however 
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Others, Bankowski for example,. encounter a similar problem, in trying to find a way, within a 
framework that is still overly dependent upon a mechanistic mode of thinking, of accommodating 
freedom, choice, creativity, etc. In other words, while Christoudolidis does not appear to accept that 
law can be thought of in other terms, according to another mode of thinking, Bankowski appears to 
assume that law can be made to work and be seen to work without changing its mode of thinking. 
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Karl Popper has described the temporal characteristic of Newtonian determinism as 
being like in a movie, where ‘the future co-exists with the past; and the future is 
fixed, in exactly the same way as the past’.
592
 But our experience of the world is 
different: we do actually experience the world as change, as emergence and 
recession, as the embracing of real choice and real possibilities, as actualized 
potential, as a contingent becoming. Moreover, this affirmation of complexity 
permits a much more accurate and coherent understanding of temporality, one that 
corresponds with our experience of lived time. In short, the irreversibility of the 
arrow of time need not signify lack of order or of dis-order, but can in fact also be 
understood as a source of order. As Prigogine states: 
 
‘Recent developments in nonequilibrium physics and chemistry point in the 
opposite direction. They show unambiguously that the arrow of time is a 
source of order. This is already clear in simple experiments such as thermal 
diffusion … [C]onsider a box containing two components (such as hydrogen 
and nitrogen) where we heat one boundary and cool the other … The system 
evolves to a steady state in which one component is enriched  in the hot part 
and the other in the cold part. The entropy produced by the irreversible heat 
flow leads to an ordering process, which would be impossible if taken  





Moreover, ‘it is precisely through irreversible processes associated with the arrow of 
time that nature achieves its most delicate and complex structures. Life is possible 




The Historical Dimension 
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Associated with the temporal dimension, the historical dimension precipitates a 
similar problematic. A spectator joining friends at a soccer match some time after the 
start will usually ask, ‘What’s the score?’ or ‘What’s happened already?’ Likewise, a 
dinner guest arriving late at the table could not expect to understand the point of a 
story being told if joined half-way through, at least not without also having some 
knowledge of the patterns of conversation that led up to it, from which it arose, and 
of which the present story is but the latest chapter. Likewise, no judge can ever hope 
to understand the full significance of a particular case without having some 
background knowledge and understanding of, or at least familiarity with, the 
historically developed patterns of behaviour and interactions that form the backdrop 
to its current re-production. As Whitehead argues conclusively, our present 
experiences are brought about our previous actions and the choices that we now have 
are dependent on the choice path that precedes them: actions to actualize possibilities 
from the scope of potential choices before us delimit the scope and range of 
succeeding choices. In other words, the form and direction of our present choices 
depends on the sequence of events preceeding them.  
 
In this sense, we might also say that not only do our legal problems require 
legal answers, but our legal answers are searching for the questions that will host 
them. That is to say, the institutional structures and interrelations that we set up in 
law, and the way we set them up, may be seen to reflect not simply our need and 
desire for a deterministic universe, but the central cultural self-understandings of our 
society as they have evolved over time. As Robert Cooper puts it,  
 
‘Representation … shows that the inside is always a doubling of the outside, 
that the inside is always an inversion of the outside … . [R]epresentation 
displaces the outside of the remote and “beyond” into the inside of the near 
and familiar …  it displaces the outside of the dispersed and macroscopic into 
the inside of the compact and manageable. Representation displaces the 
outside inside. In contrast, bounded rationality, as a singularity, must always 
be an inner resource which acts on an outer problem; it is allied to intentions 
and goals which are also presumed to be integral to the organizational 
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decision-making apparatus directed from the “inside” of the individual. For 
representation, however, intentions and goals are themselves displacements in 




In this way, law in the sociological sense, as a social institution, may be seen to 
reproduce in law in its philosophical sense, in its institutional legal practices and 
doctrines, the practices and beliefs of the social environment that surrounds it and of 
which it forms a part. Thus, we can see how it might make more sense to emphasize 
patterns and relationships rather than values. We can see how this might be worked 
out if we consider, as an example, recent calls for more engagement with narrative 
understandings of legal cases, institutional practices and doctrines.
596
 Qualitative 
descriptions are much better suited than their quantitative cohorts to reveal the 
unfolding nature of historical narrative, how and why the relationships, choices, 
actions and interactions combined to produce the complex unity of each particular 
case. Reducing the complex unity of the qualitative whole to a quantitative 
assessment of its individual parts is a vain attempt to discover and apply governing 
norms, for it cannot do justice to this historicity or evolution. The whole is more that 
the sum of its separate parts. There is something other, ineffably present in all social 
phenomena that cannot be captured in this way. In answer to the question, what then 
is the point of the process that we are beginning to describe as law, the answer must 
be that the end or point of the process, like its beginning, is the process itself. It is the 
discovery of meaning in concretization, in the actualization of potentialities; that is, 
law must be understood not simply in terms of rational conclusions to rational 
problems but in more aspirational terms as the continual uncovering of ideals which 
will operate to lure us into further commitment. In this way, law actually becomes 
understood as part of the ongoing process of life: not just as a tool for helping us to 
live, or even to live well, but to live better. 
 
In What Sense, if at all, is Law as an Institution a Chaotic System?  
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At first sight, law is typically non-chaotic.  What is being argued here, however, is 
that law is not one way or the other. In other words, neither those who have argued 
for metaphors of complexity and chaos in legal theory nor those who have argued 
against such conceptions have grasped the essential point. Metaphors describe, they 
do not represent. Law is not one way or the other, but we describe the world from 
within those historically conditioned social, cultural and linguistic environments in 
which our use of language makes sense. We cannot escape that: there is no 
Archimedian point in respect of our use of language. For example, Bankowski 
argues: ‘Let the story speak to you’. But the story doesn’t speak: only we do.
 597
 The 
story, once we allow ourselves to read it in a different way, even to get inside it, may 
cause us to entertain different viewpoints, and to want to suggest things that we 
would not otherwise have suggested, but it can only speak through us if we first have 
a language to speak about or for it in. So really we can never be sure that the 
language through which we attempt to capture the nature of an event, an act, a 
person, and so on, and by which we represent it in legal decision making, will 
actually capture its essential qualities. Language is a tool that provides us with 
indirect access to reality: analogical truth is a construct that stretches only as far as 
the analogy holds; metaphors do not disclose prior meaning, they shift our focus 
from the stared at to the glanced over features so that they may become clothed with 




So why then should we use metaphors of chaos and complexity to describe 
law? Simply and principally because they help to draw out aspects of and about law 
and legal decision making that have for too long been overlooked or overshadowed. 
Terms such as non-linearity, sensitivity to initial conditions, iteration, feedback 
loops, novelty, unpredictability, process, emergence, help to equip us with a new 
vocabulary, necessary if we are to begin to describe and re-describe law and legal 
institutions according to the manner proposed here. Understanding law through these 
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lenses may not endow us with 20/20 vision but it will provide us with a storehouse of 
alternative imagery that may help to make different things appear interesting and 
interesting things appear different.  
 
Understanding law’s aporia, the particularity void, the phronetic gap, in terms 
of chaos may help us to see how it is that the unbridgeable gap is crossed, without 
doing violence either to law or to reality. Order and chaos are not so much polar 
opposites as two sides of the same coin – flip it and see! If we need, as we do, to find 
a way of understanding law and legal decision making that accommodates the 
contextual, historical, temporal, processual, meaningful, political, evolving, 
contingent, reflexive, novel, complex and changing aspects of reality, this alternative 







CLOSING THE GAP: NARRATIVE AND THE LAW 
 




How can we uncover the assumptions and presuppositions of ITL that will enable us 
to understand better its underlying reality? This question addresses and forces us to 
acknowledge something that is easily and often forgotten when we start to think 
about and analyse law and legal reasoning; namely, that there is a difference between 
thinking of law as a structured institution and our thinking about thinking of law as a 
structured institution. So it may well be that although the propositional form of 
statements is characteristic of our thinking about law as a structured institution, 
precisely as MacCormick suggests, a narrative form might still be the more 
appropriate way to consider law in relation to practices. Indeed, if this is the case, 
then it may well be that the logic of ITL is not incompatible with a narrative 
methodology. This chapter aims to explore these possibilities and to examine the 
usefulness of narrative as a means for understanding law. 
 
Similarities between legal reasoning and literary studies have been noted 
often by a number of legal scholars; notably, Martha Nussbaum.
600
 However, just as 
interesting as the question of the similarities between the two is the extent to which 
narrative theory may actually be applied to the study of law and legal reasoning. In 
this respect, what is being suggested is an extension of the argument presented 
above; that is, that the significant features with which we are concerned are not those 
which we entertain on account of their propensity to predict a certain future but 
which will act as signposts, pointing out a way forward by disclosing hitherto hidden 
associations and suggesting novel relations and connections. Rather than 
understanding the structural functioning of law as something which aims at a 
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reduction of complexity by means of an underlying system of unifying doctrines and 
complementary principles, we are more concerned to look for ways of pushing at 
law’s boundaries, expanding its horizons of possible thought and action and 
generating new insights through the operation of a narrative view-point and a 
metaphorical use of the idea of complexity. 
 
According to MacCormick,  
 
‘It is of course the snake bite, not the theory that snake bites can be fatal 
because of the property of snake venom, that causes Cleopatra’s death. But 
what enables us so to conceptualize the death of Cleopatra is that the 
particular fact of the biting snake belongs as minor premise in an argument of 
which the major premise is a hypothesis culled from the snake-venom theory 




But does this explanation really capture the essential difference between the two 
modes of thought operating here? In the logical proposition, ‘ If X, then Y’, the word 
‘then’ operates differently than it would in, for example, ‘the snake bit, and then the 
queen died’. While the first precipitates a search for universal truth conditions, the 
second looks for probable connections between the two. In the first there is an 
assumption of conjoinment; in the second, connection; that is, the first emphasises 
separation while the second emphasises continuity. How can we understand these 
two modes of thinking and how are they related?  
 
A friend, a senior army officer, was sometimes heard to say to his junior 
officers when asked for their assessment of a situation and possible courses of action: 
‘Great idea, bad plan!’  In other words, there is a difference between saying that 
something sounds good and that it argues well. Good stories do not always make 
sound arguments (but, arguably, sound arguments are always good examples of a 
particular kind of story)! Murray Gell-Mann defines complexity as  
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‘the length of the shortest message that will describe a system, at a given 
level of coarse graining, to someone at a distance, employing language, 





Thus, in the first place, complexity relates to the ease or difficulty with which 
information that conveys a sufficient and correct account of an experience of some 
phenomenon can be transmitted; it is linked directly to the subject experiencing the 
phenomenon, and is dependent on their ability to represent it. In this sense, 
complexity is  
 
‘necessarily context dependent, even subjective … In actuality, then, we are 
discussing one or more definitions of complexity that depend on a description 
of one system by another, presumably a complex adaptive system, which 




In the second place, complexity relates to the compressibility of information, so that 
information that can be condensed into short, sharp phrases will be less complex. 
Thus, complexity, on this account at least, has more to do with the experiencing of 
complex phenomena and the amount of work involved in communicating this 
experience than with independent and objective complex states of affairs. That is, it 
has to do with the compression and transformation, the reduction for simplification 
of complex sense experience into commonly recognized and accepted forms of 
speech.  
 
Tsoukas calls this ‘algorithmic compressibility’,
604
 and uses this to help 
convey the basic difference between ‘propositional knowledge’ and ‘narrative 
knowledge’ as that between conditional ‘if, then’ statements derived from empirical 
observation and knowledge expressed through stories, anecdotes and examples. He 
argues that while the former can be represented via an abbreviated formula the latter 
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can not, since no abbreviated formula exists by which it may be properly represented. 
In this way, what we experience may be considered simple or complex depending on 
how readily our experiences submit themselves to ‘algorithmic compressibility’; that 
is, how easily they can be described and analyzed. Notice then, that propositional 
knowledge, which is algorithmically compressible, is inherently reductionistic and 
therefore ill-suited to accommodating non-propositional forms of understanding, or 
complex experiences, at their own level of communication and how this then results 




Much of the recent trend in legal theory towards emphasizing reflexivity, 
paradox, ambiguity and contradiction may, in this way, be seen as an attempt to 
overcome this difficulty by further complicating the language of law; that is, as an 
attempt to render it more complex. But, against this, consider for example, 
Christoudolidis’s argument in response to MacCormick’s ‘updating of the Solomonic 
tale with a number of contemporary maternity disputes’. How, he asks, in this 
situation, would a judge ‘know that she was faced with a new problem?’ That is, 
‘[h]ow, given universalizability, would she know that “she has two choices?”’ 
Christodoulidis explains that 
 
‘[t]his is an argument directed at the potential of surprise and at how law 
might harbour this potential. Stated in the form of a paradox …: every case is 
prima facie a case of “first impression”, and yet none is … On the one hand 
… every case is unique in its particularity … and thus at some level always a 
“case of first impression”. On the other hand … the recognition of a 
maternity dispute … already occurs in terms of classifications available in the 
law, so that any “first impression” is over-determined by classifications – 




In other words, how could the complexity deficit resulting from law’s inherent 
tendency to reduce complexity possibly be overcome? By resort to what vocabulary 
could a legal practitioner even begin to make sense of it? What mode of thought 
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could she utilize to accommodate it? This is a question that strikes right to the heart 
of any attempt within law to increase the complexity of our understanding so as to 
mirror the complexity of the situation before us. However, it also a question that 
while presupposing law’s institutional and propositional structure appears to ignore 
the significance of its existence as law in terms of the narrative structure associated 
with law as practice. 
 
Might judges be able to increase the complexity of their legal understanding 
so as to mirror the complexity of the situation they are contemplating through 
equivocality; that is, through the formulation and accumulation of multiple 
inequivalent descriptions? How, if at all, in law and as law, might it be possible, in 
Bankowski’s terms, through ‘paying attention to the story’ to get inside it, to ‘lift the 
veil’? The difficulty with the argument being presented here is that features such as 
non-linearity, recursiveness, sensitivity to initial conditions, emergence, and so on, 
can be understood and articulated only from a position of second-order complexity; 
that is, by moving from a position where every focus is on the system’s reductionistic 
tendency to one where we can entertain descriptions of the system as complex. For 
Christodoulidis, this is not possible: law’s ‘structural inertia’ operates to cut off this 
possibility. However, for the moment, let us simply note how, by moving from 
propositional statements to interpretative or narrative statements, we move from 
talking about properties of the system to understanding our statements in respect of 
the system as a part of a vocabulary that describes the system, and in this sense they 
cannot, as Taylor argues, be separated from our beliefs and goals.
607
 In the 
propositional mode, this is not obvious; in the narrative mode, the dependence is 
openly acknowledged. 
 
How Might a Property of the System Become Accepted as a Descriptor?   
 
In the first place, this must involve bringing the teller of the story actively into the 
focus of the story itself. Take, for example, the case of Lord Justice Ward’s rendering 
of Re A as ‘very unique’.  It is precisely because we expect linearity here that the 
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lack of proportionality between what we would normally identify as cause and effect 
secures our interest. So, we interpret the non-linearity of complex systems as 
surprising. However, the surprise itself is not part of the system but is down to our 
expectations not being met or fulfilled and depends on our perspective; similarly, it is 
our concepts that are indeterminate, not the system they describe. To alter our 
perspective on something, to try and define where an event or occurrence begins and 
where it ends, or to suggest that a certain coincidence of features mark it as systemic, 
each of these is an interpretative move: it does not identify system properties. 
Moreover, if we reveal complexity by using these methods, it is precisely because of 
our involvement that this is introduced. How, then, in law, can we gain access to 
second-order complexity, and how might a narrative approach help to do this? Here 
we will try to answer these questions by looking again at a Newtonian style of 
thinking and how it has influenced directions in legal theory. 
 
As we have already noted, the Newtonian approach involves the adoption of a 
particular attitude towards the world. First, there is an emphasis on what is 
quantifiable and measurable. Second, in line with this, it operates by constructing 
ideal models, providing a method of analysis that is both a-contextual and a-
historical so that the construct is released from the stimulation of temporal and 
situational influences. In this way, the phenomenon under investigation may be 
thought of as complete in itself, and regarded as a self-sufficient bounded entity, at 




Examples of this style abound throughout the legal theoretical literature. 
However, for our purposes here, we will confine our interest to noting the relation of 
ITL to this mode of thinking. As we have seen, MacCormick moves effortlessly from 
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talking about law as an institution to the institutions of law and their underlying 
structuring principles. If we ask how we discover these principles, the answer is that 
we discover them from the accumulation of identifiable, self-contained life-
situations. In other words, abstracted from context and from diverse contingent 
influences we can proceed to discover the relevant universal, or generally applicable, 
principles. But notice how, in effecting this transition, we move effectively from the 
experience of events in their uniqueness to a theoretical construction of them that 
swaps contingency for necessity.  
 
The methodological procedure adopted by MacCormick in his ITL is that of 
seeking out regularities within situations marked by set limits and conditions. Under 
this procedure, rules can be constructed and codified, and their validity established, 
that can then be followed by legal subjects and legal practitioners alike. 
MacCormick’s account of his ITL may be seen to conform to what Jerome Bruner 
has described as logico-scientific thought. Bruner presents a comparison of ‘two 
modes of cognitive functioning’, the logico-scientific mode and the narrative 
mode.
609
 According to Bruner, while ‘each provid[es] distinctive ways of ordering 
experience, o[r] constructing reality’, they are nonetheless ‘irreducible to one 
another’, so that ‘[e]fforts to reduce one mode to the other or to ignore one at the 
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expense of the other inevitably fail to capture the rich diversity of thought …’
610
 
Conversely, those tendencies within ITL which may be thought of as discouraging, 
or at least constraining, are those that find representation within Bruner’s narrative 
mode. 
 
For MacCormick, as we have already noted, legal institutional knowledge is 
organized around a propositional form of statements that relates a factual predicate to 
a consequent. These conditional statements are used to explain the recurrence of 
certain institutional phenomena and they also provide the basis for the framing of 
legal norms to guide subsequent behaviour. Here knowledge operates recursively 
inasmuch as it is used for both explanation and prediction of behaviour and for the 
guidance of legal practitioners; that is, events that occurred in the past form the basis 
for the factual predicate that will guide questions relating to future action. Thus, 
when the legal system is disturbed by encountering a ‘new’ situation, that new 
situation is reduced to and described by reference to those constituent parts that can 
be accounted for in the familiarity of past situations so that the behaviour in question 
may be examined by legal norms (rules). Therefore, in this sense at least, time is 
made redundant: the future is reducible to the past, in whose terms it is understood.  
 
Of course, as MacCormick is quick to point out, regulating life by subjecting 
human behaviour to the governance of rules has its advantages, for once a particular 
interpretation has been assigned in a particular case they become applicable across a 
range of contexts. Nonetheless, as we have seen, with generalizations it is difficult to 
properly account for particular circumstances or experiences. Propositional 
statements have reference to purposes and motives that cannot be articulated 
propositionally. Moreover, because the propositional form makes time redundant this 
often results in paradoxes.
611
 In these ways, the propositional structure and form on 
which ITL is made to depend may be considered to be limited.  
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Just so, it is in order to address these limitations that the complementary 
capabilities of a narrative approach are being considered here. The main point is to 
ask in what ways, if at all, a narrative approach may be thought to act in tandem with 
the sort of approach suggested by ITL so as to address the complexity deficit 
highlighted above; that is, in what ways may a narrative mode be considered to 
complement rather than to conflict with the mode of thinking engaged in ITL?  
MacCormick describes his model of legal reasoning as utilizing the following 
method: universalizability; consequences; coherence and consistency. Here, the aim 
is to demonstrate the usefulness of the narrative approach as a necessary supplement, 
or corrective, to counter the perceived shortcomings of ITL. In other words, to ask 
how we may ally to those methodological features of MacCormick’s approach, the 
following features characteristic of a narrative mode that MacCormick’s approach 
seems to preclude: contextuality and reflexivity; the articulation of purpose and 
motive; sensitivity to the temporal aspect.   
 
To say that a rule exists is necessarily to generalize: rules connect types of 
behaviour by types of actors to types of situations. Thus, to speak about human 
action as institutionalized is, MacCormick argues, necessarily to imply the existence 
of rules.
612
 But rules find application within particular local situations and in contexts 
where the configuration of events found to exist may not be seen to replicate those 
specified in the rule’s factual predicate. In this practical sense, at least, law is 
indeterminate, because one can never escape the ‘tyranny of the particular’.
613
 In this 
sense, too, the only person capable of undertaking effective action in any situational 





However, rules are not self-applying and neither are they simply applied in a 
mechanistic way through reference to other rules. Therefore, judges, in applying 
rules, can be seen to be dependent upon a historically derived knowledge concerning 
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the previous application of these and other rules. Even so, all of this collected and 
collective historically derived knowledge cannot encompass the problem of the 
particularity of each new situation. Each new situation has its own history of how it 
came to be there, and no amount of institutional understanding can account for or 
encapsulate this: a judge cannot understand a situation at a certain point in time 
without some knowledge of how it got to be there.
615
 Consequently, every judge 
must appreciate and take of account two divergent historical ‘tracks’, and the one, the 
institutional, cannot render the other, the experienced, intelligible and articulate. To 
do so, must involve the utilization of the narrative mode and its understanding of 
contextual sensitivity, which, as MacIntyre, Bruner and others remind us, requires a 
‘story’ with a ‘plot’. So the problem that we are faced with is one of how, if at all, 
this narrative mode of thinking may be utilized within the legal institutional context, 
without contradicting, negating, or denying it. 
 
Fundamental to the success of rule application is the bringing about of a pre-
arranged state of affairs, which Schauer calls ‘justification’.
616
 This is the reason why 
law is composed not just of rules but also includes rule-like exceptions to those 
rules.
617
 Thus, in the criminal law, for example it is a defence to the charge of 
unlawful homicide that the accused acted in self-defence. The accused might have 
committed the actus reus of unlawful homicide but her use of fatal force becomes 
justified and her act of killing is permitted if it is used to counter unjustified and life-
threatening aggression from her assailant. The justification for this rule and the 
consequent rendering of a notional infringement of the criminal law as lawful is the 
desire not to hold a person placed in such a situation, without other means of defence 
or escape, criminally liable. In this way we can see how the justification is related to 
the sort of society that we want to be, or to become, and the rule’s factual predicate 
(the definition of the reasonable application of the defence) causally related to its 
justification; in other words, we believe that our preferred social order is brought 
about or hastened by adherence to the rule.  Therefore, justifications lie hidden 
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behind the rules: they are the reasons why we have such rules
618
 and they exist in the 
rules only by implication, not by explicit formulation. To try to include such a 





 To this extent, we might say that a rule’s justification exists in a rule like 
Polanyi’s tacit knowledge; that is, it is ‘essentially unspecifiable’.
620
 We cannot focus 
on it and expose its meaning because to try to render it articulate in propositional 
form would introduce a never-ending dependence of explicit rule on implicit 
justification similar to that which we noted earlier. In this sense, then, it is 
completely wrong to think that a rule and its justification exist as two opposite ends 
of a continuum that can somehow be joined or connected. They relate more as east 
does to west than as north does to south: by reference to each other. One is the 
shadow side of the other, as it were. Thus, why we follow a legal norm cannot be 
expressed in legal propositional form: the rule is the instrument of the purpose, not 
the purpose itself. To engage with such assessment, with thinking about thinking 
about …, takes us beyond law as we know it, which is perhaps why Christodoulidis 
insists that is takes us into the realm of ethics. 
 
 So, we have seen how law in its institutional context operates through 
governing by a set of rules. We have also seen how this leads unavoidably to 
paradoxes that cannot be contained within law’s logical structure, and how this is 
due, in part at least, to the exclusion of the temporal aspect from that logical 
structure;
621
 moreover, the circularity associated with causal statements cannot be 
conveyed in logical propositions without generating paradoxes. How, then, if at all, 
might a narrative mode of thought be legitimately utilized to provide support for the 
temporal dimension of experience, and so prevent the reduction of causality to logic?  
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In this next part, I will engage more particularly with the narrative mode and 
consider how it might be said to offer an alternative to the propositional mode that 
both complements and supplements it,
622
 helping to overcome the difficulties created 
by law’s institutionally formed complexity deficit. 
 
There is a difference between something talked about and what is said about 
it. Thus we can rightly mark a distinction
623
 between, on the one hand, the meaning 
of what is said, the story, and, on the other hand, the particular situation in which it is 
interpreted, both by the teller and also by the hearer.  When both the story and the 
story-teller are taken into account, the whole background of the story-teller, those 
purposes and dispositions alluded to earlier, must be brought into view. What do we 
mean when we talk about the story? In the context of judicial decision making this 
might be taken to refer to the written legal judgement containing a judge’s reasons 
for the decision; or it might refer to the actual events and relationships, the facts; or it 
might even refer to the actual moment of decision in which the judge by reference to 
those facts comes to a decision which will later be reported upon in the written 
judgement. Obviously, when we take into account both the written judgement and 
the relevant events and relationships to which the judgement refers, there is a gap 
that appears that concerns issues of application, interpretation and context. 
 
According to Ricoeur, ‘narrative [is] exactly what Aristotle calls muthos, the 
organization of events’
624
 by which a story is ‘pulled forward’,
625
 by the ‘successive 
actions, thoughts, and feelings in the story inasmuch as they present a particular 
“directedness”’.
626
 Thus, the constituent parts of a narrative are organized 
sequentially according to a ‘plot’, and we understand one in terms of our 
understanding of the other: they are recursively ordered, mutually constituted, not 
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reducible to each other or to anything else.
627
 But what Ricoeur then takes up with 
his notion of ‘emplotment’ and what Bruner takes up with his idea of the narrative 
mode is not simply the identification of similarities between narratives and plots or 
plots and their structural elements; rather, it is the deeper question of how, in 
constructing plots, we create and employ narrative thinking. Ricoeur notes how ‘the 
definition of muthos as the organization of events first emphasizes concordance … 
characterized by three features: completeness, wholeness and appropriate 
magnitude’. Here, it is ‘[t]he notion of a “whole” that is the pivot …’ for this  
 
‘fix[es] on its logical character. And it is precisely at the moment when the 
definition skirts the problem of time that it distances itself most from time: 
“Now a thing is a whole if it has a beginning, a middle, and an end” (50b26). 
But it is only in virtue of poetic composition that something counts as a 
beginning, middle, or end. What defines the beginning is not the absence of 
some antecedent but the absence of necessity in the succession. As for the 
end, it is indeed what comes after something else, but … [o]nly the middle 
seems to be defined just by succession … If succession can be subordinated 
in this way to some logical connection, it is because the ideas of beginning, 
middle, and end are not taken from experience. They are not features of some 




On the one hand, thinking in the narrative mode can be seen as a way of connecting 
and imputing meaning to what would otherwise appear as separate and detached 
events. Plots give meaning through connecting, sequencing and relating, events 
within a context; that is, situating events. On the other hand, thinking in the 
propositional mode, what Bruner calls logico-scientific thought, connects not 
particular events but universal categories: types of actions to types of actors to types 
of situations. However, once the plot is assigned, those events and actions are no 
longer simply instantiations of categories, but they are real: they have real, local, 
situational effects and consequences. We might think of the narrative mode as 
breathing life into these ‘emplotted’ elements. Nuances of relationships, reciprocity 
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and purpose, all of those features denied expression by processes of abstraction, 
categorization and correlation are able to register within this more concrete, 
historical and specific portrayal. Recalling Whitehead’s phrase, ‘that wolf ate that 
lamb at that spot at that time: the wolf knew it; the lamb knew it; and the carrion 
birds knew it'.
629
 In this respect, narrative thinking bestows and communicates 
context, in terms of situation and circumstance, instead of contingency. Indeed, 
without such an understanding of context it is difficult to see how the narratives that 
take place or are contextualized in institutional settings can be properly understood. 
A narrative mode of thinking encourages or even demands an awareness of the 
concrete, local, particular and situational aspects denied by propositional thinking. 
And since narratives not only refer to contexts but also have a context – that of the 
narrator and the act of narrating that goes towards interpretation of the narration - 
then we can see how, in fact, a recursively symmetrical contextualizing is built up 
with each new act of interpretation: it is impossible to escape from context, no matter 




Likewise, every decision presupposes a decision maker. Each decision 
presented in judgement is constructed by a human judge; it is not a product of logical 
necessity but contingent. A judge is not simply some passive computational device, a 
machine designed to compute decisions already decided, but an active, perceptive 
and reflective agent who forms, and performs, the decision, and, in forming that 
decision, creates something new in the present out of the materials received from the 
past. In this way, narrative thinking may be seen to provide a semblance of reality 
considered lacking in propositional thought, since it provides a resonance with 
experience; that is, between the persons and events addressed by the decision and 
their appearance within the address in which the decision is given by the decision 
maker. There is thus coherence between the decision as delivered, the decision maker 
and the decisional moment.  
 
                                                 
629
 Whitehead (1929), p. 43. 
630
 MacIntyre makes a related point when he says that ‘the story of my life is always embedded in the 
story of those communities from which I derive my identity … [R]ebellion against my identity is 
always one possible mode of expressing it’. See MacIntyre (1985), p. 221. 
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In our previous discussion, we noted how a proper understanding of the 
significance of complexity requires us to be aware of the importance of the notion of 
thinking about thinking about complexity. For law, then, we might say that every 
judge not only engages with the practice of legal decision making but must also deal 
with the matter of her own complexity. In other words, every judge is a part of the 
decisions that she makes and subject therefore to narrative analysis. Here we might, 
as Bankowski does, allude to the distinction between coming to a decision from a 
perspective of being inside, of ‘paying attention’ to the story, and that of being 
outside of it, and also of whether of not the decision maker counts themselves in this 
sense as a part of the story that is told and whether that will be represented in the 
decision, the story that is told (which of course brings us back yet again to that sense 
of the recursively symmetrical layering of context). Narrative thinking discloses a 
legal decision delivered by a legal decision maker in a particular legal position, 
interpreted by others, some of whom are legal practitioners in the same sense, who 
are also occupied collectively in the narrative act. Sequences of events, relationships, 
persons, etc, are contextualized by legal decision makers whose positions as legal 
decision makers offer the context by means of the insight that operates within the 
context of the legal decisional making process. To the extent then that a legal 
decision maker’s thinking is part of the situation to which the decision relates, a 
decision maker who is aware of this interaction and dependence between their 
thoughts and decisions will be able to generate more descriptions of that situation. 
 
In narrative, it is not simply a question of what comes next, but why. A plot 
implies more than mere sequence. ‘The snake bit and then the queen died’ narrates a 
sequential order through time.  But ‘the snake bit and then the queen died of 
poisoned venom’ narrates a plot. While, according to the propositional mode 
characteristic of ITL, a particular event is accounted for by demonstrating that it 
instantiates a universal rule, in the narrative mode an event is accounted for by 
connecting it to purpose. This is possible because, as we have seen, although the 




We can observe how the difference between propositional and narrative 
modes in relation to purpose operates by considering Alan Norrie’s analysis of how 
motive and intention are handled in criminal law.
 631
 The starting point for Norrie’s 
critique is the Enlightenment ideal of the abstract juridical individual. This 
ideological form places the individual at the centre of moral and legal discourse, and 
is replicated in criminal law doctrine through principles of individual responsibility 
and rules respecting individual freedom. But, Norrie claims, as the product of a 
particular historical period it has distinct and severe limitations. Made possible only 
by the abstraction of the individual from her concrete reality, this ideological form 
ignores the social nature of criminality and so we find that, as a result, law must 
continually be searching for new ways to exclude this nature from its view. 
Moreover, at the same time, this individualism is political:
632
 while the individual is 
presented as a rational, intentional, voluntary actor uninhibited by random political 
interference, this freedom is guaranteed only as long as, for example, the rational, 
deductive system that controls the state can constrain the judges within their 
politically neutral and value-free role. Judges, however, appear to form a value-laden 
socio-political class of their own, operating openly contradictory standards and 
moving, almost unreflectively, from rules that assert a more rigorous requirement of 
individual responsibility to rules that appear less scrupulous and exacting; moreover, 
their judgements can often appear unconstrained or ambivalent towards the 
requirements of logic.
633
  So, Norrie concludes, it is a mistake to suppose that law 
can be understood as a politically neutral system of rules: having evolved out of the 
struggle for power between conflicting social classes, criminal law functions as a 
mechanism of social control mediated through an ideology of psychological and 
political individualism. Thus, it operates both to condemn and to protect individuals. 
Crucially, however, this contradictory, paradoxical state of affairs is maintainable 
only through the systematic operation of conflicting inclusions and exclusions of acts 
and contexts, individual and socio-political concerns. This becomes especially clear 
when we consider the relationship between motive and intention in the criminal 
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 During criminal proceedings, an appeal is often made for the motive of the 
accused to be taken into account in relation to the crime committed; however, this is 
met every time with a stubborn refusal. Motives, it is said, lead to the formation of 
intentions and, as such, are psychological, not socially formed. No surprise, here, 
perhaps, for were the law to recognize the social context within which an 
individual’s actions take place, and thus to understand motives as arising out of the 
locations of individual acts, it would then be extremely difficult to attach blame and 
to convict. 
 
A similar result may be observed if we consider the defences of duress and 
necessity,
635
 where a clam is made that the accused is not responsible for her motive, 
which results from circumstances beyond her control. What causes a person to form 
motives to commit crimes? Is it duress or necessity, threats of violence or their 
situation? Clearly, any attempt to reconcile the idea that ‘she was forced to do it’ 
with the free will notions of intention and rationality (‘she intended it and her reason 
was unimpaired’) is fraught with difficulties. And if a loaded revolver pointed at her 
head could excuse her action, why would ‘an evil system’ not do so? Law’s 
contradictory location may have ‘its provenance in the enlightenment representation 
of a world of free individuals coming together in civil society’, Norrie says, but 
‘crime is a social problem generated in ways that can be statistically correlated’. This 
‘social context is refocused through law into a matter of individual responsibility, 
justice and deterrence’ as ‘[e]ach act of crime is relocated from the social sphere, 
where crime is produced, to the individual criminal agent … It is the consequences of 
this translation, which is also a repression, a refusal to see the individual as always-
already social, that lie behind the dilemmas of legal justice and criminal law. What is 
suppressed always returns … [s]urfac[ing] and resurface[ing] across the terrain of 
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Motives, as the interpretation
637
 of reasons for acting, permeate the narrative 
mode of thought being structured by and finding expression in the discourses in 
which they are set. However, they resist expression in the propositional mode since 
they cannot be fixed in propositional form but depend instead on viewpoint and 
perspective, where any number of different interpretations may be considered equally 
valid. Law, as a discourse in the propositional mode, provides the vocabulary for all 
human agents to justify their actions and decisions in ways that the institutional 
discourse dictates or allows. Just so, as the discourse changes so will the 
justifications; by the same token, as our use of language evolves and develops, so 
must the terms in which we express our motives.
638
 Nonetheless, while law can 
accommodate the first type of change, it is unable to accommodate the second type: 
it can accommodate change from one relatively fixed and stable position to another 
relatively fixed and stable position but not change rooted in interpretation, whose 
meaning is dependent upon context. Attempting to understand motive in relation to 
legal discourse would be an impossible complication of our understanding of law in 
the propositional mode: it quite simply could not be undertaken because this 
standpoint is not equipped to handle such levels of complexity. And yet, as we have 
already noted, a narrative mode of thinking is not only equipped for but best suited to 
handling these levels of second-order complexity. Indeed, to talk of law as narrative 
is precisely what it means to understand and to talk in terms of motive. Narrative 
thinking not only provides the vocabulary for conveying this but it also structures the 
discourse in precisely the ways that would accommodate it. Thus, narrative thinking 
can convey motive, and structure it, even though propositional thinking can not. 
While propositional thinking aims at reducing complexity but in doing so forever 
increases its own complexity, creating an unbearable paradoxical burden, narrative 
thinking allows us to think recursively, providing for us a way of entertaining and 
encouraging complexity.  
 
In light of this, we can understand Whitehead’s point, referred to earlier, that 
it is much more important that something be interesting than that it is true, for the 
narrative style is much more concerned with the power of a story to evoke a response 
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by the way it is put together than with analytic questions and debates over the 
veracity of claims. And here, in a sense, we pick up again Ricoeur’s notion of 
‘emplotment’, for inasmuch as a narrative style emphasizes the sequential ordering 
of component parts then in that sense it may be said to be much more concerned with 
time than with truth per se. It is at this level, in the idea of emplotment, that we 
discover the means by which judges are able to perform the link between what they 
find in the rules on the one hand and the events, persons and relationships they must 
address on the other. 
 
Ricoeur claims that time is essential to narrative. He refers to Augustine: 
 
‘Suppose that I am going to recite a psalm that I know. Before I begin my 
faculty of expectation is engaged by the whole of it. But once I have begun, 
as much of the psalm as I have removed from the province of expectation and 
relegated to the past now engages my memory, and the scope of the action 
which I am performing is divided between the two faculties of memory and 
expectation, the one looking back to the part which I have already recited, the 
other looking forward to the part which I have still to recite. But my faculty 
of attention is present all the while, and through it passes what was the future 
in the process of becoming the past. As the process continues, the province of 
memory is extended in proportion as that of expectation is reduced, until the 
whole of my expectation is absorbed. This happens when I have finished my 




In other words, the past that is memory and the future that is expectation interact to 
produce the present, and this coming together of the past and the future in the present 
means that memory and expectation can potentially reach across time to bring to 
consciousness in the present those things that belong to both memory and 
expectation.
 640
 Thus, our experience of time is created out of a galvanizing of 
memory, expectation and attention. 
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In this sense, since the present is what exists between the horizons of past and 
future, and can be evoked by us in its various modes, then our experience of time is 
something that is created by us, and which, in narrative thinking, we can create and 
utilize by attending to the present as that which we hand on from expectation to 
memory and so consign to the past. In that sense, creating and employing an 
experience of the passing of time, narrative thinking allows us to do what Bankowski 
asserts we must do and to ‘pay attention to the story’; that is, in the terms of our 
earlier discussion, narrative thinking permits us to increase complexity by expanding 




 We can see how all of this is relevant to our discussion of law as institutional. 
As we saw from Levi, making connections across time, situations and decisions, 
enables decisions, definitions and meanings from the past to be brought forward into 
the present, their importance re-presented in such new ways as allow for even wider 
implications and meanings. Thus meanings are stretched and widened across ever 
longer stretches of time and connections established in this way impart greater scope 
and flexibility to decisions. But the point is that this evolution of the collective mind, 
the collected and woven pattern of judicial decision making, is really possible only 
on the back of a narrative mode of thought. As we have already noted, the 
propositional mode is unable to accommodate such levels of complexity.  
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‘[I]f there is real novelty of qualities each moment, then it is the different self which includes 
the self that was there all along, not vice versa. The contrast between my present reality and 
my past reality includes this past reality, for “contrast of B to A’” includes A. But it is my 
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reverse argument, that the contrast between the old reality and the new includes the new. The 
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asymmetrical in its relatedness. Thus the self as numerically the same is an abstraction, the 
latest self as new is the total concrete reality containing the former’, Charles Hartshorne 
(1970), Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, La Salle, IL.: Open Court Publishing 




But how is this judicial savvy managed? How do judges enrich and make 
more complex the collective mind of the law? Not by any way associated with the 
propositional mode, clearly, but by the harnessing and developing their individual 
skills associated with thinking in the narrative mode. In this way institutional 
knowledge can become ever more complex, transposing and interweaving of past, 
present and future, make multiple connections across multiple time frames. In this 
way legal knowledge can be brought to bear on particular situations in a legitimately 
legal way. But the point is that it is not propositional thinking that provides the 
connection; rather, it is thinking in the narrative mode. Such connections are only 
possible on the basis of features that the propositional, generalizing mode of thinking 
denies absolutely. There is something qualitatively different, and dynamic, about this 
moment, right now, immediately after I have pressed the space-bar on my computer 
that cannot be accounted for in any other moment(s), just as there is in the moment 
that followed immediately the snake’s biting of Queen Cleopatra. Narrative thinking, 
narrative time, allows us to experience such complexity in a way that propositional 
thinking never can. In fact, it is in the narratives that we construct about the 
situations that we confront in and with law, and in the narratives that we construct 





So, also, in another sense, it really does matter when, where and how we 
ascribe initial conditions when we look at situations in an institutional context. 
When, where and how we do this can have radically different effects in terms of how 
we then see and characterize the system’s development, and this introduces an 
element of surprise. The more that this happens, the more complex a system is and 
the more situations, events, actions and interactions that we have to accommodate the 
more intricate are the patterns of behaviour that develop. With this increase in 
complexity comes a theorizing that we can understand as thinking in the narrative 
mode, as thinking about our thinking about complexity.  
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 When does a line of people become a queue? asks MacCormick. He suggests 
that what we perceive, at the simplest level, is in fact only a grouping of persons, and 
that when we think of that grouping of persons as a queue we are in fact following a 
somewhat complex chain of inference from which we draw a conclusion. The way 
that this happens is that we recall the experiences and the training of past situations 
and we compare this to the present where, in order to satisfy a formed intention to 
travel, we conclude that this present grouping of persons is in fact a queue, and we 
move forward to join the queue in order to satisfy our intention to travel: 
 
‘To the extent that people “take their turn”, there is an orderly movement 
through … From nearly everybody’s point of view a kind of fairness and 
efficiency prevails … Clearly, there can be a successful practice … without 
perfect conformity to the practice. But there must be some minimum 




‘Turn-taking or queuing is then normative’, concludes MacCormick, so that ‘where 
there is a queue for something you want, you ought to take your turn in it’, which of 
course requires a decision that it is in one’s best interest to queue. Of course, ‘[t]his 
does not mean that there is a single quite specific or explicit norm that everybody 
cites when queuing’, and ‘[q]uite likely, my articulation of the queuing norm will 
differ from what you might offer in an attempt to make explicit what is implicit in a 
common way of acting’. Nonetheless, ‘queuing is an intrinsically personal activity 
aimed at a common point … at attaining a service or opportunity that others seek at 
the same time, and at facilitating its attainment in mutual civility rather than through 
open conflict’.
644
 Yet, when does a queue begin? How do people get to this position? 
What happens prior to this? How does what has gone before relate to identifying the 
‘start’ of the queue, and how will identifying a particular point as the start impact in 
determining the significance of what follows? How do we perform the separation of 
this newly-formed ‘queue’ from all that happens before, and what determines this? In 
one sense, if we really think about it, a queue has no identifiable ‘beginning’ as such. 
Queuing is an abstraction from process. Granted, we habitually and necessarily 
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abstract in precisely this way in order to negotiate our passage through the 
multifarious day to day tasks of modern living. But we make a mistake if, after 
abstracting, we begin to treat our abstraction as if it were ultimately real instead of 
continually referring it back to the real and changing concrete situations from which 
it is abstracted. Why does this matter? Well, in the first place, as we have already 
implied, there is history trailing behind ‘the queue’, a history that is now in danger of 
being obscured, forgotten or overlooked. MacCormick acknowledges this, ‘From 
nearly everybody’s point of view a kind of fairness and efficiency prevails …’, but 
then appears to forget those other points of view not included there. What of those 
others? How are their voices to register? To identify the character of the activity that 
constitutes the queuing process is one thing, to go on and treat the abstraction that we 
then term a ‘queue’ as if it were a precisely bounded independent entity without 
continually referring it back to the continuous process from which it is abstracted 
would seem mistaken. So we need to find ways to think about and question the 
abstractions that we make from reality, and to refine them, in order to gain a better 
understand of what is happening, how and why. 
 
In this respect, imagine for a moment, that I am a photographer, or an artist or 
a writer. I may or may not have a formed intention to travel? But, instead of going 
over to the queue, I stop, take out my camera, sketch-pad or notebook and proceed to 
try and capture an image of the situation before me. What is happening here? As a 
photographer, an artist or a writer I am using my acquired ability and trained eye to 
contemplate the relative positions of persons standing in front of me. It takes effort of 
the imagination and not a little developed skill to resist the lure of that complex chain 
of inference that would lead me to the conclusion that what I see before me is a 
queue. This, perhaps, is what Bakowski is arguing towards when he cites Gillian 
Rose’s notion of ‘suspending the ethical’ and says that ‘[t]he action taken when I 
suspend the ethical is not one of self-assertion but of self-renunciation … There is no 
final judgement; I can always be wrong’.
645
 In other words, ‘[w]e have to work from 
where we are … engage and take responsibility’.
646
 In this sense, ‘our decisions 
whether to apply the law or not [will] always … be arbitrary … [W]e will never 
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know for sure whether we are right …’ However, ‘[w]e must realise that our life is 
never clear-cut and clean and is always something of a mess. But we must get hold of 
it as it is … and we must use that anxiety creatively’.
647
 In this sense, contra 
Christodoulidis’s caution in terms of the absolute force of law’s exclusionary rules, 
we can affirm affirm a way of understanding Bankowski’s suggestion that 
‘[r]easoning can be thought of as operating in a sphere which is barred by a thick 
almost opaque curtain … You lift the curtain to look but the curtain is extremely 





In this way, despite law’s inherent tendency towards exclusivity in terms of 
its propositional mode of its thinking, reinforced through a strict understanding of the 
exclusionary force of second order reasons, thinking in the narrative mode can 
encourage and develop that very approach to law that the propositional mode denies. 
In complementing and supplementing law’s preferred mode of thinking in this way 
narrative thinking can extend law’s reach into and find a foothold within the 
concrete, local particularities which it seeks to address.  Moreover, not only is 
thinking in the narrative mode possible alongside of thinking in the propositional 
mode, but law as an institution (its sociological sense) supporting institutions of law 
(its philosophical sense) actually presupposes this. While law’s propositional mode 
achieves reduction of complexity, this results in an increase in internal complexity 
that law’s preferred mode is not equipped to handle. So it is narrative thinking, about 
law and in law, which provides a bridging of the gap here.  
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INTEGRATING LAW AND PROCESS 
 
 
‘What really exists is not things made but things in the making. 
Once made, they are dead, and an infinite number of alternative 
conceptual decompositions can be used in defining them. But put 
yourself in the making by a stroke of intuitive sympathy with the 
thing and, the whole range of possible decompositions coming into 
your possession, you are no longer troubled with the question which 
of them is the more absolutely true. Reality falls in passing into 
conceptual analysis; it mounts in living its own undivided life – it 
buds and burgeons, changes and creates’.
649
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LAW’S INSTITUTIONAL BECOMING: NOVELTY,  
CREATIVITY AND CHANGE 
 
‘[U]sually we look at change but we do not see it. We speak of 
change, but we do not think about it. We say that change exists, 
that everything changes, that change is the very law of things: yes, 
we say it, and we repeat it; but those are only words, and we 
reason and philosophize as though change did not exist. In order 
to think change and to see it, there is a whole veil of prejudices to 
brush aside, some of them artificial, created by philosophical 




Clearly, in terms of the philosophical approach that we have been pursuing here, 
traditional thinking about law, even more contemporary theories of law such as 
MacCormick’s ‘institutional theory of law’, approach the idea of law and legal 
institutional change from the point of view of stability rather than continuing change. 
It seems important, then, to ask why and how it might benefit such views if 
institutional change, both as an object of investigation and as an everyday legal 
reality were approached from the point of view of continuous change rather than 
stability; in other words, if the ontological priorities were reversed and change was 
seen as the normal state and not just a special case or deviation from the stable and 
routine? 
 
The argument being pursued here is three-fold. First, it would provide legal 
theorists and other legal researchers with a more comprehensive view of the micro-
processes of change that may be operating. That is to say, what makes institutions 
change? How are new templates and models discovered and legitimated? How does 
this happen? Who does it? What this suggests is an enquiry into whether there is any 
alternative to the linear model of change characteristic of traditional legal theory. 
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How might we account for the possibility of non-linear processes, of surprise? What 
connotations and consequences might this suggest for our ideas of law?  
 
 Second, although change in law is often understood as the change from one 
stable condition or state to another, expressed in terms of often quite detailed 
descriptions of what these states and the differences between them are, there is little 
in the legal literature on how and why what happens, comes about. Even if we can 
say that a decision must be justified by the giving of justifying reasons for that 
decision (a movement from state A to state B), such reasons, as we have seen, do 
more to explain the decision rather than justify the decision making. This 
‘justification’ explains and describes the effect of the decision on the legal system 
and on the parties involved; however, it does not admit us into the experience of how 
and the why and by what means the decision was actually achieved: for example, 
how those legal rules were translated into, became, that decision, and how, in the 
process of being translated thus, they underwent change, modifiying and being 
modified, adapting and being adapted. Justification for legal decision making is 
always viewed retrospectively, more as a fait accompli, when understood in terms of 
the giving of justifying reasons for a decision that has already been made. In this 
sense, something important is lost: its vibrancy, its revelatory, evolving qualities are 
not only lost from view, obscured or denied, but perhaps also contradicted and even 
negated.
651
 When we view change in law as something exceptional to the stable state, 
we lose sight of the fact that change is happening all the time. On the micro level 
change is all pervasive; what we find is continuous change. In this sense, far from 
being repeatable and repeated patterns remaining essentially unchanged from 
instance to instance, institutions of law are actually perpetually moving waves or 
currents of ideas that act and interact and change in acting. Therefore, in so far as 
habitual patterns of behaviour are human actions then they too contain potential for 
change, since change is there all the time, unrecognized and unseen.  
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Perhaps the main stumbling blocks to any attempt at a re-conceptualization of 
law and legal change are the ontological and epistemological assumptions under-
girding our thinking about law. Nonetheless, there are inklings of a push towards a 
new way of thinking, or at least a restless dissatisfaction with the old way. Levi, for 
example, stresses how a legal concept changes as decision makers respond to 
previous decisions in the context of new decision making situations. He notes how 
ideas develop, appear and reappear in different guises, and how the classification 
changes as the classification is made. In this sense, every decision in law is a change 
in law. Others
652
 note how in law the decisions that are made cannot be separated 
from the decision makers who are making them. Generally, legal institutional change 
remains part of an ongoing process of legal decision making, grounded in the 
decisions taken by legal actors, and arising out of their encounters with contingent 
everyday situations. Indeed, as long as human judges act in decision making, the 
potential for continual change and institutional creativity always remains. Moreover, 
the development of an emphasis on the authority of the decision maker rather than 
that of the decision itself is a further part of this same trend. 
 
Here, our purpose is to show that and how it might be possible to build upon 
and develop these trends by proposing and explicating the philosophical basis that 
would sustain them. Our starting point is the recognition that to understand legal 
institutional change we need first of all to cease ascribing ontological precedence to 
the outcomes of institutionalization, a view that understands change as something 
exceptional, a temporary aberration, deviation or unbalancing, that is produced by 
certain persons under certain conditions. Rather, change must be seen as the 
standard, base-line condition, permeating reality through and through, the 
inseparable, undividable, continuous character of reality and thus also of legal 
institutions. But this effort to push further at the boundaries of our present 
understanding cannot and will not follow without a reversal in the ontological 
precedence of institutional stability over change. Institutionalization must be seen as 
a function of change; change as ontologically prior to institutionalization, the 
condition of its possibility.  
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 What, then, must institutions of law and law as an institution be like if change 
is constitutive of reality? Here, I will show that change is the result of the reflexive, 
recursive, inter-weaving of an institutional actor’s intricate web of thoughts, values 
and routine behaviours as a consequence of new experiences obtained through 
interaction in concrete situations. Inasmuch as this is a continuing process, that is, in 
so far as it is an institutional actor’s attempt to understand, comprehend and act 
coherently, change is intrinsic to human acting. Law is an attempt to try to make 
sense of this continuous tide of human activity, its to-ing and fro-ing, and to channel 
it, and shape it, through generalizing and institutionalizing meanings and rules. Yet, 
at the same time, law and legal institutions are patterns arising out of change. So, law 
is an accomplishment, an achievement, in two ways: first, it is a set of norms utilised 
in order to attempt to stabilize expectations over time of an always altering reality; 
second, it is a product, a pattern arising out of the reflexive application of these same 
norms in concrete situations, over time. Law aims at controlling change; it is also the 
product of change. 
 
Thinking about Change 
 
In law, thinking about change usually centres around the idea of change as a resultant 
state, whose significant features, causes and consequences require explanation and 
elucidation. This is the view underlying MacCormick’s account of institutional 
concepts: change is approached from the standpoint of external observation. His 
institutional model therefore takes on a ‘3-stages’ form with transition taking place 
between these stages over a period of time. In this way, ‘frozen’ pictures of key 
aspects along a temporal sequence are accompanied by explanations of the route 
traced. Nonetheless, however crucial such knowledge is to enabling our 
understanding, it has certain limitations; not least, because it is an overview, a series 
of frozen pictures. In this sense, it can never capture the inherent unpredictability and 
variability that we have been highlighting, the extent to which the continuity of 
connected micro-processes underlying the routes traced are characterized by 
indefiniteness and essential un-dividedness. But why is it that stage models, such as 
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that of MacCormick’s institutive, consequential and terminative rules, cannot 
encapsulate the significant characteristics of change?  
 
 The beginning of an answer is to be found in the age-old paradoxes of Zeno. 
Take, for example, the story of Achilles and the tortoise. The problem, as Zeno 
presents it, is that Achilles cannot ever catch up with and overtake the tortoise 
because every time that he reaches the tortoise’s starting point the tortoise has 
already moved forward from it. But the real problem with this is not that Achilles 
cannot ever catch up with the tortoise; rather it is that Zeno’s paradoxes arise on the 
back of a misplaced assumption that space and time are infinitely divisible. 
MacCormick has the same problem in respect of the story about the poisonous 
snake’s venom and Cleopatra’s tragic demise. Why do we assume that space and 
time are infinitely divisible? The answer is found in our impulse to intellectualize 
everything. We try to make sense of what we experience by imposing on our 
perception a conceptual framework, a template through which to understand. We 
conceptualize perception in order to make sense of experience but, in so doing, 
freeze what is an otherwise essentially continuous, moving, ever-mutating 
phenomenon. It is, of course, our use of concepts that necessarily demands we 
impose such an arbitrary ‘halting’ on the continuous flow. Nonetheless, the result is 
that we impose on the essentially fluid our notion of a series of static positions; we 
understand movement in terms of immobility. 
 
 Bergson, on the other hand, claims that to understand movement in terms of a 
series of successive points in space and time fails to capture what is distinctive about 
movement. Here, movement from A to B is understood in terms of the positions that 
something occupies in getting from A to B, in spite of the fact that none of these 





‘the stages into which you analyze a change are states, the change itself goes 
on between them. It lies along their intervals, inhabits what your definition 




This is exactly the problem that we encounter in MacCormick’s theory with his 
attempt to understand legal change by breaking it down into a series of stages 
understood in terms of the transition from institutive to consequential to terminative 
rules. There, too, we perform a reduction of change by converting it into to a linear 
sequence of relatively static positions. But the point being argued here is that, in so 
doing, we actually lose its essential character and important quality. Instead of 
capturing what is significant about change, change itself eludes us and remains 
unexplained and unrecorded. The paradox is this: the conceptual apparatus by which 
we try to make sense of change fails to get to grips with change. We are unable to 
understand change qua change; that is, change in changeful terms. This is because 
we attempt to understand it using the language and terms of what it is not; in other 
words, we attempt to understand change through the use of a conceptual apparatus 
that denies change. In this sense, to understand change in terms of law is not a 
question of categories of universal and particular and how to communicate between 
them, but what both fail to grasp; that is, change, continuous process. To assert that 
what we need to do, since the universal cannot ever capture the particular, is to focus 
on the particular, itself misses the point, because that is still the same attempt to 
understand movement, change and process, in terms of immobility, stability and 
state. Put differently, we might try to represent change by a series of boxes, marked 
A, B, C, and so on, and explain that change is the process by which we move from A 
to B to C and so on. But the problem is that change understood in this way sees the 
boxes, not what happens between them (change); or, at best, it sees the boxes first, 
which amounts to the same thing.  
 
If our customary methods of employing our conceptual apparatus in order to 
understand change continually issues in paradoxes that only serve to deny change, is 
there another way? Can we understand change in a way that does not contradict, 
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negate or deny change? Bergson
654
 suggests that we must re-enter the flow, 
approaching reality with our senses and connecting through our intuition. For him, 
we must get to know reality from within. In this sense, only an unmediated 
perception of reality can glimpse its essential features –constant change, undivided 
continuity, the continual reiterative action and interaction of sameness with 
difference over time. But how do we get to know something ‘from within’? For 
Bergson, this happens when we experience it directly. Through placing ourselves at 
the centre of something we can experience something directly and know it from 
within. We identify with something through intuitive sympathetic understanding; for 
example, drawing on the resources of our own experience to understand the 
complexity of someone else. Bergson cites the example of a man with photographs 
of Paris, arguing that he could ‘feel’ it from the photographs because he already 
knew it from being in it, but without that intuitive sympathetic understanding he 
could not. Similarly, when we listen to music, we do not hear simply a succession of 
static, individual notes but the continuing movement of the melody. We move with 
its flow, listening to it from within. Intuition, direct unmediated experience, insight, 
paying attention from within, sensual perception rather than intellectual conception, 
really are all pointing to the same thing: holding both continuity and difference, the 
homogeneous and the heterogeneous, together. But we are still left with the question: 
how? 
 
Conceptualising Change: The Problem with Universals and Particulars 
 
On the one hand, generalizations, or abstract universals, deny differences and seek to 
hide them; on the other hand, perception recognizes difference and is responsive both 
to difference and to modification. Just so, when everything is the same, even very 
familiar, its essential character goes unnoticed. Thus, the visitor to a beautifully 
scenic place will often gasp in awe at the beauty to be experienced all around, while 
the local inhabitant hardly notices it or takes it for granted. For the one, difference 
heightens awareness; for the other, sameness dulls perception through the senses.  In 
recent years, we have witnessed increasingly how the ability to produce a work, or 
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technique, of art that shocks at the very least ensures that its author gets noticed. For 
Bergson
655
 we might say that this is the sign of a good painter, one who has the 
ability to bring to the forefront of our attention something that had hitherto gone 
unnoticed. But how does this happen?  
 
One way in which this might happen is through encouraging a sense of 
detachment; that is, by resisting the obligation to ‘look straight ahead in the direction 
we have to go’
656
 and to engage instead what Chia calls our ‘peripheral vision’,
657
 to 
notice fully what is on the fringes of our everyday life and experience in order to 
really see and understand. But we are too used to looking at things instrumentally, as 
means rather than as ends in themselves, as examples or instances of general 
categories, instantiated universals. By contrast, the artistic spirit naturally engages 
with reality in a different way: 
 
‘when they look at a thing they see it for itself, and not for themselves … It is 
because the artist is less intent on utilizing his perception that he perceives a 




So we can gain greater awareness and appreciation of the dynamic complexity of 
reality by glancing at things rather than gazing, seeing them in and for their ever 
changing selves rather than in terms of their utility. But of course our minds and 
senses are not equipped like electron microscopes, to scan almost everything at once. 
There is a limit to our awareness and our abilities to perceive and to recognize 
difference and continuous change. We can only perceive to a certain degree of 
nearness and distance. How and at what point we perceive and come to recognise the 
effects of global warming on the polar ice cap, the rising of sea levels and the 
changes of climate that take place over tens and hundreds of years is certainly not 
comparable to manner or the degree of perception involved in our experience of the 
difference between a heavy rainfall or a single day of scorching sun. For the former 
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we cannot but utilize our conceptual apparatus. Therefore, our conceptual apparatus 
and our direct perception of reality must work together, one supplementing the other. 
 
 Looked at from the point of institutions, reality appear deceptively stable. 
Indeed, from a certain point of analysis stability appears to be correct: I am the same 
legal person I was yesterday, last month, last year. But I do not have the exactly the 
same body throughout my life, it changes entirely, and from that point of view I am a 
totally different person.  The apparent stability of institutions of law at a certain level 
of analysis, that of repeated patterns, is a function of the underlying and continuously 
changing character of all things. In this sense, stability, the static, divided nature of 
reality, presupposes change, process, un-dividedness. Thus also, in the same way, in 
relation to the distinction and relation between ‘universals’ and ‘particulars’, we can 
see clearly how it is that what we call the universal is an abstraction from the 
particular, and we can also see that what we call the particular is itself also an 
abstraction, from process, or continuous change; therefore, far from denying change, 
presupposes it. In this way, as Scott Veitch rightly suggests: 
 
‘[i]t may well be that while there are undoubtedly universal forms, universal 
and particular in practical reasoning (including legal reasoning) are no more 
than relative forms of abstraction or of generalization – more or less useful 





At one level of analysis, that of explanation and ex post facto justification, it 
is pattern, repetition, substance, stability, and so on, that are assumed; at another 
level, that of the actual moment of decision, where the human judge as agent ‘intuits’ 
the answer to the legal problem, performs or decides (which is really the 
unrepeatable, fleeting moment that justifies the decision), it is continuous change, 
process, that we observe. The patterns that we so readily identify and continually 
refer to are really no more than momentary haltings of that process, which keeps on 
changing ceaselessly; in other words, reduction achievements that depend, for their 
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intellectual acceptance, on a certain view of the dialectical relationship between facts 
and rules, particulars and universals, a view that only exists and is given credence 
through the action of the human agent that links the two. 
 
 So we can see how, for the purposes of analysis and explanation, focussing 
both on universals and also on particulars is necessary. In this way we are able to 
keep in our vision both the big picture of things, the extended horizon of reality 
where time is arrested and concepts are constructed, related, transferred and used, 
where things and patterns appear as stable and repeatable, and also the nearer picture 
where momentary but significant decisions are made and time unfolds in a never-to-
be-repeated way. But focussing on both particulars and universals and their 
relatedness in this way is really to focus not on different accounts of things, as if to 
differentiate between how they are in themselves and how they appear when viewed 
through the lens of abstraction, but it is really to focus on different accounts of 
change. ‘Rules’ and ‘facts’, ‘universals’ and ‘particulars’, appear and come together 
in the moment of decision, the decision performed by the human judge as agent, in a 
synthesis that is directly connected to that human judge’s lived experiences. The 
change in law and by law that is later represented by this made decision, accounted 
for by way of ex post facto explanation or legal ‘justification’, is actually 
experienced by the judge as a continuous process, an unfolding in time of 
possibilities, events and interactions. It is not a process that can be adequately 
represented in terms of a shift from one stable position to another stable position; 
rather, change is fundamental. Therefore, it is not sufficient if we are to take 
continuous change and process seriously in this way, that we then produce an 
account of legal change that is represented in terms of decisions that shift the state of 
affairs from state A to state B (that is, from afar, as abstract concepts). Instead, we 
need to find a way of understanding and re-presenting change as it is when 
experienced from within; that is, of re-presenting change in changeful terms, taking 
seriously the full import of Levi’s injunction that the classification changes as the 
classification is made. So we need now to try and address the difficult problem of 
how to do this: how can those ideas that we have been contemplating be expressed in 
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law? How would we begin to describe a processual model of legal institutional 
change and decision making? 
 
All of the legal and social philosophers whose writings we have been 
considering here accept the idea that law as a social system is to be regarded in terms 
of its capacity for reducing differences between human agents. In MacCormick’s 
terms it is the procedure of generating repetitive behaviour through institutional 
categories and structuring thought: for something to be an instance of institution A 
implies A-typical behaviour. As we have noted, following Searle and Berger and 
Luckmann, MacCormick relates types of behaviour to types of situations and types 
of actors. In this way, a legal institution, say, contract, provides legal persons with a 
thought framework with corresponding and appropriate choices of action. 
 
Clearly, on the one hand, decision making implies generalization and the 
subsumption of particulars under generic categories which, although not objectively 
available to institutional actors at every different point in time, are defined socially 
by context. On the other hand, as we have seen, those same categories and their 
contents and their meanings are always changing. In this way, therefore, we can see 
how the legal institution is both a recognizable and relatively stable framework or 
structure and also an unfolding, evolving or continuously changing pattern in and to 
which new descriptions are constantly being added. As categories are utilized by 
institutional actors and drawn upon by human judges as agents so the generalizations 
change in ways that are not always predictable. 
 
This occurs because although the definitions relevant to those categories are 
to some extent set by the institution they are not set conclusively: law lacks full 
control over these definitions. In order for legal institutional action, in terms of 
established and recognizable recurrent behaviour patterns, to be possible there must 
be some stability or control exercised over definitional categories, some form of 
closure of these categories, however impermanent. We can appreciate this when we 
realise that legal institutions do not exist in a vacuum but are set within a wider 
social context where change occurs more obviously; in this way, social change 
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affects legal institutions through constant interaction. Changes occur in society that 
challenge and stretch legal definitional categories to their limits, and beyond. 
Categories which are clearly helpful in many, even most, contexts and situations 
appear to be of more limited use in others. In these latter situations potential 
challenges occur that could not be foreseen and so ideas about rules and definitions 
and their relevant applications must be revised. To make the point in another way, 
legal institutional action necessarily presupposes both bounded, rule-attracting 
behaviour and activity and also the non rule-like behaviours of those involved in 
ongoing and evolving non-bounded contextual activities.  
 
 Just so, we know what we mean when we refer to theft as a category of acts 
that correctly attract criminal sanction: what we mean by this is derived from a 
shared cultural background of understandings and experiences. But what about 
certain types of white collar theft, different types of tax fraud or theft of intellectual 
property, patents, and so on? We can see that as we begin to move further and further 
away from the stable core of shared meanings represented by the models belonging 
to or utilized by our common cultural background variations appear to challenge the 
core of settled meanings and the categories in which these are represented, and these 
must then be addressed individually to determine their inclusion or exclusion. 
However, the point is that we are still able to do and do this through extension of our 
stable categories, to make reasoned and reasonable decisions regarding these because 
we can see how it is that we are able to differentiate, mark a distinction and extend 
the scope of application of our generic categories to include or exclude and thus to 
alter or modify these. Hart’s famous example of the question of what exactly is 
included and what excluded in an order banning wheeled vehicles in the park 
illustrates this clearly; as, indeed, for vastly different reasons, does the question of 
whether artificial insemination by a donor constitutes adultery and provides grounds 
for divorce in the case of MacLennan v MacLennan.
660
 Here the judge is not simply 
clarifying the content of relevant categories and sorting out the allocation of 
particulars to universals but making a value judgement that changes, re-defines, re-
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creates and re-determines the law at that point. As Taylor
661
 maintains, applying a 
concept is always a performative and normative act in the sense that it involves a 
functional determination of how the rules apply in practical situations, an extension 
of the rules through use of the imagination: every application of a rule in a marginal 
case noticeably transforms the rule. Thus, institutional concepts themselves throw up 
marginal cases: by their very nature as incompletely circumscribed entities their 
edges are blurred.  
 
But we can also see how the control of institutional categories and definitions 
by law is limited in another way. While it is true that our interaction with the world 
we live in often throws up situations and events that could not have been foreseen, 
our ability to interact with our own thoughts about the world and to interact with our 
interactions can also lead to new distinctions, the awareness of ever newer 
possibilities and potentials, albeit as they are imagined or described through simile 
and metaphor. Thus, we are back once again with the recursive application of 
descriptions and descriptions of descriptions, with our reflexive capacity to usher up 
new descriptions that are themselves the result of our reflection on our own 
behaviour and thought, and our thoughts about these, as if these were real, 
independent entities observed objectively by us from a distance. In such ‘worlds 
within worlds’ almost everything could always be otherwise. Does law accommodate 
and encourage, can law ever permit, such institutional reflexivity? Are the conditions 
necessary for such reflexivity to occur to be found in law? In Bankowski’s terms, à la 
Schauer, and bearing in mind Christodoulidis’s arguments about the force of 
exclusionary reasons, can the curtain be lifted? And, if so, how? 
 
 The first thing to notice is that, whatever positivistic claims may be made 
from time to time to suggest otherwise, even legal institutional categories are only 
closed temporarily. Human interactions, with events, objects and people, as with 
oneself, are not individually distinct but intermingle and are woven together with 
other interactions, current and previous, forever altering. Moreover, we do not ever 
cease to weave this web of beliefs and habits and actions such that any part of it 
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could be said to be identifiably and individually distinct; rather, we continually 
struggle to maintain some coherent sense of it all both in spite of and because of its 
forever changing, reconfiguring nature. Thus, our ability to forever generate new 
forms and patterns of meaning, new descriptions and configurations and 
reconstructions is unceasing. We repeatedly generate new patterns. Even our 
memory of past events is not simply a repetition, but a repetition that is constructed 
in terms of and constrained by our present sense of what is important or significant. 
Each adjustment may be miniscule, but every repetition is an adjustment that 
represents a change. This becomes obvious when we consider how the same thing 
said at one point in time and then again at a different point in time are two different 
things. Thus, in every case some change, however small, occurs and the categories 
are altered and reconfigured. Every decision according to law is a change in law and 
every case changes the rule; every fact, every inclusion and every exclusion, every 
time. Repeated applications of a rule do not simply affirm its stable, unchanging 
correctness of application, but effect a modification, or refinement, even if only by 
the simple fact of each further application operating to accommodate what is 
significant in each new case, which must also, in turn, do something new to alter the 
sense of established expectations. Therefore law must always have an 
improvisational character, consisting more in terms of a working hypothesis, 
accepted and utilized by legal institutional actors struggling to make sense of and to 
act in a coherent way in the world. 
 
 So we need first to be able to see through the smokescreen that is presented 
by the way we use the terms ‘particulars’ and ‘universals’, ‘rule-determination’ and 
‘rule-application’, ‘legislation’ and ‘adjudication’, to give an appearance of 
institutional stability, if we are to begin to uncover any sense of this underlying 
reality of continuing change. Law and legal institutions are not in states of being but 
in a perpetual process of becoming: legal institutional categories are always on the 
threshold of change, modifying and altering to allow new experiences and new facts 
to be accommodated. We may indeed talk of particulars and universals as if these 
were ‘real things’ and abstractions from ‘real things’ but, as Whitehead rightly notes, 
ultimately there is no such object that undergoes change, no unchanging subject of 
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change. Instead, there is only change and the choices, actions and decisions of 
change: reality as such does not change but, in Bergson’s terms, change constitutes 
reality. 
 
 What, then, might an idea of legal change mean? How does it make sense to 
talk in these terms? Is change in law something exacted on law from without, or is it 
more properly something internal to law? If we accept what has been said so far we 
can see that far from being characterized in terms of the former, as some conscious 
creative effort or external application of force, change, as underlying reality, is very 
much an inherent feature of law as, indeed, it is of all reality. Even the most passive 
accommodation of new experiences already is and is potential for further change. But 
the degree to which such change will be institutionally effective is, of course, 
dependent on the extent to which institutional actors, in particular the agents of 
institutional decision making, take up its opportunities for interaction. 
 
So we can see how a process perspective on legal institutional decision 
making, in light of all of this, will place strong emphasis on the situational aspects of 
judicial action and on social relations as the source of structure and order. That is to 
say, legal institutions are contexts of decision making structured locally through 
social interaction, possessing durable institutional force. Within such settings and 
contexts, human legal institutional actors are always confronted with distinct 
circumstances and choices. These circumstances condition the situations in as much 
as they are included or excluded as relevant or not by the human agent. It is precisely 
this emphasis on perceiving institutional life as continually changing and forever 
evolving contingently that marks the character of process thought as pertinent to our 
discussion here. Legal institutional phenomena are not considered as entities, 
bounded states, but as unfolding processes, happenings, events in which decision 
makers make choices from out of the various alternatives presented to them, 
choosing to actualize certain potentialities and not others, and where the further 
potential choices and possibilities for actualization depend on those previous choices 
made for the range of new possibilities open to choose from.  Legal decisions are 
unfolding processes, in which judges interact with unavoidably local conditions 
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through recourse to rules, etc. What, from an external observation point, seems like 
decision making controlled by legal rules and other norms is, in fact, experienced 
internally as a subtle yet dynamic succession of finely tuned actions and interactions 
in a continuously evolving realization of what is really happening and being made to 
happen. That is to say, legal institutions do not exist or operate independently of the 
human actions and decisions that constitute their working out, but in and through 
them. We might also say that legal rules and legally relevant facts, universals and 
particulars, operative facts and evidentiary facts, and so on, do not exist prior to and 
thus determine the existence of the decision making event; rather, they appear as a a 





On this understanding, legal institutions are indeed sites of human activity 
and decision: institutional actors draw upon the structure and framework of 
interrelated legal institutional categories that function to make their behaviour 
predictable but, in so far as it is within and upon inescapably local concrete 
conditions that their activities of reflecting upon these and seeking to adapt and apply 
them takes place, such categories are always unavoidably altering and modifying. Of 
course, this may be minimal, in the sense of dealing with decisions where the 
question of rule-application is obvious, not in the least bit complicated or 
problematic, but it may also be maximal, where such certainties do not hold. 
Nonetheless, every time that a legal institutional actor acts imaginatively to extend 
the circumference of application of a rule or institutional category significant change 
occurs. This is really only another way of saying that change is immanent in legal 
institutions through the inescapable interaction of institutional actors with their 
environment, in the accumulation of new experiences. Such actors are inherently 
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reflexive: they are forever drawing new distinctions, creating fresh and lively 
metaphors, making new connections. There is no escaping this: the world around a 
judge is not closed off from the potential for new experience and every action and 
interaction with it and in it is pregnant with creative potential. New meanings, new 
actions, new decisions, all create a constant need and increasing momentum for 
creating and recreating, weaving and interweaving webs of beliefs and habits and 
attitudes. 
 
Certainly, throughout, our use of conceptual abstractions from concrete 
reality is unavoidable. We could not navigate our way around or begin to act 
coherently within the world of everyday living without recourse to these useful and 
necessary aids. How could I possibly eat my breakfast if I did not first accept that at 
some level of analysis that yellowy-white object that I call an egg has some sort of 
objective existence. But all that this really implies is that not only is change 
immanent in institutions, but it is also pushed along by them; in other words, it is 
institutional change. For instance, in MacCormick’s understanding of the dual 
meaning of institution: law as an institution in a social sense is the locus of forever 
evolving human actions and interactions; institutions of law in the philosophical 
sense are ways of creating meaning through the patterns of repeated, reiterated 
human behaviour, decisions and action. So the use of the term institution can be used 
in respect of law to encompass both the input and the outcome of human action. In 
one sense, it is the conceptual tool, the structure and framework of thinking, for 
human action, while, in another sense, in terms of pattern, it is generated by it. What 
MacCormick shows us is how law operates both as an institution(s) to enable us to 
observe change and an institutionalizing activity in which we actively work to make 
and discover meaning out of the otherwise continuous and somewhat chaotic flow 
and flux of life, and in all of this judges to some extent have to ‘make do’ or 
improvise in the activity of judicial decision making.  
 
In a sense, this is what the common law doctrines of ratio decidendi and 
precedent are all about. Judges, in making legal determinations, must attempt to 
negotiate the tensions inherent in the activity of legal decision making by 
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accommodating, adapting and altering legal understandings both in response to past 
and in view of future accommodations, adaptations, and alterations. The inevitable 
‘gap’ that then appears to open up between our use of abstract generalizations and 
the concrete facts of individual cases that we seek to relate these to simply reinforces 
this view that judges must improvise as they reflect on their own understandings and 
those of their fellow judges. However, the point is that this description is not a 
description of the exceptional case, the occasional irksome departure from an 
otherwise stable system; rather, it is the norm. In this sense, change is not an 
imposition on an otherwise fixed and constant state of affairs, but it takes place all 
the time that judges and others in legal institutions do what they are trained and paid 
to do, applying the law as legal professionals in concrete settings. Moreover, none of 
this should be taken to suggest that because of law’s inherent indeterminacy, it is 
somehow bound to be incoherent. Indeed, quite the opposite, since all of this activity 
concerning the interrelating of one’s thoughts, decisions and actions with those of 
others produces, from concrete situations, precisely those patterns that interrelate 
over time to bring about an emergent institutionalization. 
 
Of course, law as a system must respond to changes in its external 
environment. But how law responds is a complex, evolving, many textured affair 
determined internally by law itself, by its own historically created self-
understandings. If there is a significant question to be posed here perhaps it should be 
set in terms of how it is that particular aspects of law’s self–understandings are made 
to seem relevant in particular and changing contexts over time. For example, changes 
in society put pressure on legal decision makers’ legal understandings in order to 
improve the response of the legal system to the problems and social pressures that 
arise. Societal changes may lead to calls for a better determination of criminal law 
and its many applications and enforcements through the criminal justice system, but, 
if anything, it is the legal decision maker’s understanding and appreciation of societal 
changes that will in the end influence her response.  
 
So, to reiterate, each new decision changes law and, as legal decision makers 
act later, they do so in the wake of previous decisions. In turn, this must also generate 
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different understandings of the possibilities of legal decision making, different 
opportunities for imagining newer possibilities not previously intimated. In other 
words, when viewed from an external position, the changes represented by new legal 
decisions may seem like discrete, simply locatable closed or bounded episodes that 
effect a technical shift from one stable position to another, but, seen from inside the 
decision making process, they will be experienced more in terms of the ongoing flow 
of creative potential, choices arising in and through opportunities for decision 
making that could not have been predicted or anticipated before. Decisions, once 
made, may yet have to be presented as based on legal principles, but each relatively 
discrete legal decision, taken in respect of its own concrete historical circumstances, 
all unrepeatable in time, must to some extent alter, adapt or modify those legal 
principles. To put it another way, the decision in Re A, despite Lord Justice Ward’s 
insistence on its ‘very unique’ character, effects change in the legal situation: it 
expands the criteria merely by being there. 
 
What all of this amounts to is different ways of making the same point: 
change is not something external to law, imposed on it from the outside. Change is 
ongoing, in law as in all else, a fundamental feature law. Levi has showed through a 
number of case histories (referred to earlier) how a momentum for change can 
gradually build up and increase to be continually modified and adapted by those 
involved in the decision-making process. Not all of the opportunities for decision that 
opened up could have been anticipated or foreseen, but unfolded gradually, some 
triggering others and opening up new discursive contexts that would then allow 
them. Where legislative enactments are made to work in local concrete situations, 
there is always some adaptation, alteration or modification, some improvisation by 
the human agent as decision maker, whether this occurs by way of inclusion or 
exclusion as the terms and categories of law are imaginatively considered and 
extended and put into effect. 
 
So change in law should not to be understood merely in terms of deliberate, 
measured change; that is only a small part of the whole situation, at least under the 
argument being put forward here. Changes in law as an institution and in its legal 
 261 
 
institutions occur all the time. There is no need to posit an intentional actor, a 
calculating, purposeful author of change, in order to account for legal change. Such 
changes as might arise in this way occur only on the back of, and because of, law’s 
always-already changing nature. But without a recognition of this fundamental 
character of change at the heart of reality as undergirding, overarching and 
permeating law we will be unable to appreciate law’s underlying processual nature. It 
is only because law is, at root, one expression of an otherwise ongoing activity in 
which individuals are forever trying to make sense of new experiences and to 
actualize new possibilities that we are able to appreciate how the more obvious 
aspects of planned change also come about. 
 
What is the role of judicial discretion and a judge’s deliberation in all of this? 
It should go without saying that judges must be able to see clearly what is transpiring 
in the facts of the case before them and be able to discover and identify among these 
the coherent and legally sustainable pattern of persons, events and circumstances that 
accommodates and reflects what is going on. Significant changes in law often take 
place when a judge or judges consider the circumstances of the case before them and, 
holding these together with their own experiences of similar cases, effect an 
intervention in law by agreeing to distinguish the present case on particular grounds. 
In such cases, these locally significant facts become amplified in terms of their legal 
significance and their specific differences become institutionalised depending on the 
structural context envisaged by the judges. Seen from this perspective, as it were 
from the inside, judges must be attentive to the nuances of the discursive context 
appropriate to their deliberations; that is, they must keep in mind how certain legal 
codes have been shaped historically and how these codes and the practices associated 
with them have developed and changed over time as a result both of others’ and of 
their own thinking and decisions. In other words, in terms of our previous discussion, 
judges need to acquire the skills relevant to attuning their thoughts to recognize those 
subtle legally specific differences and sensitive nuances. 
 
Thus, we can see then how change in law or, more correctly, deliberate 
change in law may come about not so much by the realization of a conscious desire 
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and plan to effect particular change(s) but as the subtle introduction of new ways of 
thinking or understanding. Such new ways of talking are, effectively, new forms of 
legal interpretation; in short, a new language, a new discursive context. We can see 
something similar happening as a result of the new methods of quality assessment in 
higher education. Here new ways of assessing and recording allow some but not 
others of the methods, practices and goals of teaching already in place to be 
amplified. In this way, they work to reinforce certain interpretative codes that in turn 
will be more likely to allow other novels ways and aims to be more easily and subtly 
introduced and to become established. In this way, recursively, over time, a whole 
new system can be created, almost imperceptibly. Here, again, this is not so much 
about introducing wholesale change as an interruption to an otherwise stable system; 
really, it is more about recognizing the underlying processual nature of reality and 
discovering the already-existing ongoing changes. In this way, a changing of the 
terms of the discussion or debate, even altering the accepted meanings of the same 
terms, will eventually create a new context of discussion.  
 
What all of this suggests is the constant need to be aware of the resources that 
decision makers require to be able to interpret and reinterpret their own experiences 
and of the availability of a common language to enable them to interrelate their 
decisions. In this sense, change in law is not simply something imposed on from 
without, as legislative response to growing political unease or social disquiet, but 
something effected through the locally significant acts and responses of judicial 
decision making. Nor is this simply to understand the power of judges to effect 
change in law as limited to the exercise of some technical device akin to the 
declaratory power of the High Court in Scots Law, its institutional power to 
authorize and thereby effect ‘a change in the world by representing it as having been 
changed’.
663
 This sense of ‘declaring’ change is precisely the reason why the 
catchphrase ‘You’re fired!’ in the current popular television series The Apprentice 
has become so captivating for contemporary audiences. By the simple utterance of 
these words the new state of affairs that they describe is brought about. Likewise, 
judges’ powers to make and deliver decisions in law are powers to permit fresh 
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observations from everyday reality, to draw new distinctions and to see new relations 
and interrelations, to compel others to restructure their systems of thought, and to re- 
pattern or re-weave their webs of belief, habit and action. However, from the 
perspective of the underlying processual nature of reality, and already ongoing 
change, these so-called ‘declaratory powers’ are merely institutional interruptions:  
they may indeed introduce new ways of thinking and speaking and understanding 
and provide revised templates for judicial decision making, but it is the local 
circumstance of actual decision making situations, real cases whose outcomes must 
be decided under the pressures of time and lack of resources, that will ultimately 
provide the authentic basis for understanding change, being the places where these 
new codes and interpretations are further interpreted and re-interpreted according to 
the local concrete circumstances of the cases they are made to address and brought to 
bear upon. 
 
As far as the argument being advanced here is concerned, we might conclude 
that a major part of the legal theoretical task must include a sense in which legal 
theorists should give a theoretical priority to the natural, incremental, and relentless 
aspects of microscopic change that produce change by adaptation, variation, 
unexpected and unforeseen opportunity.
664
 Why? Well, not least because such 
change reflects the actual becoming of things, the underlying nature of reality. This, 
then, is what it might mean to observe change from within: to look at the different 
ways in which all institutional actors (including but not only judges) modify, alter 
and adapt their webs of habit, thought and acting in response to new experiences in 
new situations and the many different ways in which decision makers can be said to 
influence and thus interrupt the otherwise ongoing flow of institutional activity. 
Making sense of the process of the institutional becoming of law must inevitably 
mean a bringing together of several dynamics of the experience of legal decision 
making that have hitherto been considered separate; that is, not just the legal but the 
political, the ethical, the cultural, and other dimensions, too. 
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LAW AS PROCESS; LEGAL DECISION MAKING AS AN ACTUAL 




We have seen how, for Whitehead, an actual occasion is a whole, undivided occasion 
of experience that ‘becomes’ immediately in a quantum of time but which, for the 
purposes of analysis may be distinguished into several logically successive and 
mutually related phases of its concrescence.   In its initial receptive phase, the present 
occasion of experience comprises a double inheritance from the past, which 
Whitehead terms the ‘conformation of feeling’.   But each moment of human 
subjective experience not only involves a reception of data from the immediate past; 
it also involves some personal response to what is inherited.   And while no control 
can be exercised over what is received, how it is responded to will involve some 
measure of choice.   The responsive and integrative phases of the process of 
concrescence are where the personal decision about this reaction is formed.   While 
no restatement of the previous summary description of Whitehead’s philosophical 
scheme will be presented here, the earlier definitional discussion of nomenclature 
should be assumed throughout the following analysis.   At this point, then, we may 
attempt some preliminary integration of Law and Process.  
 
The sum total of Whitehead’s contribution to thinking about law amounts to 
no more than a few brief comments on common law, legal systems, legal 
determinations, legal organizations, legal agencies, and legal contracts,
665
 and to one 
slightly longer passage on the foundations of property and contract law.
666
   
However, this lack of a sustained treatment of the subject of law may be due rather 
more to the unavailability of any systematic, or sufficiently detailed, theory of law 
which it could address than to the inapplicability of his philosophy to law as such.   
Indeed, absent such a theory, it is difficult to see how Whitehead himself could 
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possibly have provided, with respect to law, the sort of analysis that, for example, he 
does in his treatment of the intellectual, scientific, religious, economic and political 
history of Western civilization,
667
 and that might, in turn, have presented the 
evidence for, and confirmed, his doctrine of the self-creativity of actual entities and 
his metaphysical system.   Nevertheless, recent developments from a variety of 
theoretical perspectives, particularly those that can be represented collectively under 
the banner of an ‘institutional theory’ of law, appear to adopt precisely the sort of 
common strategy that, given their shared emphasis on the nature of law as a 
normative institution combining norms affecting general conduct with those 
providing authorization to officials, may now allow that hitherto unavailable form of 
access into the internal apparatus and dynamics of society’s most potent and most 
powerful forces.  
 
In what follows, I aim, first, to recall my earlier discussion of the institutional 
theory of law as propounded by Neil MacCormick, noting how this fully worked out 
institutional theory of law defines and deploys its basic unit of explanation, ‘the 
institutional fact’: second, with recourse to a mainly Whiteheadian process 
theoretical model, to provide a theoretical description of the institutional theory of 
law and its practical application in terms of the meaning structure of process thought 
and, in so doing, to explore more fully how a legal decision is created and maintained 
within the legal decision-making process; and, third, by this means, to extend the 
application and thereby broaden the appeal of process thought beyond its existing 
boundaries.   This will, hopefully, pave the way for a more extensive discussion, 
which will follow. 
 
Integrating Law within a Philosophy of Process 
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civilizations, religious institutions, and scientific paradigms is a powerful macroscopic confirmation 
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The discussion presented earlier
668
 outlines MacCormick’s theory of the 
development of institutional normative order and its relation to the common law 
system of judicial decision-making through its interaction with a theory of legal 
reasoning that stresses ‘the significance of the justifying relationship between reason 
and decision’. However, although this institutional theory of law highlights the 
importance of understanding the temporal development of law as normative in a way 
that affirms its dual aspects as momentary and dynamic, and of seeing this as 
evolving in and through a decision-making process which ‘in no way entail[s] a 
denial that particular reasons must always exist for particular decisions’ but which 
‘presents universalization as essential to justification within practical reasoning’,
669
 
no attempt has yet been made to relate this institutional theory of law to any wider 
theory of process (Whiteheadian or other) or, indeed, to suggest whether or not this 
might be possible.   
 
This chapter argues that not only is such integration possible, it is also 
desirable and necessary. In order to comprehend more fully the deeper complexities 
of the process under consideration, to increase our awareness of the likely 
constitution and structure of the judicial decision-making experience, a more detailed 
analysis of the interaction of the different types and levels of influence will be 
attempted. This analysis will present an outline of the basic elements of process 
described by Whitehead himself and use these to explore the way in which a discrete 
instance of legal judgement is created and maintained within the decision-making 
process.     
 
In ‘Trust as Process’,
670
 Mark Dibben suggests that: 
 
 ‘[t]he accuracy of a theory of process to trust development depends, 
ultimately, on selection of the appropriate unit of analysis.   Given the 
concrescing actual entity as the central concept, or irreducible unit of 
analysis, in Whitehead’s explication of the process of the development of 
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experiential existence, … integration is made easier by the establishment of 
four simplifying conditions:   
 
(1) a purposeful distinction can be made between an actual entity and 
an actual occasion, whereby (a) the actual occasion is the unit under 
immediate discussion (that which is in the process of becoming) and 
(b) the actual entity is the unit which is formed, ‘is immortal in the 
past’, and which the actual occasion prehends in its coming into 
existence; 
 
(2) following from the first condition, that the appropriate units of 
analysis for the actual occasions in concrescence are selected; 
 
(3) the appropriate actual entities affecting the concrescences are 
identified and discussed and; 
 




Assuming Dibben’s ‘simplifying conditions’, it should now be possible to outline a 
proposal for how this model might usefully be employed in law (how the legal 
system might legitimately be understood as a society of societies of actual occasions 
and how the various phases of the theory of concrescence of an actual entity might be 
seen to map on to the different phases of the process of judicial decision-making) and 
submitted for confirmation/refutation by a more extensive study of legal decision-
making and the decision-making process.    
 
 If the attempt to integrate law within a theory of process can be understood as 
an attempt to explore how a legal decision is created and maintained within the 
decision-making system, then the accuracy of applying a theory of process to law 
will, as intimated above, depend on the selection of appropriate units of analysis: 
identifying the levels of actual occasions and actual entities that can be isolated for 
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analysis and the enduring traits or forms that can be termed eternal objects. That a 
legal decision can be understood in this way, as an actual occasion of experience 
affected in its concrescence by a set of actual entities, really follows from what has 
already been said regarding types of knowledge and complex occasions of 
experience, made possible through the adoption of a process terminology and a 
processual meaning structure. The persistence, regularity and significance of legal 
decisions across the legal system may then be seen to arise from the creative impulse 
which determines that an actual occasion in the process of concrescence will, in 
passing from subject to object, immediately become part of the world of entities 
affecting future concrescing occasions. That is, law’s creativity arises from the 
continuing creativity of new legal decisions.    
 
Following Dibben, we can attempt an integration of a theory of legal 
reasoning based on MacCormick’s institutional theory of law with a process-
theoretical model derived mainly from Whitehead’s Philosophy of Organism in the 
following way.   We can isolate for the purpose of analysis: 
 
 a. the following levels of actual occasion: 
  
(i) the current quantum moment of the decision-making process 
upon which situational cues will act to modify expression;  
(ii) confirming/conflicting behaviour towards a decision 
(universalising/consequences); 
(iii) confirming/conflicting action towards decision 
(coherence/consistency);  
(iv) the formed (justified) decision. 
 
b. the following four levels of actual entity: 
 
(i)  previous decisions, including the previous moment of decision 
in the immediately prior occasion, combining to form a set (S) to 
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affect the concrescence of the actual occasion that is the quantum 
under discussion; 
(ii)  criteria for decision making as separate actual entities 
combining to form a set (C) which, along with the actual occasion of 
level (i), now a complex actual entity, affect the concrescence of the 
actual occasion that is the confirming/conflicting (consequential 
balancing) behaviour of each of the universalised features under 
discussion;  
(iii)  the actual occasions of level (ii) now each a set of actual 
entities which are the cooperative behaviours which combine to affect 
the concrescence of the actual occasion that is the coherent/consistent 
action that takes place among the rules 
(iv)  the set of actual entities that are the situational judgements (J) 
which combine to affect the concrescence of the actual occasion that 
is the altering justified decision of the judge. 
 
c. enduring and eternal objects 
justified decisions and precedent, rules, principles and values, may be 
identified as enduring objects due to their semi-permanent nature 
dispositional aspects associated with habitus are identified as simple 
eternal objects or universals being both transtemporal
672
 and 
‘unanalysable into a relationship of component eternal objects’.
673
   
This affects the level (i) actual occasion, where such eternal objects 
are prehended by the actual occasion in the absence of the enduring 




This attempt to integrate the institutional theory of law and its associated method of 
legal reasoning within a processual understanding is made in order to explore how a 
discrete instance of legal judgement is created and maintained throughout the legal 
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decision-making process. The purpose of this section is to explore how a legal 
decision might arise and how it might be maintained throughout the period of its 
concrescence. To do this, we rely partly on Whitehead and partly on the conclusion 
reached previously that law is a form of tacit knowledge ‘invoked’ in order to 
overcome a lack of explicit knowledge about a situation. That law may be considered 
to be a type of knowledge in these terms is confirmed by Whitehead:  
 
‘[knowledge is] conscious discrimination of objects experienced … derived 




We have already noted that conscious perception may be understood in terms 
of ‘affirmative judgements’
675
 that arise in some circumstances in relation to 
‘propositional feelings’
676
 (an actual entity which makes ‘incomplete abstraction 
from determinate actual entities’
677
). Here, ‘the entertainment the mind gives … is 
called a belief … admitting or receiving … any proposition for true, upon arguments 
or proofs that are found to persuade us to receive it as true, without [explicit] 
knowledge that it is so’.
678
 This is the general ‘rule’ of process that allows us to 
understand and accept law in terms of the positive expectations that an individual 
holds towards another’s motives and acts in a situation entailing risk and which thus 
allows some general prediction to be made of it regarding both its capacity for 
endurance (consequential rules) and its decline (terminative rules). However, 
Whitehead insists that the ‘triumph of consciousness comes with the negative 
intuitive judgement … produced by the definite exclusiveness of what is really 
present’.
679
 Here, the lack of explicit knowledge and the feeling of absence which 
cannot be addressed lead to the need for law. In this sense, there is a double deficit 
with regard to law, both in terms of explicit knowledge and of the implicit 
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knowledge required as a result of this. This double deficiency is experienced by the 




 In this sense, the making of a legal decision is properly a type of knowledge, 
a complex occasion of experience whose concrescence is affected by a set of actual 
entities (set S). The justification of this legal decision (its determination as a ruling 
for this case) is the actual occasion in concrescence emerging from the conscious 
integration of the situational decision (complex actual entity) with the dispositional 
threshold that is the result of a simplifying abstraction of individual prehensions of 
another set of actual entites (set C). We can now attempt to unpack these processes in 
more detail. 
 
A Process-theoretical Description of the Development of Legal Decision 
Making and Legal Rules 
 
We can explicate the creation of a discrete instance of legal judgement (ie. a level (i) 
actual occasion) in a judge’s mind, its continuity over time throughout the period of 
the decision-making process, and the development of coherence and consistency 
thresholds (level (ii) actual occasions), by following Dibben’s lead with a substantial 
paraphrasing of Whitehead’s own description and illustration of the three phases of 
the process of concrescence of an actual occasion.
681
 For example, let us suppose that 
a judge, J, is presently involved in the process of decision making with respect to the 
facts of a case, K. According to normal usage, we might say that she has come to 
(intuited) her decision and now she must justify it. But how does she come to her 
decision, how does she know that it is valid and how can she be sure that her 
subsequent accounting for it will actually correspond to her intuited decision? This is 
really another way of asking how she knows that she has been making this decision 
in that way throughout. How is it accounted for in her experience now? In one sense, 
the answer is obvious, she remembers. But since it is really memory that is at issue 
here, then this statement explains very little. Whitehead’s answer is that the judge 
experiences it now with the same subjective form of experiencing that she felt a 
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fraction of a second ago. This is the first phase in the immediacy of the new 
concrescing occasion, concerned solely with physical prehensions. 
 
Whitehead, as we noted earlier, uses ‘feeling’ as a way of describing this 
‘basic generic operation of passing from the objectivity of the data to the subjectivity 
of the actual entity in question’; that is, the ‘variously specialized operations’ that 
effect its ‘transition into subjectivity’.
682
 In other words, the ‘feeling’ our judge 
enjoyed in her past moment of decision making is present in her new moment of 
decision making as a datum felt, with a subjective form conformal to the datum. So, 
if A is the past occasion, and E is the datum felt by A with a subjective form 
describable as A deciding, then this feeling is felt initially by the new occasion B 
with the same subjective form of deciding. The feeling enjoyed in the new occasion 
in this initial phase of concrescence is thus grounded in the experience of causal 
efficacy; that is, it arises from the data themselves as the past is inherited by the 
present, rather than as subjective notions read into, or imposed upon, the data of 
experience. The experienced decision (which MacCormick represents in terms of 
these evidentiary facts being deemed instances of those operative facts such that 
certain normative consequences then follow) is continuous throughout the successive 
occasions of experience within the same decision-making situation. In so far as this 
feeling is a conscious one, J enjoys a subjective perception
683
 of the past emotion 
towards K as both ‘belonging to the past, and … continued in the present’.
684
    
 
In the event of J hearing a new case involving either a recognized context 
with unforeseen facts or an unrecognized context with foreseen facts then the 
enduring object which is this decision of J takes the place of the past occasion A; 
equally, where both the context and the facts are new and unforeseen then the 
relevant eternal object takes the place of the past occasion A. In the case of the 
conformation of a settled decision of J, the process is the same, with the descriptors 
A, B and E varying accordingly. Thus, the first phase is concerned solely with the 
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conformation of feeling in respect of the actual entity (now datum D) that was the 
past actual occasion A. 
 
 The influence of K occurs in the second, intermediate phase, when 
unpredictable or uncharacteristic behaviour by K may give rise to the prehension of 
variations in the situational prompts and so introduce a novel content of positive 
conceptual prehensions which affect the concrescence of the new actual occasion B:  
 
‘Th[is] intermediate phase … is a ferment of qualitative valuation … 
[C]onceptual feelings pass into novel relations to each other, felt with a novel 




In this way, each of the level (i) actual entities (x situational prompts) is understood 
as an objective datum F(x) felt by A, bringing about B’s concrescence. 
 
 So, again, if A is the past occasion of decision making (now the actual entity, 
datum D), and F is the different datum felt by A with subjective form describable as 
A deciding, then this feeling is, to begin with, felt by the new actual occasion B with 
a different subjective form of deciding; namely, as correlative to K.   That is, it is the 
subjective form in A, of J, that feels and transforms F to concresce as the new 
decision-making moment B of J with respect to K. 
 
 Clearly, this new decision is also continuous throughout successive occasions 
of experience within the decision-making situation; that is, J continuously embodies 
the immediate past decision as a datum in the present and, absent the introduction of 
yet more novel content via other data, maintains in the present that decision that is a 
datum from the past. However, the level (i) actual entities felt by B may be felt as a 
single prehension, arising from the set of actual entities (Set S) and taken into 
account as the objective datum F, through ‘[t]he transference of the characteristic 
from the individuals to the group as one … [whereby t]he qualities shared by many 
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individuals are fused into one dominating impression’.
686
 Again, inasmuch as this 
novel feeling of decision is a conscious one, judge J now enjoys a subjective 
perception of the emotion affected by past emotions (the objective data F(x)/F) 
toward K. In relation to the concrescence of a new level (iv) actual occasion, or 
justified decision, the introduction of novel content would be through the level (iv) 
set of actual entities (Set T) that are the past moments of decision. 
 
 The final phase in the concrescence of the new actual occasion B is that of 
anticipation, in respect to the necessities it lays on the future to embody it in the 
concrescence of future actual occasions: 
 
‘Thus the self-enjoyment of an occasion of experience is initiated by an 
enjoyment of the past as alive in itself and is terminated by an enjoyment of 
itself as alive in the future’.
687
   
 
Thus, if D is the future actual occasion that is the decision of J with regard to K, this 
is affected by the prehension of what is now the level (ii) complex actual entity B’ 
(from the previous level (i) actual occasion B) along with the set of actual entities C 
as a limiting condition for application. This limiting condition is a dominating 
impression arising from the intuitive blending of a number of the characteristics of 
individual members of the set of actual entities (set C) detailed above, though there is 
no necessary relation between the limiting condition and the complex actual entity B’ 
since they are contemporaries.
688
 Nonetheless, they are indirectly related, in that they 
‘originate from a common past and their objective immortality operates within a 
common future’.
689
 The valuation of subjective forms yields both the limiting 
condition and the type of decision that, depending on their values, affect the 
concrescence of the level (ii) actual occasion as either a rule-determining or non rule-
determining applied decision of J in respect to K. Significantly, this whole process of 
the concrescence of consequent and contemporary actual occasions will occur on the 
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part of K also, so that the level (iii) actual occasion is the action resulting from the 
combination of J’s behaviour towards K and K’s behaviour towards J.  
 
For Whitehead, to be an actual entity is to be a self-created, fully formed, 
fully definite, fully determinate, entity with nothing left unresolved.   From the whole 
mass of possible determinations, each actual occasion decides what it will become: 
actualizing some potentials and excluding or rejecting others, and thus taking up 
some position in relation to everything, both ideal and actual.   It is, by virtue of its 
decision, a new fact in the world, ‘externally free’,
690
 but limited in its freedom by 
past achievement and limiting by its conditioning of future process.   In other words, 
it is a decision that arises out of previous decisions and provokes future decisions.   




Clearly, the concrescence of an actual occasion in the actual world is limited 
by the factor of order, the limited possibilities available for synthesis in the data 
settled and given for it by its antecedent world. In simple terms, one can only create 
the future out of present circumstances. But order is not the same as mere givenness. 
The actual world given to an actual occasion for its concrescence also contains 
elements of disorder. So while the latter certainly gives rise to a satisfaction, it is the 
former that promotes different levels of intensity in satisfactions relative to the initial 
objective data. That is, it is through the balance of contrasts, the creative synthesis of 
conflicting elements in an aesthetic unity, that intensity of satisfaction, and thus 
value, is achieved.
692
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I began this thesis with recollections from personal experience in order to illustrate 
the type of difficulties I consider to be involved in any notion of a straightforward 
application of legal rules to particular facts, events and circumstances. Having 
defined the problem in terms of the articulation of the relationship between 
universals and particulars in legal decision making I undertook an examination of the 
difficult case of the conjoined twins, Mary and Jodie. In attempting to address the 
situation before it by means of abstract legal representations of those events, law is 
found to encourage a dualism that results in a shortfall between lived experience and 
that which can be accounted for by legal representation. The result is an obscuring 
from view of otherwise relevant information, producing a deficit that is, effectively, a 
silencing of voices. In this way, and under its compulsion to reach a decision, law is 
seen to commit an act of ‘violence’ on the free flow and expression of opinions and 
arguments. This critical shortfall appears difficult to calculate and impossible to 
remedy, attempts to provide justifying reasons for legal decisions forever stumbling 
on the question of time. It seemed like an impossible passage, an unbridgeable gap. 
 
Considering how a number of different theorists attempt to deal with this 
problem, I suggested that the seeming impossibility of finding a way of bridging this 
gap that opens up between theory and practice, rule-determination and rule-
application, is in fact symptomatic of a far deeper, underlying problem; that is, while 
much of contemporary legal theory appears as the expression of a continuing concern 
to ‘connect’ legal research with actual judicial decision making, this effort is 
misplaced. Instead, although legal theory and legal practice are often considered as if 
they were two separate but connectable areas, I have argued that an alternative 
understanding based on the notion of a mutually constitutive process of becoming 
provides a more adequate and correct way of interpreting the interpenetrating and 
interrelating aspects of this relationship.  
 
This alternative approach was traced through the tradition of process thought, 
in philosophers such as Whitehead, Bergson, Deleuze and Polanyi. Taken together, 
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their complementary insights were found to offer precisely the sort of alternative 
approach by way of which such a reconfiguration of the problem can be effected and 
a reconstruction of legal decision making begun. Informed by attempts from within 
the field of organization studies to engage in a similar way, I outlined a way of 
approaching legal decision making based on Bergson’s notion of ‘creative 
evolution’. I tested this approach using Levi’s understanding of the process of legal 
reasoning, in which he portrays it as proceeding on the basis of a pattern of extending 
examples. Levi’s analysis, and his outlining of the mechanism that drives legal 
decision making lends itself well to a process interpretation when taken together with 
Deleuze and Guattari’s metaphor of rhizomic communication. 
 
Having outlined the mutually constitutive nature of the relation between 
institutions and practices in terms of formal legal contexts I focussed on the role of 
the judge as institutional actor and decision maker. Employing Tsoukas’s analysis of 
the links between individual knowledge, organizational knowledge and human action 
undertaken within organized contexts, I was able to demonstrate how, while the 
propositional structure of legal knowledge is fully realized within formal legal 
contexts in terms of institutions, legal knowledge in terms of practices (that is, as 
shared traditions in and out of which legal practitioners work), exhibits a narrative 
structure. In this latter sense, informed by Polanyi’s notion of tacit knowledge, it was 
possible to demonstrate how legal knowledge is essentially unspecifiable, maintained 
by anecdote, story and example. Attempts to harness a narrative approach within law 
can thus be understood to suggest a way of reconceptualizing what is involved in the 
task of legal decision making as a skill that judges use, a tool to enable them to get at 
the essential features of the situations before them and of which they are neceassarily 
a part in their role as decision maker. I explored this further through ideas associated 
with chaos theory and complexity. 
 
All of this was brought together to suggest an alternative understanding of 
law: law’s institutional becoming, the becoming of law in institutions. Finally, 
having negotiated a way through all of this, and with the aid of the process-
theoretical approaches mentioned above, I attempted a necessary integration of law 
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and process thought, integrating MacCormick’s institutional theory of law, referred 
to continuously throughout the argument, within Whitehead’s scheme of 
metaphysical principles, relating his theory of legal reasoning to Whitehead’s 
analysis of the process of concrescence.  
 
Thus, it is now possible to give a presentation of the thesis in thoroughly 
Whiteheadian terms: law as process; legal reasoning as an actual occasion in 
concrescence. In doing so, I believe I have provided a way of introducing a much-
neglected and hitherto relatively unexplored (at least within law) philosophical 
approach within one of the most complex social processes associated with modern 
living. Now, in turn, this should potentially open up numerous opportunities for 
further exploring and meaningfully unpacking many more of the otherwise hidden 
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